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This volume contains three edited lectures originally 
delivered in 2016 by Heather Douglas. Each is followed 
by two commentaries that illustrate a depth of critical dis-
course welcome not only for scholars, but also for practi-
tioners whose work is at the interface of the many 
domains explored in this book. That Heather Douglas has 
given lectures in a series named for René Descartes seems 
highly appropriate. After all, Descartes has for centuries 
influenced Western thinking about values and empiri-
cism. Douglas herself has influenced much current think-
ing about the practical nature of the interface between 
science and values. These nine well-linked contributions 
will be of essential value not only to scholars of the phi-
losophy of science, but also to practitioners at the inter-
faces between science and policy and science and society. 
Science should not be defined as a form of truth, but 
rather as a set of processes for the making and testing of 
empirical knowledge claims in an ongoing and cumula-
tive way. Done well, it is communal, self-reflexive, and, 
thus, self-correcting. The issue that emerges in the context 
of science’s interface with democracy has to do with its 
claim of general epistemic authority. More specifically: 
On what basis is such authority earned or granted? As 
this volume discusses, such authority can only exist when 
well supported by values, principles, and behaviors of 
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scientists and the scientific community. But how the pol-
icy community, political actors, and society then act is in-
extricably intertwined with the community of science. It 
is complex, messy, and evolving. But a greater under-
standing of these interfaces is essential if democracy is to 
thrive, and if science is to play its essential role in address-
ing the challenges of sustainability, resilience, and human 
development. 
Although there are many scholars who have interro-
gated the intersections of science with society, policymak-
ing, and politics, too many of those insights have stayed 
buried within the confines of specific scholarly disci-
plines. Seldom can this work claim any obvious impact 
on the actual conduct of science or science advising or sci-
ence communication. Even post-normal science (what Ar-
thur Petersen would rebrand as “extra-normal” science in 
this volume), which seeks to describe and explore the 
boundaries from an experiential perspective, has had lit-
tle traction within the relevant communities. Douglas, 
however, makes a strong case that for science and democ-
racy to serve each other well, an understanding of the 
place of values and principles must be well embedded 
within the practitioner. In these lectures, as in her previ-
ous book, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, she 
makes this argument cogently. Understanding when val-
ues are appropriately embedded within science and when 
not—and appreciating that the use of science is always a 
values-based choice—is key to ensuring that science ap-
propriately supports democracy. 
The questions addressed in these nine contributions 
encompass issues of immense importance, issues which 
COVID-19 has brought to the fore. How should we un-
derstand the interdependence between science and de-
mocracy? What are the responsibilities of scientists when 
they function as experts in society? How should the ten-




transparency operate against the need for decision mak-
ers to have trusted relationships with experts? How, in an 
age of misinformation, should skepticism and denial be 
addressed? How can we enhance literacy about the pro-
cesses that shape and define science? 
The discussion could be further advanced by explor-
ing the two distinct components of science advising to 
policymakers: evidence synthesis, given the plurality of in-
puts and perspectives that Douglas has already pointed 
out are necessary; and evidence brokerage, which is the 
careful and appropriate transfer of the knowledge from 
that synthesis to the policy and political process and to 
the public. These are distinct undertakings, often involv-
ing different actors and very different theoretical and 
practical considerations. Unless this distinction is made 
clear, the questions of accountability and transparency 
become difficult to parse. My concern is simply that the 
discussion these papers have initiated is not yet complete 
and hopefully this will be an area for further reflection.  
Each of the chapters, both the lectures by Douglas and 
the commentaries by her interlocutors, opens up issues in 
a very accessible way, but importantly does not close 
them. There is much more to reflect upon and explore, 
particularly if the work is to transcend the theoretical and 
impact the practical, as much of Douglas’ work has al-
ready done. This book is a valuable stimulus for scholars 
and practitioners alike. In the age of COVID-19, post-
truth politics, and digitally accelerated misinformation, 
the importance of understanding and confronting these 
issues cannot be overstated.  
Sir Peter Gluckman 
President-Elect, International Science Council 
Chair, International Network for Government Science Advice 








WHY SCIENCE, VALUES, AND 
DEMOCRACY? 
Heather Douglas 
Human beings are social creatures. We live together, 
learn together, and love together. This sociality is part of 
the success story of human beings—together, we can ac-
complish things that would be quite impossible individ-
ually. Science is one of the enterprises that requires 
sociality among humans and is one of the things that no 
individual can quite manage on their own. Scientists re-
quire other scientists to collaborate with, to read and dis-
cuss ideas with, even to compete with. Without other 
scientists, there would only be individual investigation, a 
dull and idiosyncratic affair without the grit of other 
minds against which to hone ideas. 
Essential to science, at least to science done well, is dis-
cord and disagreement, the willingness to challenge each 
other’s ideas, which makes us work better than we would 
alone. Such disagreement can arise from different experi-
ences, different cultural backgrounds, and different social 
locations. The plurality of voices, rather than unanimity, 
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is part of what makes science such a potent social institu-
tion and effective knowledge production system. 
The plurality of voices needed in science must come 
from somewhere. That science is embedded in society, 
that it is not held fully apart or conceptualized as autono-
mous and isolated from the society in which it functions, 
proves crucial. We live in pluralist societies, with disa-
greements about values and ways of living, with diver-
gent experiences, with local architectures and 
expectations. The plurality that exists in our human soci-
eties is a resource for doing science well. 
But such pluralism is also a source of difficulty for 
governance. That we must collectively govern ourselves 
arises from our very sociality. We cannot each find our 
own patch of wilderness in which to live, like tigers roam-
ing forests, particularly as the world’s population contin-
ues to grow and stretch the earth’s resources. Most of us 
have no desire for such an isolated existence, as much of 
what we find valuable in human endeavors (such as art, 
music, friendship, and science) requires the sociality of 
human existence. But we don’t all agree. So how, in the 
face of the sociality of humanity and the plurality of hu-
mans, can we collectively make decisions on how to live? 
There have been many experiments with different 
forms of government over the past centuries, but democ-
racy has proven to be “the worst form of government, ex-
cept for all those other forms that have been tried,” to 
borrow a quip from Winston Churchill. We are perpetu-
ally frustrated and occasionally horrified by what demo-
cratic governance produces, but no system of government 
is as self-correcting (particularly in the face of the ram-
pant potential for abuse) as democratic systems. Indeed, 
among political theorists, there are few advocates for non-
democratic systems—only debates about which kind of 
democratic system should be pursued1 and, of course, 
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which economic system should accompany democratic 
governance. 
Democracies encompass many different forms, but the 
central characteristic that creates an umbrella over them 
all is an institutional check on those who govern by those 
who are governed. There is an ongoing accountability 
built into the system, so that those who are granted power 
to make decisions on behalf of the citizenry can be peace-
fully recalled from that power, if the governed disagree 
with the direction of the government. This is usually min-
imally in the form of elections, in which citizens vote and 
thus have a definitive say in the governance process. De-
mocracies usually also involve a range of other social 
structures, such as independent judiciaries, freedom of 
the press (to encourage reporting on and public delibera-
tion over the actions of those in power), and public ability 
to openly question those in government. Different coun-
tries and cultures instantiate the required mechanisms, 
which produce public deliberation and recall power dif-
ferently, but in all, the ongoing consent of the governed is 
the central source of legitimate power. 
With this legitimate power, democratic societies create 
binding agreements about how we live. Democratic gov-
ernments can legislate what can and cannot be sold in the 
marketplace, what is and is not going to be supported 
with the public purse, and what laws or regulations will 
bind public behaviors. The ability of democratic govern-
ments to shape so deeply how we live means we cannot 
stop paying attention to what our governments are doing. 
Being in a democracy means an ongoing commitment to 
engaging in the disputes and struggles of the society (not 
all of the time, but at least some of the time), as the per-
petual experiment of democratic governance unfolds. 
In this series of papers, I will not make any ontological 
claims about whether science or democracy has meta-
physical primacy, or that one is foundational or causative 
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of the other. I find such arguments generally suspect. 
Robert Merton argued in 1942 that democracies are al-
ways more conducive to science, but nondemocratic 
states have produced good science.2 More recently, Tim-
othy Ferris has argued that scientific endeavors produced 
democratic states in the eighteenth century.3 But the his-
tory is more complex than in Ferris’s narrative and the 
causal arrow from science to democracy is far from 
straight, as the most robust scientific cultures (e.g., the 
Royal Society in the United Kingdom) were late in com-
ing to democracy.  
Further, recent scholarship provides a much richer ac-
count of the development of democratic forms, discover-
ing far more texture than the usual highlights of Athens 
and the American Revolution.4 Rather than such essen-
tialist stories, all I presume here is the fact that we want 
both science (for the discovery and ongoing testing of em-
pirical knowledge claims) and democracy (for the gov-
ernance of pluralist societies). That we want both is 
enough for getting on with, for it makes clear that we 
need to think carefully about how these two central insti-
tutions—science and democratic government—are to re-
late to each other within our human societies. 
That there is a challenge here at all is clear from the 
differences between science and democratic governance 
in how they decide things. While both science and demo-
cratic governance value deliberation and debate, demo-
cratic governance requires closure of decisions, often 
before consensus is reached. We need to know what the 
socially binding rules of action will be, so that we can get 
on with our lives, and we cannot wait for everyone to 
agree. We often use voting to achieve such closure—for 
example, voting among our elected representatives or 
voting for a referendum or voting for the representatives 
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themselves. The vote is a binding act and, through it, de-
cisions that grip onto the whole of society are made, even 
if in the next legislative round they can be reopened. 
In science, we rarely require such closure, especially 
before consensus is reached organically. To vote to end a 
discussion among scientists about what to think would be 
anathema in science, unless there were pressing external 
reasons to do so. This is part of the luxury of the space of 
inquiry in which science and other academic pursuits ex-
ist, that inquiry can go on indefinitely (resources permit-
ting).5 And when scientists speak in worried tones about 
democratizing science, it is the conflict between science 
and democratic governance with respect to practices that 
lurks in their minds, that somehow science could be re-
duced to voting on results. 
Science, particularly scientific expertise, can also pose 
a threat to democracies. It would be devastating for de-
mocracies if scientific experts were given legislative au-
thority outside of accountability mechanisms, if our 
democracies devolved into technocracies. In addition to 
the need for public officials to be aware of relevant sci-
ence, we need experts to be kept informed by, and in 
touch with, the needs and interests of the public. Ulti-
mately, we need socially binding decisions to remain 
democratically accountable. 
Despite these sources for conflict, there are areas 
where science and democratic governance must interact. 
In areas of science funding (either from the public purse 
or in areas of moral concern), of the use of science in pol-
icy (how science informs democratic decision-making), 
and of the influence of science on society generally (its 
ability to “legislate” our lives through, for example, the 
shifting of public/private boundaries or the creation of 
new capacities), we must sort out how these two central 
aspects of human societies are to interrelate. 
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I will begin my investigation of this question with the 
examination of science and values. The pervasive (and of-
ten legitimate) influence of social and ethical values on 
science creates an avenue through which democratic pol-
itics might productively and legitimately interact with 
science (without devolving to the caricature of voting on 
scientific results). Once I provide an account of values in 
science, I will then turn to an examination of how scien-
tists and elected officials should interact. How should 
those in power and those who investigate the world relate 
to each other? How should we understand the responsi-
bilities and roles for those who would “speak truth to 
power”? Finally, I will turn to the democratic public and 
assess what we need to do to create robust public dis-
course about science, given its pervasive importance for 
both society and governance. 
I originally gave these lectures as the René Descartes 
Lectures in September 2016 at Tilburg University in the 
Netherlands. I am grateful for the invitation from Jan 
Sprenger and Silvia Ivani and for their work organizing 
the event, for those who attended the lectures and the rich 
conference created around them, and to my commenta-
tors for providing such excellent reflections on the mate-
rial. Thanks as well to Joyce Havstad and Ted Richards 
for reading and discussing early drafts with me. Al-
though it has taken four years to finally get the lectures 
ready to publish, I have not substantially altered them, 
and they reflect faithfully what I said in 2016. The world 
has changed in many ways since these were given. We are 
in the midst of a global pandemic, for which scientific ex-
pertise has been absolutely essential, and the success of 
using such expertise can be assessed in weeks or months, 
well within the span of public memory. The disparities of 
the pandemic’s impacts have also been palpably on dis-
play, fueling a long-overdue focus on social justice. Re-
newable energy sources have become cheaper than fossil 
fuels, showing us how policy and infrastructure are now 
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the main impediments to effective action on climate 
change, still looming as a long-term threat. In the pressure 
cooker of these and other crises, the threats to both dem-
ocratic governance and scientific practice have intensi-
fied. I continue to believe we need both science and 
democracy to maintain healthy, pluralist human commu-
nities, and hope these lectures help to that end. 
Notes
1 Political theorists debate the merits of representative de-
mocracy versus direct democracy versus deliberative democ-
racy, as well as when we should use what form. 
2 Robert K. Merton, “Science and Democratic Social Struc-
ture,” in Social Theory and Social Structure (New York, NY: The 
Free Press, 1968), 604.  
3 Timothy Ferris, The Science of Liberty: Democracy, Reason, 
and the Laws of Nature (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publish-
ers, 2010). 
4 Benjamin Isakhan, “The Complex and Contested History 
of Democracy,” in The Edinburgh Companion to the History of De-
mocracy, Benjamin Iskhan and Stephen Stockwell, eds. (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 1.  
5 Scientists do sometimes have to vote on how to distribute 
resources for doing science, as it is a decision that requires 









SCIENCE AND VALUES:  
THE PERVASIVE ENTANGLEMENT 
Heather Douglas 
Since the mid-twentieth century, insulating science 
from social and ethical values has been something of an ob-
session for philosophers of science.1 Philosophers articu-
lated, and then staunchly defended, a value-free ideal for 
science. This ideal did not insulate science completely from 
societal influence. Philosophers were willing to concede the 
“context of discovery” to the influence of values (which, in 
contemporary parlance, includes scientists deciding upon 
research projects and methodologies), but argued that the 
“context of justification” had no place for social values. This 
view was supported by three ideas: 1) that societal values 
can add no confirmatory weight to empirical claims (and 
that to think otherwise is to confuse “ought” claims with 
“is” claims); 2) that values distinctive to scientific theory 
choice could guide scientists when faced with inferential 
decisions (i.e., epistemic or cognitive values); and 3) that 
the authority of science in the public sphere rested on the 
separation and disentanglement of science from social and 
ethical values. This final presumption was bound up with 
hopes for science as a resource in public debates that could 




transcend divergent societal interests—that science could 
be a “value-neutral” resource in our democratic discourse.  
In this lecture, I will argue that there is something to the 
first idea—that there is an important conceptual difference 
between normative and descriptive claims, although in 
practice they are both used to support each other. Yet be-
cause of their logical structures, normative claims cannot 
provide sole support for descriptive claims, and vice versa. 
I will argue that the second idea is crucially incomplete—
that although there are distinctive epistemic values in sci-
ence, they cannot decisively guide inference. And, finally, I 
will argue that the third idea is inadequate as well—that we 
need a more complex understanding of why we grant sci-
ence general epistemic authority, with multiple bases sup-
porting that authority.  
Descriptive and Normative Claims 
It is a standard presumption in philosophy that one can-
not derive “is” claims from “ought” claims, nor can one de-
rive “ought” claims from “is” claims. I can make arguments 
about how one ought to value science or how one ought to 
value democracy, but that does not mean that the people to 
whom I am making these arguments do value science or de-
mocracy. Similarly, I can describe the way the world is in 
great detail, but someone can always respond, “Yes, but 
that is not how it ought to be.” The difference between “is” 
and “ought” claims seems crucial for giving us the space to 
imagine what a better world might be like, even in the face 
of an (often grim) accurate and detailed description. It also 
provides space for resisting the automaticity that can fol-
low from a particular “ought” claim. That the world is not 
like it should be (in some people’s eyes) may be a good 
thing in our view, and we might use that descriptive differ-
ence, or the projected costs of change that arise from a de-
tailed description, to resist a normative appeal. 
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Philosophers debate whether the practical difference 
between these types of claims is grounded in some meta-
physical difference in the nature of normativity. Is the true 
different from the good? Is the beautiful different from the 
just? I have no wish to wade into such debates, although it 
certainly seems plausible that the answer to both these 
questions is yes. The world does not seem so unified that 
all the normativities line up. For my purposes here, it suf-
fices to note that making a whole set of descriptive claims 
(with nothing else) does not make an adequate argument 
for a normative claim; nor does a whole set of normative 
claims (with nothing else) make an adequate argument for 
a descriptive claim. Each kind of claim cannot serve as sole 
justification for the other. They simply don’t interact that 
way. 
They do, however, interact. For example, it is difficult to 
see how to make an argument about how the world ought 
to be (or, more pointedly, how we ought to act) without re-
lying upon some descriptive claims about the way the world 
is. We need empirical information about what causes pain, 
for example, if we are to craft a world with less pain in it. 
Arguments about what we should do rely upon descrip-
tions of what we can do, what is feasible, what is readily 
achievable, what comes at higher costs and what those 
costs are. That we need both kinds of claims in our argu-
ments is indicative that there are in fact two kinds of claims.  
Conversely, the question of whether one can make an 
argument for a descriptive claim without normative claims 
is a central concern in the current values in science debate, 
particularly as science is now a major source for our de-
scriptive claims. At issue is whether descriptive arguments 
rely on (without being built wholly out of) normative 
claims. The decisions of what to study, how to study it, and 
when to say the study is completed (when the evidence is 
sufficient) suffuses normative presuppositions into our de-
scriptive statements. They are not there on the surface (just 




as descriptive claims are not there on the surface of norma-
tive claims) and they do not suffice on their own for argu-
ing for (or supporting) the descriptive claims, but they are 
part of the overall argument for, and process of, generating 
the descriptive claims.  
But to say that normative claims have a role to play in 
generating descriptive claims is not to give away the differ-
ence altogether. When Carl Hempel argued back in the 
1960s that normative claims can provide no confirmatory 
weight to a descriptive claim, he was right.2 Saying that the 
world ought to be a particular way is not a good argument 
that the world is actually that way. In this form of argu-
ment, such normative expressions are more pious hopes 
than reasons for the accuracy of descriptions. And this is a 
gap in kind that we want to preserve. The world is often 
not how we want it to be, and keeping this difference is es-
sential for being able to perceive and to say that. 
With this conceptual distinction in place, we can now 
address the debate over values in science. Acknowledging 
that there is a conceptual difference between descriptive 
and normative claims, we can examine more closely how 
they might (and should) interact in producing science. (For 
those who are not convinced there is a difference between 
descriptive and normative claims, the value-free ideal for 
science doesn’t make any sense. In the arguments that fol-
low, I will presume a conceptual difference, but show a 
practical interdependence, between the two.) 
Values in Science 
Science is, of course, a human practice. And when we 
do science, we entangle values, including social and ethical 
values, in that science. The questions are how values inter-
weave with science, whether it is legitimate and necessary, 
and ultimately what to do about it. 
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Critics of the value-free ideal for science initially 
pointed out how values (particularly social and ethical val-
ues) influence the practice and products of science, because 
science is performed by humans. Feminist philosophers of 
science showed how sexist values blinded scientists to al-
ternative explanations of phenomena or directed the atten-
tion of scientists to some narrow subset of data, a fuller 
examination of which produced rather different interpreta-
tions and results. Examples from archaeology (explana-
tions of how tool use developed), cellular biology 
(explanations of fertilization processes), and animal biol-
ogy (explanations of duck genital morphology and mating 
behavior) demonstrate such influences of values on science 
in spades.3 Feminists were quick to point out that problem-
atic science of this sort was not obviously bad science (sci-
entists were not making up data and not engaged in 
pseudoscientific practices immune from criticism and revi-
sion), but the limitations of it (and the value-influence on 
it) became obvious once better science was pursued.4 Look-
ing back on the cases critiqued by feminists, the science 
looks woefully inadequate and blinkered. 
Several feminist philosophers proposed addressing 
these issues by focusing on the social nature of science.5 Be-
cause science requires communities of scientists, in critical 
dialogue with each other, feminist scholars looked to the 
structure of those communities for answers. Improving the 
diversity of scientists, many argued, would improve the 
range of explanations pursued and the kinds of phenomena 
examined, bolstering the epistemic reliability of the sci-
ences. And by having more diversity of participants in sci-
ence, and more diversity of values through the participants, 
the value judgments and influences could be more readily 
spotted by someone in the scientific community rather than 
disappearing, invisible by virtue of universal acceptance 
among scientists. In addition, in such an agenda, the virtues 
of the just and the true could be aligned, as breaking down 




the barriers to participating in scientific research would be 
both fairer and produce more accurate science.6  
While this is certainly a worthwhile approach to ad-
dressing many issues of justice in science and epistemically 
inadequate science, this approach does not take on the 
value-free ideal directly. One could argue that the reason 
for increasing diversity in science is to ferret out those hid-
den value presuppositions that were distorting the search 
for truth.7 Once made clear, one could hope that the values 
could be removed from the scientific explanations. The 
called-for diversity in science could be made to serve the 
ultimate aim of a value-free science. What the feminist cri-
tiques showed (for some) is not a problem with the value-
free ideal per se but with the past practices of science. The 
cases of sexist science were weak science, empirically feeble 
science, and the pursuit of new theories and evidence made 
science stronger. Stronger science could still aim to be 
value-free. 
Another reason the value-free ideal remained mostly 
unscathed was that it was narrowly focused on when val-
ues need to be kept out. One could still argue that science 
should be value-free in its justifications, that regardless of 
how the theories and explanations of empirical phenomena 
were developed (and feminist critiques showed we needed 
to improve this process substantially), what mattered when 
making inferences in science—when deciding what the ev-
idence said—is that scientists try to keep values out of that 
process, and just focus on the evidence at hand (perhaps 
bolstered by a sense that with diverse participants in sci-
ence, the evidence at hand is the best available set). The 
value-free ideal was articulated as being about the moment 
of inference in science, of being about the practices of justi-
fication at one particular point. The idea was that if values 
were kept out at this point, it could serve as the pure ful-
crum for later decisions, that science could be universal and 
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authoritative if and only if values were not part of the jus-
tificatory inference. And indeed, the idea that values can 
offer no confirmatory weight to the pile of evidence, and 
that if they did we would be blurring the important differ-
ence between descriptive and normative claims, added fur-
ther reason to support the value-free ideal. Scientists 
needed to make inferences (and justify those inferences) 
with no regard to social and ethical values, according to the 
value-free ideal. Maintaining this ideal was crucial to the 
authority of science, which rested on purity from societal 
influences at the point of inference.  
To upend the value-free ideal, and its presumptions 
about the aim of purity and autonomy in science, one needs 
to tackle the ideal qua ideal at the moment of justification. 
This is the strength of the argument from inductive risk. It 
points to the inferential gap that can never be filled in an 
inductive argument, whenever the scientific claim does not 
follow deductively from the evidence (which in inductive, 
ampliative sciences it almost never does). A scientist al-
ways needs to decide, precisely at the point of inference 
crucial to the value-free ideal, whether the available evi-
dence is enough for the claim at issue. This is a gap that can 
never be filled, but only stepped across. The scientist must 
decide whether stepping across the gap is acceptable. The 
scientist can narrow the gap further with probability state-
ments or error bars to hedge the claim, but the gap is never 
eliminated.  
How is a scientist to decide that the available evidence 
is enough? That the gap is worth stepping across? That a 
claim is worth accepting? Some have suggested that epis-
temic and/or cognitive values can do this. It is time to ex-
amine whether there are “canons of inference” that can 
fulfill this role. 
  




Epistemic and Cognitive Values: What Guidance? 
When Isaac Levi suggested in 1960 that there were “can-
ons of inference” that guided decisions of acceptance in sci-
ence, and that these were sufficient for theory assessment 
in science, he helped to put in place a crucial piece of the 
value-free ideal.8 There has been voluminous work on 
what became known as “epistemic values” (for some, “cog-
nitive values”) in science. Some of the work has focused on 
particular attributes (e.g., What is the value of simplicity? 
Does prediction matter more than accommodation? What 
constitutes a good explanation?),9 and discussions initially 
described a collective soup of values that scientists held.10 
More recent work has involved unpacking nuance among 
the values considered constitutive of science.11 
It has helped enormously to consider what these values 
are good for. Instead of merely noting their pervasive im-
portance in science (historically and currently), one could 
attend to differences in why particular values might be cen-
tral to science. For example, successful prediction and ex-
planation are values that organize the evidence in relation 
to theory, and as such help to structure how we assess the 
strength of the available evidence.12 Precision in successful 
explanation and prediction similarly helps assess how 
strong the evidence is—if precise theories explain or pre-
dict precise evidence, we think the evidential support is so 
much the stronger for the theory. Theories that successfully 
predict or explain a broad scope of evidence (across a range 
of phenomena), or theories that successfully predict or ex-
plain complex phenomena with simpler theoretical appa-
ratus, also are judged to be supported more strongly by the 
evidence than competitors without these virtues. These 
kinds of values are properly epistemic, as they help us 
judge how good a theory is at this moment, and how strong 
the currently available evidence is.  
Note that while these virtues are very helpful in as-
sessing the strength of the available evidence, they are 
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mute on whether the available evidence is strong enough to 
warrant acceptance by scientists. Such epistemic values do 
not speak to this question at all.  
Other traditionally constitutive values in science are 
more future oriented, and direct our attention to the prom-
ise of a theory in the future. These values, such as broad 
scope over potential (but as yet ungathered) evidence, fe-
cundity in producing predictions (as yet untested), and ex-
planatory power (as yet uninstantiated), are suggestive of 
the general fruitfulness of a theory. But such future fruit-
fulness is only a reason to keep working on a theory, to use 
that potential fecundity to explore the world further, to ac-
cept it as a basis for further research, not to accept it gener-
ally for other decision-making. I have called these values 
“cognitive values,” because their presence means that a 
theory will be easier to work with going forward, and thus 
they have a pragmatic research value for scientists.13 They 
are not epistemic, as they do not indicate the general relia-
bility of a theory—they do not tell us that a theory is well 
supported and likely to produce accurate predictions. They 
do, however, indicate good research bets. Thus, neither the 
set of epistemic nor the set of cognitive values can tell us 
when we have enough evidence. They simply do other jobs. 
There are two sources of trouble here for seeing the nor-
mative entanglement of science and social values. The first 
is local: that many of the cognitive values have the same 
name as the epistemic values, and thus are readily con-
flated. Predictive power could be a name for past successes 
(and thus be epistemic) or could be a name for future fe-
cundity (and thus be cognitive). The same goes for explan-
atory power or scope or even precision and simplicity. That 
there is a sense of these values that is directed to past suc-
cess in grappling with and organizing actual evidence (an 
epistemic sense) and that there is a sense of these values 
that speaks of the future promise of a theory (a cognitive 
sense) confuses things. It also makes it seems as though the 




general list of such values is indeed sufficient for science—
for what else do scientists qua scientists need but to assess 
the strength of evidence and to decide upon the future 
promise of potential research questions?  
But such a conception of scientific practice neglects that 
we want something else from scientists; that indeed, sci-
ence is not just pursued for scientists alone. We need to 
know what to think about the world right now, and not just 
to know which theories are promising for future research. 
And we need to know more than how strong the evidence 
is for a particular theory—we need to know whether it is 
strong enough to use for deciding what to do in the wider 
world beyond the endeavors of scientific researchers. The 
inductive gap remains, despite the utility of epistemic and 
cognitive values, and we have to know what to do about it. 
Should it be stepped across or not? Even with probability 
statements or error bars, does the available evidence sup-
port the claim enough? Epistemic values can help assess 
how strong the evidence is; cognitive values can help assess 
where to place bets for future research. But for the assess-
ment of evidential sufficiency in the moment, we need to 
look beyond epistemic and cognitive values. 
The Necessity of Social and Ethical Values in Science 
How do social and ethical values help with this induc-
tive gap? While they can’t fill it, they are crucial for decid-
ing when the evidence available (the strength of which is 
assessed using epistemic values) is strong enough. Strong 
enough for what? What is this assessment of sufficiency? 
How does a scientist decide that the inductive gap is ac-
ceptably small enough to step across? It is here, at this ques-
tion, that philosophers and scientists must stop looking at 
the purely internal practices of science and answer this 
question with respect to a full understanding of science as 
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it operates within societies, rather than isolated from socie-
ties. When scientists decide the evidence is strong enough, 
they are deciding not just for themselves, but for anyone 
who wants to rely upon science for guiding decisions in the 
broader world. For that, the internal practices and values of 
science are not sufficient. 
Social and ethical values, however, do help with this de-
cision. They help by considering the consequences of get-
ting it wrong, of assessing what happens if it was a mistake 
to step across the inductive gap (i.e., to accept a claim), or 
what happens if we fail to step across the inductive gap 
when we should. In doing so, such values help us assess 
whether the gap is small enough to take the chance. If mak-
ing a mistake means only minor harms, we may be ready 
to step across it with some good evidence. If making a mis-
take means major harms, particularly to vulnerable popu-
lations or crucial resources, we should change our 
standards accordingly. Social and ethical values weigh 
these risks and harms, and provide reasons for why the ev-
idence may be sufficient in some cases and not in others. 
The difficulty is that there are risks of error in all direc-
tions. There are risks of error in prematurely making a 
claim; there are risks of error in failing to make a claim soon 
enough; and there are risks of error in saying nothing while 
we wait for more evidence. There is no perfectly safe space 
in which to stand. Neither science nor logic can assure us 
of safety—indeed nothing can. There are no guarantees. 
What this examination of science, values, and inference can 
give us is not assurances of success, but assurances that we 
are doing the best we can—and what that best consists of. 
Doing our best in science requires the involvement of social 
and ethical values in the decision that evidence is sufficient.  
There are alternatives to involving social and ethical 
values in evidential sufficiency assessments. We could 
simply toss a coin when deciding whether to accept or re-




ject a claim. But this would be arbitrary, and thus irrespon-
sible to the authoritative weight that science has in society. 
And we would still need to decide when the evidence was 
enough to warrant the coin toss! We could also set stand-
ards internal to science: What are the risks to scientific re-
searchers and to the practice of science of accepting or 
rejecting a claim? But that is also arbitrary—arbitrarily in-
sular: Why should impacts on scientists and research be the 
only impacts that count? Note that this too would still in-
volve ethical values (some of the impacts on scientists 
would surely be ethically weighty), but we would be con-
sidering only scientists. Why should we do that? With sci-
ence taking place within a broader society, why should 
only scientists count in making these decisions? We could 
ask that scientists never step across inductive gaps, but 
merely tell us the evidence and how strong they think it is. 
The practical difficulties of this are insurmountable. As I 
have argued, the moment of inference is not the only place 
where inductive risk considerations arise.14 In addition, we 
would have to learn how to examine the evidence our-
selves, as scientists would no longer be free to tell us what 
it means (that would be drawing the inference). Finally, we 
could require that scientists only step across the inductive 
gap when it is very, very small, and thus be as conservative 
in their risk-taking as possible. But why is this the right 
standard? Such a standard presumes that only risks of 
making a claim incorrectly matter, and ignores the risks of 
not making a claim when it is true, of waiting too long.  
To attempt to be value-free in the assessment of eviden-
tial sufficiency is to ignore the broader society in which sci-
ence functions, by being arbitrary, or ignoring the full set 
of risks, or ignoring the implications of scientific work in 
the broader society. If science is to be responsible to the 
broader society in which it functions, if it is to earn its au-
thority, it should not be value-free at all. Instead, it needs 
to be value-responsive.  
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Suppose one still wanted to maintain the purity of sci-
ence from social and ethical values, and that to do so one 
was willing to institutionally isolate scientists from society. 
This would involve not only making sure that only risks to 
scientists and to research were considered in the assess-
ments of evidential sufficiency, but keeping scientists from 
saying anything publicly about their research. Others 
would need to maintain and police the border between sci-
ence and society, deciding what bits of information, which 
pieces of scientific research, were ready for public con-
sumption and which were not. Communication among sci-
entists would need to fall behind a shroud of secrecy, 
insulating scientific meetings, publications, and debates 
from public consumption. Scientists could be free to pursue 
inquiry indefinitely, and someone else would need to de-
cide when the evidence was enough to instigate other deci-
sions or actions. Scientists would need to eschew the public 
eye, and would likely need to be physically isolated from 
the rest of society. We could sever science from society in 
this way, and thus keep scientists willfully ignorant of the 
societal implications of their research and from thinking 
about them. We could have others trained to do this for sci-
entists and have those specialists deciding when evidence 
was sufficient for a public communication of a claim. 
I think we should view such an approach with alarm, 
and indicative of a misplaced desperation to keep science 
“pure.” Not only would such isolation likely produce ques-
tionable science (because the forums for discourse would 
have to be closed to only professional scientists, who would 
have to be more strictly credentialed than is currently the 
case, thus narrowing who was engaged in scientific dis-
course), but we would need to create and monitor an en-
tirely new social institution. Who would keep track of the 
boundary policers, and whether they were acting in the 
public interest or corrupted by a narrower interest? These 
would be very difficult issues to address. It would also be 
a very authoritarian institution, as it would require the end 




of the free exchange of information, and sequestering of the 
entirety of empirical investigation under confidentiality 
wraps. The potential for abuse in such an institution is stag-
gering. Despite the complexity we face with the demise of 
the value-free ideal, I think addressing the difficulties of re-
linquishing the value-free ideal is both more manageable 
and desirable than a truly isolated scientific enterprise.  
Nevertheless, the demise of the value-free ideal does 
leave us with a problem in thinking about science and val-
ues: What ideals should guide the interaction of science and 
values? 
Searching for New Ideals 
That we need some ideals for values in science seems 
clear. Social and ethical values can have distorting and 
problematic effects on science, as evidenced by the cases of 
sexist science uncovered by feminists. Such cases are just 
one way in which social and ethical values can distort sci-
ence. Occurrences of manufactured doubt show the influ-
ence of social ideologies on scientific research. Because the 
purveyors of doubt care so much about protecting unfet-
tered capitalism, they are willing to distort the scientific 
record to forestall unwelcome policies.15 Social values such 
as making a profit can lead scientists in the employ of for-
profit entities to bend science (e.g., by selectively reporting 
the results of clinical trials in medical research).16 And some 
cases of scientific fraud can be viewed as a pernicious influ-
ence of social values, when scientists are so sure of how the 
world should be, they make up the data to show that it is 
that way (e.g., the psychologist Cyril Burt and the manu-
facture of twin data to support his beliefs about the inher-
itability of intelligence).17 Social and political values also 
drove such catastrophic cases as the influence of Trofim Ly-
senko on Soviet science under Stalin. We should not be san-
guine about allowing social and ethical values into science 
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unfettered. Such laissez-faire attitudes about values can 
make a mess of science. 
Philosophers of science have offered several alternative 
ideals for thinking about how values should operate in sci-
ence. I will articulate those ideals here and assess their 
strengths and weaknesses. We will see that there is no one 
all-encompassing ideal that can replace the traditional 
value-free ideal. What relinquishing the value-free ideal re-
quires is that we grapple with a more complex terrain of 
science-society interactions.18 Different ideals get at differ-
ent aspects of scientific practice more or less effectively. Un-
derstanding their strengths and weaknesses allows us to 
see what they are useful for both philosophically and prac-
tically. 
In the current literature (and I can make no claims to 
completeness in this fast-moving field), there are at least 
five different ideals (or norms) for values in science: 
1. Placing priority on epistemic values 
2. Role restrictions for values in science 
3. Getting the right values into science 
4. Ensuring proper community functioning 
5. Ensuring good institutional structures for scientific 
practice 
Let me describe each, articulating their strengths and 
weaknesses, and then we can see how they fit together. 
1. Placing priority on epistemic values 
Daniel Steel has suggested that the correct ideal for val-
ues in science is to make sure they do not hinder the attain-
ment of truth (within the realm of “practically and ethically 
permissible” science).19 Ethical values, of course, do restrict 
our methodologies and the kinds of science we pursue, so 
Steel does allow those kinds of restrictions on scientific re-
search, even if they do hinder the discovery of new truths. 




But aside from this restriction, Steel wants no social or eth-
ical values to interfere with the attainment of truth.  
This is an interesting ideal, but presents some problems 
for practical guidance in science. It can be hard in practice 
to know whether a particular value judgment (whether so-
cial, ethical, or cognitive) is helping or hindering the attain-
ment of truth in the middle of a research project or scientific 
debate.20 Part of the excitement of science is not knowing 
where the truth lies, so whether a value is helping or hin-
dering can be quite unclear without the benefit of hind-
sight. In addition, one can wonder whether this is the right 
approach to take even in cases where social and ethical val-
ues do hinder the attainment of truth. What counts as ethi-
cally permissible science is an ongoing contested arena (as 
the debate over gain-of-function viral research shows).21 
Sometimes ethical values can inhibit the attainment of truth 
(because researchers are following their conscience) before 
the ethical debate is settled, and we might be quite happy 
about that in retrospect. In short, this ideal works well only 
when we have settled both what the truth is and what the 
ethical boundaries of permissibility are, which means guid-
ance in medias res is lacking. And we might decide in hind-
sight that some truths are not worth having, given the 
ethical costs of getting them. This ideal seems primarily 
useful for retrospective examinations of scientific debates. 
2. Role restrictions for values in science 
In my work, I have emphasized distinct roles for values 
in science. I have argued that there are two roles for values 
in science: a direct role (where values serve as a reason to 
do something, and thus direct the decision) and an indirect 
role (where values serve to help assess whether the availa-
ble evidence is sufficient for an inference or choice). I have 
argued that depending on where one is in the scientific pro-
cess, different roles are acceptable. For example, a direct 
role for values is acceptable in deciding which research 
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agenda to pursue (e.g., because the scientist cares about a 
particular issue) and in deciding which methodologies to 
employ (e.g., because a particular methodology is ethically 
preferable). An indirect role is acceptable in these instances 
as well. But at moments of data characterization and infer-
ence (the targeted terrain of the value-free ideal), I have ar-
gued that we can maintain scientific integrity while 
permitting social and ethical values by constraining such 
values to the indirect role only.22 It is also an ideal that can 
help guide discourse on contentious scientific issues, as it 
allows for both the expression of values (“Because of this 
value, I find the evidence insufficient”) and guidance for 
productive debate (“What evidence would be convincing 
for you?”). (I will return to this in Lecture 3.) 
This ideal is a direct counter to the value-free ideal, and 
targeted as narrowly as the value-free ideal is on these “in-
ternal” inferential moments. As such, it has little to say 
about the direction of research agendas. Further, it cannot 
help much with methodology selection (or distortion). Fi-
nally, it is not much of an ideal in the sense of something to 
strive for. It is more of a minimum floor, which if one does 
not meet, one is doing really poor science (such as writing 
down the data one wishes were accurate or making infer-
ences that one wishes were true). Although I think it is an 
important norm to hold, it will not suffice for guiding sci-
entific practice.  
3. Getting the right values in science 
Several philosophers of science have argued in recent 
years that the important thing to focus on for values in sci-
ence is making sure that the right values are influencing 
scientific research.23 Such authors have taken an “aims-ori-
ented” approach to the problem of values in science. Janet 
Kourany, for example, has argued for a “joint satisfaction” 
ideal for values in science—that only when a decision 




meets both epistemic and ethical criteria is it a good deci-
sion. Kevin Elliott has called attention to the multiple goals 
of science, including both epistemic aims and social aims. 
There are several things to note about this approach. 
The first is that all the authors that champion this ideal take 
pains to express concerns for, and support of, the value of 
inquiry. Both the epistemic aim and the ethical/social aim 
must be met, for example, in Kourany’s joint satisfaction 
ideal. So this ideal is not just about social and ethical values, 
but about valorizing the general purpose of inquiry and 
discovery as well. The pursuit of truth matters a great deal 
to those who argue for this approach. 
The second is that this approach successfully addresses 
concerns about research agenda choices and methodologi-
cal choices, about which the role-restriction norm has little 
to say. Because both roles for values are acceptable for these 
choices, that approach has no normative bite at these 
stages. Arguing about what the right values are is exactly 
on target for these choices. For example, in cases where the 
methodological choices seem to be made to guarantee pre-
selected outcomes, the get-the-right-values-in-science ideal 
can say that the decisions improperly neglect the value of 
inquiry, and thus are improper decisions.24 
Finally, the authors who support this approach tend to 
want the values utilized to be also the result of good in-
quiry—not necessarily of the same kind as empirical scien-
tific research, but still informed by good empirical results 
and robust philosophical debate. Values are not mere con-
taminants in our process of inquiry with this ideal, but a 
strong support of it, as they too are open to inquiry.25  
However, despite its importance, it is doubtful that this 
ideal is enough. First, what the right values are is often 
hotly and openly contested. How we know we have the 
right values can be unclear. So guidance for scientists in 
practice can be lacking. Second, at the moment of inference 
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(the moment of central concern to the value-free ideal and 
to the role-restriction ideal), this ideal provides either inac-
curate or incomplete guidance. What are we to do when 
evidence arises that seems to challenge our value commit-
ments? Suppose (and I think this unlikely) that we discover 
men and women really do have divergent mathematical 
abilities. Do we reject the evidence because it does not meet 
the joint satisfaction of ethical and epistemic values? Sup-
pose it is strong evidence (and so meets the epistemic crite-
rion). Do we reject it because it does not fit with our ethical 
commitments? This seems to conflate the “is” and the 
“ought,” and falls into the trap of wishful thinking and 
worrisome distortion that the value-free ideal was meant to 
ward off. It is also a case where the role-restriction ideal 
serves us well. We can say we want stronger evidence be-
fore we are willing to give up on our belief in the general 
equality of mathematical ability, and we can even say (one 
would hope) what such evidence should consist of. But re-
jecting the evidence because we do not like what it says is 
unacceptable. It is precisely this move that climate deniers 
often make, and we are rightly frustrated by that. 
In short, for guiding scientists in practice, we need both 
of these ideals—the role-restriction ideal and the get-the 
right-values-in-science ideal—in operation, although at dif-
ferent levels of granularity. At particular moments of infer-
ence, getting roles right is important. And in general, 
having the right values is important. Indeed, one could jus-
tify the roles ideal in terms of the aims ideal—that valuing 
inquiry properly means, in part, keeping values in the right 
roles. But as noted above, there is often contention about 
what the right values are. To address this, we will need a 
broader communal perspective. 
4. Ensuring proper community functioning 
One of the weaknesses of the get-the-right-values-in-sci-
ence ideal is that it is mute when we don’t know what the 




right values are. What then? Or, what if the right values en-
compass a plurality of values, all legitimate, with good rea-
sons to support them and reasonable disagreement among 
them? What kind of ideal can we articulate under these cir-
cumstances? Further, the previous ideals generally center 
on the impact of values on particular scientific choices. 
How can we ensure that the conditions that support the 
requisite critical debate and pluralistic reflection in science 
are in place? 
Philosophers of science (led by feminists) have focused 
on describing the conditions for proper community func-
tioning to address these concerns. Ensuring that one has a 
diverse scientific community—with clear forums for de-
bate, expectations for the uptake of criticisms, and effective 
distribution of research efforts reflecting needed diversity 
so that alternative theories can be explored—serves to pro-
vide essential conditions for the robustness and reliability 
of science.26 Such conditions also provide assurance that 
value judgments will be elucidated and examined within 
the scientific community, and that if there are disagree-
ments about which values should be shaping research 
agendas, those debates can occur in an open and produc-
tive way. Having proper community functioning is essen-
tial to ensuring that, if there is general agreement on the 
values, the right values influence science, and, if there is not 
agreement on the values, some diversity of values will be 
deployed in making judgments in science.  
Some minimum of effective community functioning is 
needed for producing acceptable science. But we can al-
ways do better along the ideals that philosophers like Mir-
iam Solomon and Helen Longino provide for us. This set of 
ideals, focused as it is on how communities of scholars 
should work and distribute their efforts, complements ide-
als 2 and 3, which are more focused on how particular 
choices should be made in science. The communal func-
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tioning ideal calls for proper response and uptake of criti-
cism, for example, but it is from ideal 2, from an articulation 
of how values can properly play roles in scientific reason-
ing, that we can see what proper response and uptake con-
sists of. (It is not proper, for example, to say: “I don’t accept 
that empirical claim because it disagrees with my values.” 
It is proper to say: “I find that evidence insufficient because 
of my values and my concern over false positives, so I want 
stronger evidence before accepting that claim.”) That we 
need ideals both for governing particular choices and for 
guiding communities should not be surprising. What none 
of these ideals address, however, is how the scientific com-
munity should interact with the broader (democratic) pub-
lic.  
5. Ensuring good institutional structures for scientific practice 
While the social epistemological tendencies reflected in 
ideal 4 are useful for thinking about how we want our sci-
entific communities to work, they do not help inform how 
the scientific community should think about its role and re-
sponsibilities to the broader society or how we want to 
structure the science-policy interfaces that so powerfully 
shape the pursuit and use of science. This area for ideals is 
the least developed. 
It is on this kind of interaction that many ideals articu-
lated by philosophers working on science policy have fo-
cused.27 The trouble is that the science-policy interface is 
multifaceted, and philosophers have yet to grapple with all 
the facets in articulating an ideal. What constitutes good in-
stitutional structure is very much up for debate. I will ad-
dress this in more detail in the next lecture. 
For now, I hope I have shown that we need some set of 
nested ideals crafted from those described above. Ideal 2 is 
the most targeted response to the value-free ideal (both nar-
rowly focused on inferences in science), but once we relin-
quish this ideal and confront the complexity of science in 




society, it seems obvious that no one ideal will suffice. 
Without the value-free ideal narrowing our focus, we have 
to think about and address all the ways in which values do 
influence science and consider how that should occur.  
The Authority of Science and Ideals for Science 
No one ideal for values in science will suffice. We need 
nested ideals, articulated for individual actors, communal 
practices, and science-society interfaces, in order to ground 
the authority of science.  
The authority of science rests on the interlocking char-
acter of these norms. At the communal level, scientists are 
expected to continually question and critique each other’s 
work. They are expected to respond to criticisms raised, 
and to hold no scientific claim above criticism. Such mutual 
critique is a minimum for granting science prima facie ep-
istemic authority. The more diverse and reflective of the 
plurality of society the scientific community is, the more 
taken-for-granted assumptions and unexamined value 
commitments will (hopefully) be elucidated, the more au-
thority science should have. 
But community practices need good individual reason-
ing practices with which to operate. Maintaining the proper 
roles for values in science keeps values from acting in place 
of evidence, which will support the critical interactions 
needed in science. New evidence should always be able to 
contest old positions, and this can only happen if values are 
not used to protect desired positions from unwanted criti-
cism.28 A scientist can point to their values to argue for why 
they require more evidence to be convinced, but they can 
never point to their values to argue for why evidence is ir-
relevant to the claims they make or protect. Asking for 
more evidence drives the inquiry dialectic; holding claims 
above evidential critique does not.  
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Further, it is not just in individual reasoning integrity 
(right roles) and communal practices, but in some shared 
values (operating within proper roles) that science gains its 
authority in a democratic society. I will discuss this more in 
the next two lectures, but for now, note that getting the val-
ues right, particularly in the realm of policy-relevant sci-
ence, strongly supports scientific authority. That scientists 
are investigating questions we care about, using methodol-
ogies that we find morally acceptable and targeted at what 
we are concerned with, and using values we share for as-
sessing evidential sufficiency, can and should make a big 
difference for what we think is epistemically authoritative. 
Thus, elucidating the proper roles and proper values for 
science is part of what makes science authoritative, rather 
than undermining the authority of science.  
Finally, the authority of science also rests on its raw in-
strumental success. Relying upon scientific understandings 
of disease (e.g., in the instance of communicable diseases) 
has greatly increased lifespans; relying upon scientific un-
derstandings of materials has greatly increased the range 
of what we can manufacture; relying upon scientific under-
standings of what we can transmit in the air has trans-
formed communication; and so forth. It is this raw 
instrumental success that is probably at the root of most of 
the trust that society places in science. But as we will see in 
the next lecture, we are running into areas of science where 
success is not easily measured, especially in the short term, 
and the problems we are addressing seem more interre-
lated than ever. The challenge of science in democracy is 
still with us. 
Implications 
There is much work to be done in further fleshing out 
the ideals for individual, communal, and societal practices 
in science. We need these levels of norms to mesh together 




(at least somewhat), so that our communal expectations 
and societal practices do not place impossible burdens on 
individual scientists. We need to figure out how these 
norms align and how to encourage the pursuit of the ideals 
in real scientific practice. 
But we also need to ensure that there is some space be-
tween what society might want and what scientists can 
pursue. While the full autonomy and isolation of science is 
undesirable, we also don’t want a science that only tells us 
what we want to hear. Some space is crucial for the practice 
of science. Keeping social values out of a direct role at the 
moment of inference is part of maintaining this space. Al-
lowing scientists to have a say about research agendas (and 
to pursue some research for curiosity’s sake) is another. 
Science cannot be just a mouthpiece for societal inter-
ests. If it becomes this, it will not have any claim to distinc-
tive epistemic authority. While we need knowledge to help 
us pursue our social goals, we also sometimes need to 
know when such goals are not feasible or desirable (be-
cause of what else will come with their successful instanti-
ation). Science needs to be able to tell us when we are 
running into such issues, to be able to “speak truth to 
power.” This ability is central to its authority in practice. 
How to protect science’s ability to do this, in democratic 
societies with their requirements of accountability, will be 
the topic of the next lecture. 
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Commentary on Lecture 1 
TENSIONS AMONG IDEALS 
Kristina Rolin 
In “Science and Values: The Pervasive Entanglement,” 
Heather Douglas advances a research program on values 
and science. The research program aims to develop a set of 
ideals that are nested in the sense that some ideals are ad-
dressed directly to individual scientists, some others to sci-
entific communities with the aim of providing guidance for 
interactions among scientists within these communities, 
and yet others to stakeholders with the aim of providing 
guidance for interactions among scientists, policymakers, 
and lay people. In order to promote this research program, 
I argue that there are tensions among some of the ideals 
Douglas recommends for scientists and scientific commu-
nities. Striking an appropriate balance between ideals and 
requirements that pull in opposite directions is crucial for 
the success of the research program. 
In Section 1, I present an overview of the ideals and nor-
mative principles Douglas identifies in the literature on val-
ues and science. In Section 2, I introduce the ideal of 
cognitive diversity, which is thought to be part of the 




proper functioning of scientific communities. In Section 3, 
I argue that there is a trade-off between the ideal of cogni-
tive diversity and the requirement of shared standards. 
Further, there is a tension between the ideal of cognitive di-
versity and the ideal of “getting the right values into sci-
ence.” 
1. Five Ideals 
In the literature on values and science, Douglas identi-
fies five ideals. The first three ideals are norms that individ-
ual scientists should follow in their scientific practices. The 
fourth and the fifth ideals are descriptions of epistemically 
ideal social arrangements. These descriptions involve 
norms that guide scientists in their interactions with other 
scientists or stakeholders of science. Besides norms, they in-
volve principles for organizing scientific communities and 
institutions: 
1. Placing priority on epistemic values 
2. Role restrictions for values in science 
3. Getting the right values into science 
4. Ensuring proper community functioning 
5. Ensuring good institutional structures for scientific 
practice 
Douglas argues that there is no one all-encompassing 
ideal that can replace the value-free ideal; that is, the view 
that non-epistemic values have no legitimate role to play in 
the evaluation and justification of knowledge claims. In her 
view, we need a complex set of ideals that includes not only 
the first three items on the list, but also norms and organi-
zational principles from the fourth and fifth items on the 
list. 
The first ideal states that non-epistemic values should 
not hinder the attainment of truth within the realm of mor-
ally acceptable science. While Douglas does not object to 
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this ideal, she thinks that it is not very informative as long 
as it does not specify what morally acceptable science is. 
The second ideal states that moral and social values are al-
lowed to play an indirect role in deciding when evidence is 
strong enough, but they are not allowed to play a direct 
role. While Douglas emphasizes the importance of this 
ideal, she reminds us that it has a rather narrow domain of 
application. The ideal is meant to give guidance for eviden-
tial reasoning, and it has little to say about other moments 
in scientific inquiry. Therefore, it is better thought of as a 
minimum requirement for good scientific practice rather 
than as a full-service theory on values and science. The 
third ideal states that when moral and social values play 
legitimate roles in science, scientists need to ensure that 
they are the right values. According to Douglas, one virtue 
in this ideal is that it “successfully addresses concerns 
about research agenda choices and methodological choices, 
choices about which the role restriction norm has little to 
say.”1 However, the third ideal is inaccurate and incom-
plete insofar as it does not tell us how people are to decide 
what the right values are, or how scientists are to be in-
formed about the right values. 
Whereas the first three ideals state norms that individ-
ual scientists are accountable to conforming to in their sci-
entific practice, the fourth and the fifth ideals are concerned 
with epistemically well-designed scientific communities 
and institutions. The fourth ideal (ensuring proper commu-
nity functioning) involves not just a single norm, but a set 
of norms that scientific communities need to comply with 
in order to be successful in the pursuit of their epistemic 
goals. An example of such a set is Helen Longino’s social 
value management ideal as found in her book The Fate of 
Knowledge. According to Longino, scientific communities 
should conform to the four norms of publicly recognized 
venues, uptake of criticism, shared standards, and tem-
pered equality of intellectual authority.2 Longino claims 




also that “A diversity of perspectives is necessary for vig-
orous and epistemically effective critical discourse.”3 An-
other example of a set of norms intended to be applicable 
to scientific communities is Miriam Solomon’s social em-
piricism. Solomon recommends that science policymakers 
take steps to cultivate cognitive diversity and dissent in sci-
entific communities.4 By cognitive diversity, she means a 
diversity of theoretical approaches that have some empiri-
cal successes.5 
The fifth ideal (ensuring good institutional structures 
for scientific practice) involves, among other things, a set of 
norms that govern interactions between scientific commu-
nities and the broader society. Douglas observes, I think 
rightly, that there is plenty of work to do to develop this set 
of norms and organizational principles. The work involves 
answering such questions as: What are the responsibilities 
of scientists when they function as experts in society? What 
are the responsibilities of policymakers and lay people 
when they rely on experts or use scientific knowledge in 
their decision-making? What kind of institutional struc-
tures are ideal for facilitating interactions between scien-
tists, policymakers, and lay people in different arenas of 
public life?  
Douglas argues that we need a set of ideals crafted from 
all of the five items on the list insofar as the ideals form a 
consistent whole. In order to contribute to this research 
program, I argue that there are tensions among some of the 
ideals. Insofar as an epistemically ideal scientific commu-
nity is thought to be cognitively diverse,6 the ideal is in ten-
sion not only with the requirement of shared standards,7 
but also with Douglas’s third ideal demanding that values 
in science are the “right values.” To better understand the 
tensions, I explain first why cognitive diversity is seen as 
an epistemic ideal. 
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2. What Is the Ideal of Cognitive Diversity? 
In order to understand why cognitive diversity is of ep-
istemic interest, it is necessary to introduce a distinction be-
tween cognitive and social diversity. A scientific 
community is cognitively diverse when its members have, 
for example, different research styles and skills, different 
perspectives on the subject matter of inquiry, or access to 
different bodies of empirical evidence. A scientific commu-
nity is socially diverse when its members have different 
non-epistemic values, such as moral and political values, or 
different social locations, such as gender, ethnic identity, 
nationality, and race. It is a matter of empirical inquiry to 
understand how social diversity might be connected to ep-
istemically beneficial cognitive diversity. 
A number of philosophers argue that cognitive diver-
sity is epistemically beneficial because it maintains a distri-
bution of research efforts in scientific communities, gives 
rise to critical perspectives, and generates new research 
problems. Cognitive diversity is not claimed to be an epis-
temic virtue intrinsically. The claim is rather that, under 
some circumstances, it promotes the epistemic goals of sci-
ence when these goals are understood to include significant 
truth8 or empirical success.9 In this section, I present a re-
view of arguments defending the epistemic benefits of cog-
nitive diversity. 
2.1 Distribution of Research Efforts 
In Philip Kitcher’s article “The Division of Cognitive La-
bor,” cognitive diversity is understood as a diversity of theo-
ries or methods addressing a common problem. Kitcher 
argues that cognitive diversity is epistemically beneficial in 
certain stages of inquiry, when it is not yet possible to tell 
which theory (or theories) will be true or most successful 
empirically, or which method (or methods) will lead to a 
breakthrough. When competing theories have different ep-




istemic virtues or when different methods have comple-
mentary advantages, it is more reasonable to distribute re-
sources among the theories or the methods than to allocate 
all available resources to one theory or method. 
Kitcher argues that a distribution of research efforts can 
be epistemically desirable even in an instance where it 
would be rational for all community members to agree that 
one theory is superior to its rivals. Kitcher suggests that at 
least some community members should pursue a theory 
that is widely known to be inferior to the most promising 
theory. While the pursuit of such a theory is not rational 
from an individual point of view (given a traditional con-
ception of rationality), it can be rational from a community 
point of view. It is in the interest of the community to main-
tain a competition among rival research programs. 
Kitcher also argues that even in an instance where com-
munity members are united in their understanding of the-
oretical virtues, a distribution of research efforts may be an 
outcome of scientists’ personal interest in credit. Instead of 
evaluating merely whether a theory is acceptable in light of 
available evidence and background information, a rational 
individual makes decisions strategically by anticipating 
other community members’ behavior. If an inferior theory 
turns out to be true, great credit will be due to those scien-
tists who have risked their careers for it. 
Kitcher’s arguments have been developed further by 
many philosophers. For example, in “Scientific Rationality 
and Human Reasoning,” Solomon argues that the geologi-
cal revolution between 1920s and 1960s is an example of 
scientific change where cognitive diversity played an epis-
temically positive role by creating a distribution of research 
efforts. Unlike Kitcher, Solomon does not believe that a dis-
tribution of research efforts will take place by “an invisible 
hand of reason.”10 She thinks that science policymakers and 
scientists who are in a position to make funding decisions 
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are responsible for ensuring that scientific disagreements 
are not closed prematurely.11 
2.2 Social Value Management 
In Longino’s contextual empiricism12—or critical con-
textual empiricism13—cognitive diversity is understood as 
a diversity of perspectives on the subject matter of inquiry. 
While cognitive diversity does not always go hand in hand 
with social diversity, Longino suggests that in many cases, 
a diversity of perspectives is an outcome of a diversity of 
social values in scientific communities. For example, when 
feminist scientists entered the field of human evolution, 
they introduced a novel perspective on the anatomical and 
behavioral development of human species. In the contro-
versy over human evolution in the 1970s, they challenged 
the “man the hunter” narrative by developing the “woman 
the gatherer” narrative to offer an alternative interpretation 
of empirical evidence. Neither perspective was apparent in 
light of empirical evidence. Both perspectives were value-
laden in the sense that they assumed the centrality of one 
sex’s behavior in the evolution of the entire species.14 
In contextual empiricism, cognitive diversity is thought 
to be epistemically beneficial not only because it generates 
a distribution of research efforts, but also because it gener-
ates critical exchanges in the community. Criticism can im-
prove scientific knowledge in many ways. It can help 
scientists identify and correct false beliefs or biased ac-
counts of the subject matter of inquiry. And even when crit-
icism does not give scientists a reason to reject a view, it can 
be epistemically valuable by forcing them to provide better 
arguments for their view or to communicate their view 
more clearly and effectively. Criticism can help scientists 
avoid dogmatism. 
Longino argues that a diversity of social values is epis-
temically beneficial because scientists are more likely to 
identify values that have influenced scientific research 




when the values in question are different from their own. 
As she explains, background assumptions may be value-
laden in the sense that they lead scientists to highlight cer-
tain morally and socially significant aspects of a phenome-
non over others, or they have morally and socially 
significant practical consequences, such as promoting one 
conception of human agency over another.15 
In order to keep the influence of social values at bay, 
scientific communities need to be constrained by the four 
norms of publicly recognized venues, uptake of criticism, 
shared standards, and tempered equality of intellectual au-
thority. This is needed to ensure objectivity.16  
2.3 Diversity of Social Experiences 
In feminist standpoint theory17—or standpoint empiri-
cism18—cognitive diversity is understood as a diversity of 
social experiences that have a bearing on scientific research. 
When cognitive diversity is understood in this way, it is 
closely related to a diversity of social locations. Thus, 
standpoint empiricism has affinities with social epistemol-
ogies that emphasize the epistemic benefits of democracy.19 
In both approaches, a diversity of social locations is seen as 
an epistemic resource because information that is relevant 
for understanding complex social phenomena is distrib-
uted across the society depending, among other things, on 
individuals’ social class, occupation, education, gender, 
race, and ethnic identity. 
Like many other philosophers, standpoint empiricists 
believe that cognitive diversity is epistemically valuable 
when it leads to a distribution of research efforts, critical 
perspectives, or novel lines of inquiry. In addition, stand-
point empiricists argue that a diversity of social experi-
ences brings yet another benefit to scientific communities: 
marginal or unprivileged social locations are potentially a 
source of insight on the way relations of power work in the 
society as well as in the production of scientific knowledge. 
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Standpoint empiricists argue that a marginal or unpriv-
ileged social location in and by itself may not have epistem-
ically interesting consequences unless it is developed into a 
standpoint. In their view, a standpoint is a collective rather 
than an individual achievement.20 Insofar as there is an ep-
istemic advantage associated with marginal or unprivi-
leged social locations, a scientific/intellectual movement is 
needed to realize the advantage. Scientific/intellectual 
movements are epistemically productive when they enable 
scientists to generate evidence under conditions where re-
lations of power tend to suppress or distort evidence, and 
they provide scientists with an epistemic community 
where they can receive fruitful criticism for research that 
may be ignored in the larger scientific community.21 
In sum, epistemically beneficial cognitive diversity can 
come in many forms—a diversity of theories, methods, per-
spectives, and social experiences—and have many causes. 
Cognitive diversity is thought to be epistemically beneficial 
for at least four reasons. One reason is that it generates a 
distribution of research efforts. As no one is in a position to 
know in advance which lines of inquiry will be fruitful, sci-
entific communities are better off by distributing their re-
sources among several different and sometimes competing 
theories and methods. Another reason to value cognitive 
diversity is that it is a source of critical perspectives, which 
can improve scientific knowledge in many ways. Critical 
perspectives are needed especially in those cases where sci-
entific research is value-laden. Yet another reason to value 
cognitive diversity is that it is a source of scientific creativ-
ity that can lead scientists to pursue new lines of inquiry, 
search for new evidence, propose new hypotheses and the-
ories, and develop new methods of inquiry. Finally, cogni-
tive diversity is especially epistemically fruitful in research 
projects that aim to produce evidence despite obstacles 
raised by association with power and social inequalities. 




3. Tensions Among Ideals 
Douglas, like many other philosophers, thinks that nor-
mative approaches to values and science should be con-
cerned with proper functioning of scientific communities. 
While there is some disagreement over what proper func-
tioning involves, most philosophers emphasize the im-
portance of publicly recognized standards. Shared 
standards are needed to ensure that theories, hypotheses, 
methods, and observational practices can be criticized in a 
meaningful way.22 Such standards are expected in order to 
ascertain what counts as an appropriate criticism that de-
serves uptake and what counts as a satisfying response to 
the criticism. What exactly the standards are depends, of 
course, on the specialty and the discipline we are concerned 
with. The standards are not beyond criticism, but at least 
some of them need to be widely accepted so that scientists 
can come to agree on appropriate criticism and response to 
criticism. 
I argue that there is a trade-off between the ideal of cog-
nitive diversity and the requirement of shared standards. 
While the ideal of cognitive diversity is meant to ensure 
that scientific communities benefit from a wide range of 
critical perspectives, the requirement of shared standards 
sets limits to the amount of cognitive diversity scientific 
communities can accommodate. The reason for this is that 
the requirement of shared standards excludes those critics 
who fail to follow the standards of the scientific commu-
nity, or at least a sufficiently large number of the standards. 
To what extent the shared-standards criterion limits the 
scope of appropriate criticism depends on how the criterion 
is understood.23 The challenge is to understand how many 
and which standards need to be shared for a scientific com-
munity to be able to function as a forum for meaningful 
criticism and response to criticism. Meeting this challenge 
involves striking a balance between cognitive diversity and 
shared standards. 
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Besides this trade-off, there is a tension between the 
ideal of cognitive diversity and the ideal of “getting the 
right values into science.” The latter ideal states that when 
moral and social values play legitimate roles in science, we 
need to ensure that they are the right values. Insofar as ep-
istemically beneficial cognitive diversity is generated by so-
cial diversity, it seems that almost any social diversity 
should be welcomed into scientific communities. This has 
led some philosophers to worry, I think rightly so, that the 
ideal of cognitive diversity will invite morally and politi-
cally problematic views into science, such as sexist and rac-
ist beliefs. Clearly, this was not the intention behind 
Kitcher’s, Solomon’s, and Longino’s arguments. Neverthe-
less, the concern is that despite good intentions, the ideal of 
cognitive diversity may be abused by sexists and racists to 
demand resources to scientific research that is complicit in 
sexist and racist ideologies.24 
I argue that the tension between the ideal of cognitive 
diversity and the ideal of “getting the right values into sci-
ence” can be reduced by giving more specific content to the 
latter ideal. If the latter ideal includes the requirement for 
tempered equality of intellectual authority,25 then it is in 
conflict with sexist and racist ideologies, which violate the 
view that all human beings deserve to be heard and treated 
respectfully. The requirement of tempered equality does 
not protect those speech acts that undermine the require-
ment itself.  
In response to the concern that the ideal of cognitive di-
versity invites problematic values into science, Daniel 
Hicks introduces the good faith principle. According to this 
principle, it is not sufficient to require that scientists play 
by the rules of scientific communities; they need to do so in 
good faith.26 Good faith participation in scientific commu-
nities requires that scientists do not reject the moral-politi-
cal principles that underwrite and motivate the norms of 
epistemic communities. Such principles, he argues, include 




formal egalitarianism and liberal pluralism.27 While the 
former states that all community members enjoy the same 
formal standing, the latter insists that there is room for rea-
sonable disagreement.28 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that any attempt to arrive at a synthesis 
of the five ideals will have to consider trade-offs and ten-
sions between ideals and requirements that seem to be in 
conflict. More specifically, I have argued that there are two 
tensions among the ideals: one between the ideals of cogni-
tive diversity and the requirement of shared standards, and 
the other between the ideals of cognitive diversity and “get-
ting the right values into science.” The research program 
envisioned by Douglas needs to strike a balance between 
these ideals.  
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Commentary on Lecture 1 
THE DESCRIPTIVE, THE NORMATIVE, 
AND THE ENTANGLEMENT OF 
VALUES IN SCIENCE 
Matthew J. Brown 
Heather Douglas has helped to set the standard for 
twenty-first century discussions in philosophy of science 
on the topics of values in science and science in democracy. 
Douglas’ work has been part of a movement to bring the 
question of values in science back to the center of the field 
and to focus especially on policy-relevant science. This first 
lecture, on the pervasive entanglement of science and val-
ues, includes an improved and definitive statement of the 
argument from inductive risk, which she is single-hand-
edly responsible for rehabilitating and returning to the cen-
ter of the debate. This statement makes clear the 
fundamental and absolutely pervasive nature of inductive 
risk and its import for our understanding of the role of val-
ues in science. The lecture also provides a survey of the cur-
rent field of alternative approaches to ideals for the 
epistemic role of values in science that is comprehensive 
and generous, yet critical of each. (The conceptual/seman-
tic role of values in science, i.e., the role of so-called thick 




normative concepts, is unfortunately omitted—a point I 
will return to.) 
In these brief comments, I focus on providing an alter-
native perspective on some conceptual and rhetorical is-
sues in Douglas’ account, specifically dealing with the 
nature of values and the relation of the descriptive and the 
normative. This will lead me to somewhat different evalu-
ations of two of the five new ideals for values in science that 
Douglas canvasses in the lecture. 
Clarifying “Values” 
What are we talking about when we speak of “values” 
in discussions of science and values? Lack of clarity on this 
point seems to me to be one of the biggest lacunae in the 
literature. Although there has been much work on the na-
ture of so-called epistemic values, and we’ve worried at 
length about the distinction between epistemic and non-ep-
istemic values, when it comes to understanding what val-
ues are in general, or what “non-epistemic” or “social” 
values are in particular, there is a serious gap. Few have 
thought systematically about the nature of values and how 
to draw on ethics to better inform the philosophy of sci-
ence.1 
Consider the “problem of wishful thinking” that plays 
such an important role in our contemporary discussions of 
values in science,2 including this lecture.3 The worry, 
briefly, is that if values enter into science in the wrong way, 
we will be led to conclusions based on what we wish to be 
the case, rather than what is the case. The framing of the 
problem itself presumes that values are something like 
wishes, desires, hopes, ideals, or visions of how the world 
ought to be. Is that what values are, in the relevant sense? 
Certainly that is one element of values, but it is not the only 
one. We use “values” to refer to desires, evaluations, judg-
ments, commitments, identities, ideals, and assumptions, 
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as well as social and institutional structures. We talk about 
acts, events, objects, and agents as having value (intrinsic 
or instrumental), and that seems to refer not to hopes and 
wishes, but to attributes of those things here and now (alt-
hough we might hope and wish for more of some and less 
of others based on their value). While philosophical liberals 
think of values in terms of the way the world ought to be, 
philosophical conservatives think of values in terms of pre-
serving what we currently have and enjoy. 
One dimension of the concept of values that I have been 
particularly keen to emphasize, following the work of John 
Dewey,4 is the distinction between valuing and evaluation, 
prizing and appraisal, between what we happen to like or 
dislike and the values certified by a process of value judg-
ment. Our pre-reflective values may lack evidential sup-
port, as do many of our habits, biases, assumptions, and 
received beliefs. Our value judgments, in the honorific 
sense of “judgment,” are the product of reflection and in-
quiry, and as such (according to Dewey), value judgments 
must have evidential support. Our well-established value 
judgments have been tested in practice under a variety of 
situations, and led to success—social, practical, emotional, 
and scientific.5 
Consider the example of feminist values. I say, “I am a 
feminist.” This is a statement of identity. How I act, includ-
ing how I act as a scientific inquirer, is shaped by how those 
actions relate to my identity. It involves a reflective com-
mitment to claims such as, “Women deserve to be treated 
fairly,” and “All persons, regardless of sex and gender, are 
equal.” A feminist ideal is, for example, the hope for a 
world where everyone gets equal pay for equal work irre-
spective of gender. My feminism is not a received view (far 
from it, given my upbringing), but is supported by per-
sonal and social value judgments. Feminist values have a 
good track record of guiding science into productive chan-
nels, whereas sexist values have the opposite sort of record. 




This fact lends feminist values further support. What’s 
more, the introduction of feminist structures into many 
fields has had a positive transformative effect on those 
fields. 
That’s just some of the complexity lurking behind the 
simple term “values.” This complexity matters in under-
standing the relationship between the descriptive and the 
normative, and how we evaluate ideals for determining the 
legitimate and illegitimate uses of values in science. 
Relating the Descriptive and the Normative 
One takeaway from the work on the science and values 
literature is that the much-discussed dichotomy between 
descriptive and normative, fact and value, “is” and 
“ought,” is overblown. Douglas shows us some key rea-
sons why that is, but still, in my view, gives too much credit 
to the distinction. 
Consider the bromide that one cannot derive an 
“ought” from an “is.” While it is true, strictly speaking, this 
sense of “derive” is unreasonably narrow and restrictive. In 
the same degree, one also cannot derive a generalization 
from a finite set of particular cases, nor can one derive a 
theoretical claim—say, about the charge of the electron—
from a set of observations—say, of floating oil droplets.6 
The failure doesn’t tell us much of interest about the rela-
tion between the two.7 
Consider another way Douglas puts the concern about 
the relation between descriptive and normative: “Making a 
whole set of descriptive claims (with nothing else) does not 
make an adequate argument for a normative claim,” nor 
vice versa, which again, is true.8 But also, if Douglas is cor-
rect, a whole set of descriptive claims (with nothing else) 
does not suffice to make an argument for a (nontrivial) de-
scriptive claim, because one must evaluate inductive risks. 
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Nor, except maybe in the most abstract ethical theorizing, 
does a whole set of normative claims (with nothing else) 
suffice to make an adequate argument for a normative 
claim. So it’s a limited point. 
There are also claims that sit uncomfortably astride the 
descriptive/normative dichotomy, those that involve what 
Bernard Williams called “thick concepts.”9 Concepts like 
“gender,” “equality,” “poverty,” and “well-being” all have 
an inextricable mix of descriptive and evaluative content, 
and the attempt to regiment concepts into purely descrip-
tive and normative ones distorts what such concepts mean 
and impair our ability to articulate, operationalize, and rea-
son with such concepts.10 What’s more, thick concepts (and 
the explanations and models that incorporate them) play a 
central role in many parts of psychological, social, and bio-
logical sciences. When reasoning about and making judg-
ments using such concepts, value judgments are always 
necessary. 
What Douglas seems most concerned about is not the 
distinction between normative and descriptive, valuable 
and factual, per se, but a particular aspect of that distinc-
tion, between the ideal and the actual. Here we can draw a 
pretty sharp distinction, at least given a specific context, 
and for much the same reason that Douglas focuses on. It 
would be a grave mistake to confuse the ideal for the actual. 
This would be the epitome of wishful thinking, and a mis-
understanding of the role of ideals. And yet, worthy ideals 
are also not rootless fantasies. They have what Dewey calls 
an “active relation” to the actual, which distinguishes them 
as worthy ideals rather than mere fantasies—a realizability, 
a partial realization, a concreteness gained by successfully 
guiding action and social effort.11 
As argued above, well-established value judgments 
have both evidential support and success guiding action 
under their belt. Some have success guiding scientific in-
quiry as well. Thus, contra Hempel, in the moderate holism 




that is the lot of scientific epistemology, when such judg-
ments enter into scientific inquiry, value judgments can 
lend their own support to evidence and hypothesis. 
On Role Restrictions 
Douglas is right that we need to rely on several of the 
ideals in the literature to distinguish legitimate from illegit-
imate uses of values in science. What’s more, something 
must be right about her approach to delimiting specific 
roles for values in science. But I think there are two kinds 
of problems with the direct/indirect role distinction, and 
the way Douglas uses the distinction to restrict the roles for 
values in science. First, I suggest that we need a better basis 
for the role restrictions, but that basis, properly under-
stood, problematizes some of the claims that Douglas 
makes. Second, I think the distinction is too simple to cover 
the various roles that values of different types should play 
in different phases of scientific inquiry. 
According to Douglas, evidence or values play a direct 
role in science when they act as reasons in themselves. Val-
ues play an indirect role, instead, when they “help assess 
whether the available evidence is sufficient for an inference 
or choice.”12 Values can and should play a direct role when 
it comes to external decisions about research agenda or 
methodology, but only evidence should play a direct role 
in internal, inferential, justificatory moments, while values 
should be relegated to an indirect role. This restriction is 
intuitively plausible. Ordinarily, values seem not to be the 
right sort of thing to justify empirical claims, whereas evi-
dence is. On the other hand, values do seem to motivate or 
justify actions or practical decisions, such as what research 
we choose to spend our time and money on, or how we 
ought to treat research subjects. 
Several detractors have found the direct/indirect dis-
tinction and restriction obscure.13 I suggest that we need to 
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find a more basic justification for the plausibility of the dis-
tinction. I see two sources of justification. One is the distinc-
tion between reasons to act (practical reasons) and reasons for 
claims (theoretical reasons). Reasons to act provide motiva-
tions to do something or make a certain decision; they also 
justify, in the ethical or practical sense, the action taken or 
the decision made. Reasons for claims, on the other hand, 
stand in logical relationships to those claims; they justify 
them in the epistemic sense. What the inductive risk argu-
ment shows, in my view, is that no amount of reasons for 
claims compels us to jump the inferential gap from reasons 
for a claim to reasons to assert or infer that claim. Assertions 
and inferences are actions, and as such require values to 
justify them. 
When it comes to assertion, reasons to act becomes a 
tricky matter. The norms of assertion are the second source 
of what’s right in the role-restriction ideal.14 Inductive risk 
is a necessary consideration in assertion, because one has a 
moral obligation to consider the perlocutionary effects of 
one’s assertions.15 In terms of role restriction, it is central to 
the norms of assertion that one should not assert something 
you know or believe to be false (the sincerity norm). This 
norm is of course, defeasible; sometimes it is permissible or 
even obligatory to lie, and a lie does not cease to be an as-
sertion.16 But one does so at the cost of corrupting the prac-
tice of assertion and the social relations that normally 
depend on it.  
The worst cases of values playing a direct role, for in-
stance, making a claim that flies in the face of the evidence, 
amounts to a major violation of the norms of assertion, such 
as the sincerity norm, or the requirement that one have ev-
idence or be able to defend one’s entitlement to assert the 
claim.17 That one might do so on the basis of other norms 
of assertion does not mean that such assertions are unprob-
lematic. Other putative violations of the direct role re-
striction may be less problematic, however, such as when 




one refuses to assert a claim that one has sufficient evidence 
for because of its problematic consequences, as remaining 
silent never violates the norms of assertion. Nevertheless, 
it seems that the norms of assertion, and likewise the role 
restrictions, are defeasible, if only in extreme circumstances 
and at significant cost. One does not fail to assert when one 
lies, and one does not fail to do science when one makes an 
assertion because it fits with one’s values; but in both cases, 
one does something pro tanto wrong. Of course, in such a 
case, one does prima facie bad science and might even fail 
to do science at all, for example by failing to present any 
evidence. But the direct role restriction, justified in this 
way, is not an indefeasible condition on science as such.  
When the direct role for values is permissible, it is be-
cause the values are providing reasons to act. When the di-
rect role for values is impermissible, it is because we are 
talking about reasons for claims, and values don’t provide 
reasons for claims (at least, they don’t ordinarily do so, or 
are not thought to do so). The indirect role, I think, is based 
in the limitations on other values created by the norms of 
assertion, especially the sincerity and evidential conditions, 
whose violation is rarely justified, and cannot be engaged 
in without damaging the practice of assertion (and so the 
practice of science). But the norms of assertion may not al-
ways line up with the way Douglas has laid out the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect roles.18 
Finally, is it always true that values cannot provide rea-
sons for claims, that is, provide evidence or epistemic sup-
port? In some cases, that seems right: that I value honesty 
does not mean that I or any other person tells the truth reg-
ularly. On the other hand, there is a long tradition of femi-
nist philosophy of science arguing that, in certain cases, 
values do provide evidence for claims.19 Consider, again, 
feminist values. For many, these values are the product of 
value judgments—the result of a process of inquiry justi-
fied by evidence. Feminist values are not simple or precise, 
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but a broad network of value claims, many of which in-
volve thick concepts. Action based on these values has im-
proved many lives in a wide variety of contexts. They also 
have a strong track record of success in guiding inquiry 
fruitfully and helping uncover flaws and biases in past 
studies. Certainly, I should not simply infer from these 
value judgments to claims that “People do receive equal 
pay for equal work irrespective of their gender” or 
“Women today are accorded as much respect as men.” This 
would be to confuse the ideal and the actual. But can I infer 
that “Men and women have equal natural talents at math, 
or near enough for practical purposes”? Can I justifiably as-
sert, on the basis of these values, that “This study that 
shows divergent mathematical abilities in men and women 
is probably flawed”? I am inclined to say yes to both, based 
on the particular nature and status of these value judg-
ments, just as I am inclined to dismiss until further research 
comes in news of physicists observing superluminal speeds 
or reports about “miracle” drugs. Good value judgments, 
like well-grounded theories or seasoned experience, carry 
epistemic weight. 
The direct/indirect roles distinction and the role-re-
striction ideal assume overly simplistic distinctions be-
tween discovery and justification, external and internal 
aspects of science, as well as too simple a view of the land-
scape of values. We need a more complex account of the 
roles for values, given a richer theory of scientific practice 
than the context distinction provides, and the varying types 
and statuses of values that play a role in science. That said, 
I think the role restriction ideal as Douglas describes it re-
mains our best account to date of the roles of values in sci-
ence. For all its flaws (if they are, in fact, flaws), none of the 
distinction’s detractors have provided anything like an ad-
equate replacement. In terms of practical advice, it pro-
vides the best framework on the table. 




On Getting Values Right 
Again, I agree with Douglas that something like the 
ideal of getting the values right is a crucial supplement to 
an account of the proper roles of values in science. How-
ever, Douglas lumps together some views that need to be 
carefully distinguished. 
First, we need to distinguish views (1) where the “right 
values” are a categorical absolute;20 (2) where the “right 
values” are hypothetically given by the aims of inquirers;21 
and (3) where value judgment is a process of determining the 
right values for the situation (which is the view I favor). If 
what we want to do is use the right values, understood as 
absolutes, then the contestation of values creates some sig-
nificant uncertainty for practitioners, in the same way that 
“truth” creates problems for the prioritization of epistemic 
values.22 On the hypothetical view, we take the values of 
the inquirers as given, and the contestation is really an ex-
ternal argument about which kind of inquiry we should 
pursue. On the other hand, what contestation tells a value-
judgment-oriented view is that we need to look for the 
value judgments that are warranted by inquiry and those 
that are not, or, failing that, that inquiry remains to be done. 
It is true that to provide adequate guidance, such a view 
needs to provide a robust account of value judgment or 
value inquiry, but there are already a variety of thinkers 
working in this direction.23 
Let me say one final thing about what we should do 
when our evidence seems to clash with our value commit-
ments. Certainly, the right-values ideal is not committed to 
“rejecting the evidence because we do not like what it 
says.”24 If we reject the evidence, it is because we are con-
vinced it is wrong. Is it possible to justifiably believe that 
the evidence is wrong (or misinterpreted) based on values? 
In certain cases of the type I have already mentioned, yes. 
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But the values in question are not mere desires and prefer-
ences, nor are they ideals or “pious hopes.” They are reflec-
tive, evidentially warranted judgments. 
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SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: 
SQUARING EXPERTISE WITH 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Heather Douglas 
Introduction: The Challenge of Science in Democracy 
Science is neither a value-free endeavor nor a value-free 
product. Social and ethical values interweave themselves 
throughout the practice of science, from the choice of the 
direction of research, to methodological choices, to infer-
ence decisions, to dissemination and application decisions. 
We can trace scientific practice and see how the values en-
tangled themselves in science. (Indeed, this is something 
historians and philosophers of science do quite well). 
Through such investigations, we can find judgments we 
disagree with, or evidence of improperly used values. Do-
ing so, we can conceptually untangle evidence and values, 
but only at the cost of taking apart the claims made. When 
we want to remake the claims, we make new decisions and 
conduct new experiments—perhaps with different values 
this time—thus producing new claims. So while we can 
trace the influence of values on science, we cannot squeeze 
them out. They are woven into the fabric of science.1 




We need to depend on this fabric, on the knowledge that 
science produces, for decision-making in democratic socie-
ties. Having as accurate and robust empirical information 
as we can for policy decisions is central to good govern-
ance. To ignore the empirical information that science pro-
duces would be folly, as has been shown in examples from 
Lysenko in the former Soviet Union, to HIV controversies 
in South Africa, to the slowness of the world’s response to 
climate change. The eradication of smallpox and the grad-
ual reversal of decline of the ozone layer and its beginning 
recovery are illustrations of the success of science inform-
ing governance.2 
Science is important for its aid in producing instrumen-
tal success, giving us new understandings and capacities to 
act in the world. In addition to instrumental success, a well-
run scientific endeavor also produces knowledge that calls 
for our attention and has the potential to shift our commu-
nal priorities, particularly in the discovery of unexpected 
impacts of our societal decisions and technological choices, 
and in the undermining of empirical presuppositions of 
long-standing ideological commitments. We need science 
to provide ongoing critical engagement with the empirical 
underpinnings of our understanding of the world.  
So the science we produce should not just be a reflection 
of the values that we hold, be they tacit or explicit. Even 
with values interwoven throughout scientific practice, the 
role of the empirical, and the evidence that may not fit with 
one’s expectations, creates the potential for the unexpected 
and the disruptive. And the practice of critical engagement 
among scientists should foster this potential. Ironically, the 
very thing that creates robustness in science—diverse ac-
tors engaging critically with each other over empirical in-
formation—creates instability in the knowledge we use for 
governance. The lack of fixed and permanent points in sci-
ence is central to its robustness, but means the knowledge 
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on which we depend will be inherently unstable, always 
revisable (even if never actually revised). 
In addition, since the professionalization and speciali-
zation of science in the nineteenth century, science has be-
come carved up into distinct areas of expertise. No one 
person can master all of science anymore. Even profes-
sional scientists are only experts in some areas of investiga-
tion, and the knowledge explosion that characterizes the 
past century demands specific expertise for specific prob-
lems. Such expertise is often opaque to nonexperts: hard to 
understand and even more difficult to assess. Though the 
languages of specialization help experts talk efficiently to 
other experts, they impede understanding for the broader 
populace.  
Yet experts bring with them a facility with judgments 
(in their area of expertise) that can be invaluable. Genuine 
experts in their expert terrain have a sense of what is im-
portant, and what is not. Experts know which confounders 
must be controlled for, and how it should be done. Experts 
know which paths have been tried before and failed, and 
which remain open and enticing. Experts possess an aware-
ness of their own ignorance, of the limits of their 
knowledge, as it is on the edge of those limits that they 
work. 
Specialized expertise has produced tremendous empir-
ical success, but it also poses a tremendous challenge to 
democratic governance. We need experts to inform our 
governance decisions, but we also need those decisions to 
be democratically accountable. We need experts “to be on 
tap, but not on top.”3 What does this mean and what should 
it mean in practice? We need governance to be assessable 
by the public, because that is who will make the recall de-
cisions for the government. And we need those in power to 
be able to access and use expertise in a transparent way, so 
the public can assess what those in power are doing, par-




ticularly in response to the available expertise. How is sci-
entific expertise to be utilized by the government in demo-
cratic societies, given the specialization of expertise, where 
it seems that experts can only be assessed by other experts? 
And, given the ineliminability of values from expert judg-
ments and knowledge, how should science and democracy 
interact? How should the values that shape science be part 
of the democratic accountability of science? 
The crux of the challenge of science in democratic soci-
eties is thus created by these three background conditions: 
1) the reality of value-laden scientific knowledge and ex-
pertise, 2) the importance of scientific expertise for good 
decision-making, and 3) the general difficulty of assessing 
expertise for the nonexpert. We need to think through our 
democratic institutions, particularly those on the science-
policy interface, to structure them so that science retains its 
robustness but is also accountable to the democratic society 
in which it functions. In this lecture, I will address two cen-
tral kinds of institutions, science advising (part of science 
for policy) and research funding (part of policy for science). 
There are many other locations where science and policy—
or more broadly, science and democratic politics—meet, in-
cluding (and here is just a partial list): citizen science, 
crowdfunding scientific research, moral restrictions on sci-
entific research, privacy concerns (especially in our big-
data era), dual-use/dangerous research (and related re-
strictions on communication and publication of research re-
sults), and the scientific underpinnings of the democratic 
process (which is often built on census data). Obviously I 
cannot address all of this here, but I hope to show how to 
think in general about science-policy interfaces in demo-
cratic societies, and by doing so, provide a start on how to 
address the range of interfaces we have.  
Before proceeding with a closer examination of exper-
tise, we should set aside simplistic dreams of scientism, of 
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science determining all of our decisions for us. Science can-
not tell us what we should do—it provides the best empir-
ical claims available with which to make decisions, but it 
cannot provide the normative claims with which to pro-
ceed. The idea that science can tell us what to value all on 
its own has occasionally been quite popular but those who 
make such arguments usually have implicit, and often 
quite controversial, normative commitments they smuggle 
into their arguments. Sam Harris, for example, presumes 
that the aim of social decisions should be to make people 
happy (to be assessed by looking at brain states), a clearly 
utilitarian perspective.4 Whether this might be the wrong 
thing to do when it violates rights to autonomy is some-
thing to which Harris seems oblivious. Neil deGrasse Ty-
son’s recent calls for a country of “Rationalia” similarly 
overlooks the need for clear normative commitments and 
decisions regarding thorny issues of justice in any well-
governed society.5 Science is not enough for such decisions, 
not even as value laden as it is. We need clearheaded social 
and ethical values for such decisions, and it is these that are 
at the center of both ethical discourse and (ideally) political 
debate. 
We want science to inform what we do, but science can-
not tell us what to do. How do we keep expertise on tap, 
but not on top? How should we evaluate the expertise we 
need (when we cannot become specialists in everything 
ourselves), and how do we assess the values that we know 
pervade expert judgment? Finally, how do we ensure that 
the expertise we need is being properly pursued, with in-
tegrity and relevant focus? I will begin answering these 
questions by first describing the nature of expertise, before 
turning to questions of how to hold experts accountable, 
and what we should hold them accountable for, in demo-
cratic societies. 
  




The Nature of Expertise 
What is expertise? As noted above, the cultivation of ex-
pertise generates a facility with a particular context, so that 
judgments are well attuned to what is known to work, what 
is known not to work, and where the uncertainties and 
complexities lie. Particular forms of expertise can be de-
scribed along a spectrum, from those whose success criteria 
are readily assessed by the non-expert, to those for whom 
functioning well is difficult for nonexperts to assess. Exam-
ples of readily assessable expertise include chess masters 
(do they win their games?), magicians (do they pull off the 
illusion?), and car mechanics (is the car fixed?). We depend 
upon these kinds of experts to get things done, and when 
they are done well, we can (usually) tell. As Aristotle 
pointed out, the partaker of a feast can assess the quality of 
the food as well as the chef who made it, even if the par-
taker would be quite unable to produce such food.6 And as 
Dewey pointed out, the wearer of a shoe can tell readily 
whether it hurts her foot, and thus evaluate the quality of 
the shoemaker’s craft.7 Some kinds of experts wear their ca-
pacity on their metaphorical sleeve for all to see. 
But as we move along the spectrum, it becomes more 
difficult for nonexperts to assess whether the expert is suc-
cessfully making judgments within their field. We might be 
able to assess when a weather forecaster is making good 
projections (did it rain or not?), but climate modelers are 
concerned with much larger scales (both spatially and tem-
porally) than we readily experience. Whether their exper-
tise is reliable is not assessable in so direct a fashion. Similar 
concerns arise for some of the most controversial areas of 
expertise, such as epidemiology (concerned as it is with 
population level effects and always hedged with concern 
for confounders) or ecology (where complexity, issues of 
scale, and confounders are common). When an area of sci-
ence grapples with complicated real-world processes that 
cannot be easily isolated (spatially or temporally), and 
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where science that pinpoints causal explanations accu-
rately might be swamped by confounders in actual prac-
tice, expertise is harder to assess. Nevertheless, expertise 
remains crucial in these more complex contexts. 
There are, of course, specializations that fall in the mid-
dle along this spectrum. Our healthcare providers (dentists 
and doctors, for example) can have their efforts to help us 
thwarted by confounders in practice, and thus it can take 
longer to assess success in these cases. Still, we usually stop 
going to a dentist who cannot help a toothache, or only 
seems to make it worse. We stop going to doctors (or we 
should) whose treatments exacerbate our symptoms, par-
ticularly over the long term. Readily assessable success is 
not a digital affair (either applicable or not), and it might be 
more or less difficult to assess success of a particular expert. 
Thus, we can spread expertise out along a spectrum of 
whether nonexperts can assess the expert in terms of raw 
success. We can debate whether some expertise (e.g., econ-
omists) should be held to standards of raw success or not. 
But what should be clear is that some kinds of expertise, or 
cases of the application of expertise, should not be damned 
as faux expertise merely because the expertise failed to suc-
cessfully guide our action or to accurately predict events. 
For some expertise, failure in particular instances of prac-
tice is not due to a failure of expertise, but due to real-world 
complexity, the action of confounders or unexpected 
events, or to the failure of population level information to 
apply properly to particular people. Failure in application 
is not always the expert’s fault. 
So what should we ask of experts in cases where raw 
success is not the correct measure of successful expertise? 
How do we know whether an expert actually has expertise? 
One fruitful account is from Julia Annas’ discussion of ex-
pertise regarding moral knowledge. She writes:  




Expertise requires that the expert, unlike the mere muddler or 
the person with the unintellectual knack, be able to “give an 
account” (logon didonai) of what it is that she is an expert 
in. The expert, but not the dabbler, can explain why she is 
doing what she is doing; instead of being stuck with inarticu-
lacy, or being reduced to saying that “it feels right this way,” 
she can explain why this is, here and now, the appropriate 
thing to do in these circumstances.8 
Here is what we should demand from experts whose 
success cannot be readily measured: Experts should be able 
to give an account, an explanation, for why they think what 
they think. They should be able to say what went into their 
judgments, where they felt the important judgments were, 
and on what basis they made them. It is not just the pres-
ence of judgment that makes someone an expert, but their 
ability to say why they think what they think that makes 
them an expert, particularly when success is not easily dis-
played.  
What should inform expert judgment? And what 
should be on display (rather than success) when an expert 
gives an account of their judgments? Clearly, the epistemic 
underpinnings of expertise should be a substantial part of 
the account given. Current explanations for the phenomena 
at issue, and how the expert understands the phenomena, 
should be presented. For example, if an expert judges that 
a class of pesticides is a potential cause for a bee die-off, the 
expert should explain why, given their knowledge, that is 
a plausible judgment (because of the known effects of the 
pesticide, including how it kills pests; the nature of deaths; 
the timing of the problem; etc.).  
But also on display should be the uncertainties and cru-
cial points of judgment (particularly where other experts 
might judge differently). Thus, for this example, the expert 
should also explain what other factors might be at play, and 
why they view them as more or less plausible causal 
agents. Finally, part of the presentation of expert judgment 
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should include the social and ethical values that shape ex-
pert judgment, in the directing of expert attention, in what 
methods are available for expert investigation (for exam-
ple, some desirable methods are not available for pursuing 
information about the pesticide because the value of bees 
prohibits enough hives to be available for large-scale con-
trolled studies on bees, and doing controlled studies in the 
field is extremely difficult as bees go where they will), and 
in the assessment of evidential sufficiency (through induc-
tive risk). Our expert should make clear why they view the 
evidence as sufficient for any claims made, both in terms of 
the strength of the evidence and in terms of the risks they 
are concerned about if they make an inaccurate claim. Both 
aspects depend upon their expertise, but the second de-
pends as well on the values they used. 
Experts often make such values clear in their statements 
already. They make statements about concerns for under- 
or overregulation when discussing their work, or about 
waiting too long or acting prematurely. This is part of ex-
pertise, the judgments that are essential to expertise, and 
why we rely upon those experts. Giving an account of one’s 
judgment as an expert thus involves both reference to the 
explanatory structure that underlies the area of expertise 
and to the social and ethical values that frame the problem 
and assess the sufficiency of the available evidence. Just as 
there is no value-free science, there is no value-free exper-
tise. What does this mean for the accountability of experts 
acting as science advisors in democracies? 
Science Advising: Accountability Mechanisms in Practice 
How should experts be held accountable, through dem-
ocratic mechanisms, for the judgments that are necessary 
for expertise to function? Describing accountability re-
quires a description of who experts are accountable to and 
what they are accountable for. I will argue here that there 




are two groups to which experts giving science advice 
should be accountable: 1) their home expert community for 
the accuracy of their claims, and 2) the citizenry for the 
value judgments embedded in their claims. However, for 
full accountability for the value judgments in expertise, the 
expert community is needed as well, because whether an 
expert is actually deploying value judgments properly can 
often only be fully assessed by other experts. 
Accountability to Experts for Accuracy 
The first arm of accountability is clearly needed. Exper-
tise, especially scientific expertise, is developed within an 
epistemic community, and it is that community that is per-
fectly positioned to assess the reasonableness and accuracy 
of an expert’s claims. If an expert claims something that is 
obviously erroneous, it is other experts who are best posi-
tioned to notice and to call the expert into account.  
This is precisely what did not happen in the case of 
L’Aquila. It is well known that science advisors were tried 
and convicted for providing a negligent earthquake risk as-
sessment. (Their convictions have since been overturned.) 
While there are many things that can be said about this ep-
isode, two failures stand out. First was that the seismologi-
cal experts that were part of the risk commission failed to 
correct statements made on their behalf about earthquake 
risk prior to the large earthquake that killed 300 people. A 
public official claimed that that the small tremors were de-
creasing the risk of a major quake, with the supposed back-
ing of the risk commission. In fact, it was known that the 
opposite was true for that region. Small tremors increase 
the risk of a major quake, as was well known by the experts 
in the room. While they made no such public claim, neither 
did they correct the public official who did. As a result of 
the public official’s statements, many people changed their 
usual behavior (which was to abandon their homes and 
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spend the night in the town square when such small trem-
ors occurred). It was this change of behavior, and the 30 
traceable deaths that resulted, for which the experts were 
ultimately tried.9 
The second failure was of the broader scientific commu-
nity in response to the charges leveled at the scientists. The 
international scientific community was outraged when the 
scientists were charged, and news stories and petitions cir-
culated that the scientists were being tried for “failing to 
predict an earthquake.”10 This, as the judge in the case 
made very clear, was simply not true. No one expected the 
experts to accurately predict an earthquake. What was ex-
pected was an accurate risk assessment, and this is what the 
experts failed to provide (either in the meeting or in re-
sponse to the public official’s statements). So both the local 
experts failed to correct an inaccurate risk statement and 
the broader scientific community failed to hold the local ex-
perts to account for their failure. The L’Aquila case shows 
the difficulties of experts holding each other publicly ac-
countable for failures of expertise. When threatened, com-
munities of experts tend to circle the wagons rather than to 
critically examine each other. 
The L’Aquila case also shows that inaccurate claims, 
saying things that are known to be misleading or false, are 
not just a failure with respect to the expert community from 
which the expert comes, but also a failure for those whom 
the expert is advising as well as the citizens who need good 
advice. In this case, getting it wrong caused people to 
change their behavior, resulting in their death or the death 
of family members. So getting things wrong, when it is 
known that what the expert saying is wrong, is a failure for 
all parties involved. But it is the expert community who has 
to spot such missteps and correct them. It would be too 
much to ask that nonexperts generally spot and correct ex-
pert missteps (although it may be something nonexperts 




can occasionally do). Specialization, and its resulting en-
demic epistemic dependencies, requires that experts hold 
each other accountable for saying things known to be 
wrong. 
It is crucial that expert communities resist the urge to 
protect their own when a member of their community errs 
and/or makes false claims. They need to show that they 
will hold each other accountable for claims made both 
within the expert community and in more public forums. It 
is on such critical practices that our reliance on expertise is 
(in part) grounded. Expert communities that fail to do this, 
particularly when claims are made in public realms, 
weaken substantially the integrity and reliability of the ex-
pertise upon which the public depends. 
Accountability to the Public for Value Judgments 
In addition to the accountability to the expert commu-
nity for general accuracy and competency, experts need to 
be held accountable for the value judgments that are em-
bedded in their expertise. This is a more complex account-
ability arrangement than basic competency and accuracy. 
In the next section, I will discuss the value judgments that 
shape which research is done, i.e., what experts research 
and thus develop their expertise about. In this section, I will 
focus on the making of claims by experts and the value 
judgments that are needed to assess the (already available) 
evidence. These value judgments, regarding which claims 
the evidence is sufficient for, are required to support the 
argument from inductive risk, and are central to the pro-
cess of expert advising, when the expert must decide which 
claims to make given the available evidence. Experts 
should make clear the values informing these decisions, 
both so that accountability mechanisms to the broader pub-
lic can work and also so experts can assist with the account-
ability of their fellow experts.  
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Before explaining how advisors can be held accountable 
for value judgments in their work, we need a general un-
derstanding of how science advising works in practice in 
democratic societies. 
Science advising is a complex process that is institution-
alized in many different ways across different political cul-
tures and science-policy contexts. For example, there are 
science advisors embedded within government working 
for elected officials, science advisory committees struck by 
government agencies, and independent advisory bodies 
that are on call for government needs. None of these science 
advisory mechanisms is in general superior to the others. 
Rather, what is more important for science advisory mech-
anisms is that 1) they fit with the existing democratic prac-
tices and institutions of the country,11 and 2) there be a 
robust set of advisory mechanisms available. I have yet to 
learn of a science advisory system where only one institu-
tional mechanism sufficed. Government is complex, and 
most contemporary governments will require science advi-
sory mechanisms that reflect that complexity. 
That said, we can characterize two general kinds of ad-
vising mechanisms—informal vs. formal science advice—
both of which are needed. For formal science advice, a com-
mittee must be struck to address a particular question or 
provide comment on an issue or report. The committee is 
often interdisciplinary in nature (as most interesting ques-
tions these days are not adequately addressed within one 
discipline). The purpose of the committee is to provide a 
way for the experts to discuss an issue with each other, to 
explore the relevant literature, to draw on the diverse ex-
pertise represented in the group, and to draft a report re-
flecting what the committee thinks in response to the 
instigating question or issue. This is rarely a quick process, 
usually requiring a few months at least. Examples of advi-
sory mechanisms in this category include national academy 




of science committee reports (whether from the US Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, the Canadian Council of Acad-
emies, or the UK’s Royal Society), standing advisory 
committee reports (such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Science Advisory Board in the US or the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change), and officially sanc-
tioned ad hoc committees. Any committee struck that 
drafts an official report should be considered formal sci-
ence advice. The reports are often authoritative (if done 
well), providing a comprehensive look at the relevant liter-
ature and helping policymakers and politicians make sense 
of what to think about the available evidence (and where 
future research might fill crucial gaps).  
This kind of advice can be contrasted with informal ad-
vice—that which occurs when a science advisor speaks 
one-on-one with a democratically accountable individual 
(usually a directly accountable decision maker, such as an 
elected politician or a political appointee). The science ad-
visor is frequently someone of the advisee’s choosing, and 
the relationship of advisor to advisee is one built on per-
sonal trust (if it is working well). The advice is rarely made 
public, and this is crucial to its ability to assist government 
officials. Part of what makes informal advice so effective is 
the ability of the science advisor to correct ill-informed un-
derstandings of technical issues held by the advisee. The 
advisee needs to feel free to express potentially naïve, or 
outright dumb, ideas, and to hear what the advisor has to 
say about them. Chief science advisor positions are para-
digmatic of this kind of structure for science advising. 
These two kinds of science advice require different ac-
countability mechanisms. For formal advice, the committee 
can be democratically accountable through both the repre-
sentation of different perspectives among different mem-
bers of the committee and through the expression of the 
value judgments needed to come to the conclusions of its 
final reports (even divergent value judgments). Members 
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of the public can then assess the reliability of the expert ad-
vice by examining whether an appropriate range of exper-
tise and perspective are embodied by the committee and 
whether the value judgments expressed by the committee 
in its reports are acceptable. Indeed, these two accountabil-
ity mechanisms for formal advice can reinforce each other 
in practice, as a more diverse committee is more likely to 
explicate differences in value judgments among members 
and air those in their deliberations; thus, the final report is 
more likely (although not guaranteed) to be both explicit 
and accurate in describing those commitments, enabling 
both the advisees and the general public to see how exper-
tise is operating. 
For informal advice, the advice often remains hidden, 
publicly inaccessible. And as the advice comes from one 
person, it is unlikely that the values will be as well expli-
cated. But here the traditional mechanisms of democratic 
accountability (through electoral politics) come to the fore. 
The advisee is often an elected official (or directly ap-
pointed by an elected official), and part of what we elect 
people for is for their values, their character, and the nature 
of their judgment. The advisor is thus held accountable to 
the democratic public through their close relationship with 
the advisee, who is held directly accountable to the demo-
cratic public.12 The advisee should pick an advisor whose 
judgment she or he trusts, and this is a matter of both com-
petency and some shared values. The advisor need not 
have identical values, but there usually needs to be some 
overlap, so that what is of concern to the advisee gets 
properly addressed by the advisor. 
This accountability through shared values with the pub-
lic official does not mean, however, that the advisor should 
just say things the advisee will agree with. An informal sci-
ence advisor should not be a yes-man or -woman. Values 
should not dictate what the advisor thinks; the empirical 
evidence still matters a great deal. Having an advisor who 




is broadly respected by the expert community from which 
they are drawn will thus be crucial, as that will create some 
accountability to the expert community for the accurate ev-
idential basis of the advice given. And it is for this kind of 
independence that some informal advising systems work 
well with appointments that last through multiple govern-
ments, i.e., multiple elected officials. But if the values of the 
elected official clash with that of the advisor, that is a good 
reason to find a different advisor—both the trust relation-
ship and the accountability mechanisms for the advising 
need at least some shared values. 
One might be wondering, given this difference in kind, 
where the L’Aquila risk commission is on this topography. 
That was clearly a science advising body, a committee in 
form, yet because it was not drafting a report, it provided 
something more akin to informal advice than formal ad-
vice. Which brings us to a third kind of advising mecha-
nism: advice for crises. When time is short and problems 
potentially acute, a full formal science advising mechanism 
is often impractical. But getting advice from one person 
will be incomplete. In such cases, committees are often 
struck to provide advice in response to immediate, short-
term concerns. For such committees, lengthy reporting and 
drafting processes get in the way of providing timely ad-
vice. For these kinds of committees, representation of dif-
ferent perspectives (both disciplinary and value-based) 
becomes even more important. (It does not seem the L’Aq-
uila risk commission had this kind of diversity, which 
might also be why it failed in its advisory function.) 
In short, we have some plausible accountability mecha-
nisms for the value judgments embedded in expert advice 
across several advising structures. The important thing is 
that at least one of the mechanisms be operational when 
science advice is given. If there is no such mechanism, it is 
too easy for science advice to be abused and for the mantle 
of scientific authority to cloak ideological commitments or 
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political pandering. If, for example, formal advice is not 
made public and yet still has the appearance of a thorough 
examination of the issue by a strong committee, a politician 
can claim any preferred policy is supported by the advice, 
whether or not that is true (as Nixon did regarding the Pres-
idential Science Advisory Committee report on supersonic 
transport in 1969).13 If, for example, informal advice is 
given privately, but no basis of trust exists between the ad-
visor and the advisee, the advice is unlikely to be heeded, 
and again the advisee can claim the mantle of scientific ex-
pertise having informed the final decision. While no system 
is immune from potential corruption, thinking through and 
instantiating some accountability mechanisms at least re-
duces the ease of possible abuse. Having some accountabil-
ity structures recognized and in place helps ensure that 
science advice is utilized properly in the democratic pro-
cess. 
In addition to ensuring accountability mechanisms for 
each advising structure, the potential for corruption and 
abuse is reduced by having a robust plurality of advising 
mechanisms. For example, having formal advice produced 
both within and without the government (from standing 
government committees and external bodies such as na-
tional academies), and having that advice be made public, 
allows both experts to keep an eye on each other’s work for 
accuracy and the public to see whether different experts 
come to very different conclusions.  
Such a plurality also assists with a third aspect of ac-
countability, where experts are again needed to hold each 
other to account for judgments made, particularly in formal 
advice. This third aspect depends upon the transparency of 
value judgments in advising reports, because whether the 
judgments made regarding the evidence in fact reflect the 
stated value judgments of experts can often only be as-
sessed by other experts. If, for example, an expert panel 




claimed it was very concerned about the impact of a chem-
ical on human health, but only utilized studies that in-
volved animal models generally known to be insensitive to 
the chemical, the public will not be able to tell that there is 
something seriously amiss. Only other experts can tell 
when particular selection criteria or modes of analysis do 
not in fact reflect choices guided by the stated values. So 
here too the expert community will need to hold each other 
accountable for the reasonableness of judgments made in 
the crafting of formal advice, both in terms of accuracy and 
in terms of whether the judgments reflect the stated con-
cerns of the expert panel. 
Democratic accountability for expertise thus makes sub-
stantial demands on experts. Experts need to: 1) hold each 
other accountable to the available evidence (so experts 
don’t make false claims), 2) make value judgments explicit 
in their assessments of the available evidence, and 3) make 
sure that judgments made by their peers are actually reflec-
tive of the value commitments stated by their peers. It is 
essential that expert communities function well and are 
openly critical of each other in order for these accountabil-
ity mechanisms to work. Doing so is also essential to the 
pursuit of good science—here is where the demands of sci-
ence and democracy align. Nevertheless, the life of an ex-
pert doing policy-relevant work in a democracy is not an 
easy one.  
Alternative Paths? 
At this point, the reader might be thinking that this is all 
needlessly complex. Why can we not find a more straight-
forward way to assess experts and hold them accountable? 
For example, one might be tempted at this point to hold ex-
perts accountable based on success—does their advice help 
produce the desired outcomes or not? While this may be a 
useful approach in some cases, in many cases such straight-
forward success criteria are not appropriate. Not only 
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might the best expert advice still fail to produce desired 
outcomes if carefully applied in practice due to confound-
ing causal factors in the world (things often do not go ac-
cording to plan), but we should also not hamstring our 
elected decision makers by requiring them to follow expert 
advice exactly. Such a requirement would eviscerate dem-
ocratic decision-making, which should always allow lee-
way for rejecting (or only partially accepting) expert advice 
if countervailing factors are involved.  
It is thus perfectly legitimate for politicians to argue 
(and act on the arguments) that individual freedoms are 
more important than public health benefits (as has been ar-
gued in the case of vaccines or fluoridation policies), or that 
inexpensive and/or nationally produced energy is more 
important than climate change. If the politician thinks that 
these are the correct value trade-offs, they should make that 
argument publicly, and then be voted in or out of office ac-
cordingly. 
It is also perfectly legitimate for politicians to argue that 
in some cases, they find the available evidence insufficient 
for a claim because of their values. If, for example, despite 
strong evidence for anthropogenic climate change, a politi-
cian argued that he did not think it strong enough to over-
ride his concern for maintaining cheap and affordable 
energy, that would be a legitimate reason to reject expert 
advice on climate change. Note that such a position is much 
more honest than current claims that simply reject the 
strength of evidence on climate change. Rather than out-
right rejection, arguments centered on whether the evi-
dence is strong enough focus on whether residual 
uncertainties are acceptable. It also leads to a more produc-
tive political debate, as the politician can be challenged 1) 
to say what evidence would be sufficient to change his 
mind, 2) on whether the status quo is in fact more afforda-
ble, and/or 3) to say why the current generation matters so 
much more than future generations (a key ethical value at 




stake). Rather than blocking political discussion by reduc-
ing avenues for productive engagement, legitimate use of 
values and evidence in democratic decision-making opens 
it up. (More on this in the next lecture.) 
For now, it suffices to note that often we cannot use the 
raw success of expert advice as a metric for accountability 
for the expertise, both because of the complexity of the con-
texts in which experts are needed and because ultimate de-
cision-making authority must rest with democratically 
accountable officials.  
Another gambit is to directly elect our experts to advi-
sory positions, thus holding the experts democratically ac-
countable. I suspect this would fail to work in practice for 
two reasons. First, the need to campaign for office would 
take a lot of time away from experts, and with this burden 
it is doubtful they could maintain the much-needed ties to 
their home expert community, thus maintaining their ex-
pertise. Second, the expertise needed (i.e., the particular 
specializations required) changes on a case-by-case basis. 
We must be able to draw on different specializations as the 
need arises, and requiring that experts be elected to exper-
tise-based decision-making offices would be a slow and 
cumbersome way to ensure democratic accountability for 
expertise. 
Because these more direct measures for expert account-
ability are not available to us, we need the complex (and 
sometimes diffuse) accountability measures described 
above. Experts need to be willing to be critical of each other, 
for inaccurate claims or judgments. Experts also should 
make their value judgments clear as part of giving an ac-
count for why they think what they think. Doing so will 
help with both accountability to the public and accounta-
bility to their expert community.  
But how do we ensure that we have the needed exper-
tise on hand when advice is required? How do we shape 
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what is studied so that the appropriate and required exper-
tise is likely to be available when we need it? It is to issues 
of policy for science that I now turn.  
Research Funding: Accountability in Knowledge Produc-
tion 
Specialization of expertise has allowed for the detailed 
and rich production of knowledge that is now embodied by 
many experts. Over the course of the twentieth century, the 
public purse became increasingly important for funding 
scientific research. And even with the worldwide rise of 
privately funded science again in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century, the public funds at least one-
third of the research pursued, and sometimes much more 
than that.14  
Private funders (particularly those in the for-profit sec-
tor, i.e., not NGOs and foundations) have the most capital 
to spend on research, but, unsurprisingly, they spend it in 
ways that primarily serve their interests. While some of this 
funding does serve public interests (for example, by pro-
ducing desired consumer products and new jobs, thus driv-
ing desired economic growth), this research will be 
deliberately blind to public concerns in some important 
ways. In particular, this research tends to be geared toward 
products that are patentable or over which intellectual 
property rights can be asserted. In addition, this research 
tries not to discover diffuse harms of private enterprise. 
One cannot expect private companies to fund research into 
detecting subtle environmental harms or subtle health haz-
ards of its products.15 Therefore, privately funded science 
will be geared toward the private interests that fund it. 
That there is a public interest that diverges from private 
interests can be seen in two general kinds of things that sci-
ence can discover. The first is that science can discover im-
portant causal processes for improving our lives that are 




not readily patentable. As James R. Brown has pointed out, 
we lack systematic and careful research into the effects of 
diet and exercise on our health, especially when compared 
with pharmaceutical research.16 And what nutritional re-
search is carried out is usually funded by the food industry, 
looking to support narrow claims for improving specific 
product marketability. This is because it does nothing to 
serve private interests to know, for example, whether a par-
ticular (but generic) change in exercise or diet is a more ef-
fective treatment for a disease than a particular drug. It is 
difficult or impossible to assert patent rights over such 
things, and thus to increase your company’s profits with 
such knowledge. Yet this is precisely what the public and 
our medical caregivers need to know. 
The second kind of research is when science discovers a 
public impact of private actions, especially unexpected 
harmful impacts of ostensibly private choices. Such discov-
eries can radically alter what we think of as private vs. pub-
lic. One obvious example is the discovery of climate 
change—the discovery that burning fossil fuels impacts the 
entire world’s climate makes the burning of such fuels a 
matter of pervasive public concern and not just an issue of 
private interest. Earlier in the twentieth century, discover-
ies of the impact of air pollution on public health and the 
impact of sulfates and nitrates on ecosystems through acid 
rain similarly made previously private decisions about en-
ergy sources a matter of public concern. Another example 
was the discovery of the health effects of secondhand 
smoke, turning a private decision to smoke cigarettes into 
a public issue that led to restrictions on smokers in public 
spaces. 
To see how this might work today with an issue that is 
currently not so politically charged, imagine that scientists 
discovered that Wi-Fi systems had negative health impacts 
(such as increasing glucose intolerance). What was largely 
a private affair (how strong your Wi-Fi signal is) would 
Science and Democracy: Squaring Expertise with Accountability  
89 
 
then become a public issue, since your Wi-Fi would nega-
tively affect anyone within exposure range. Regulations 
about how strong Wi-Fi systems could be would likely re-
sult. Science in this way can expand the purview of the pub-
lic, and thus the purview of government.  
Science does not always expand the realm of the pub-
lic—it can contract it as well, by discovering there is no 
public impact for choices once of public concern. This has 
happened with the adoption of children by gay parents, 
once an issue of profound public concern. But as studies 
failed to find any adverse impact on the children, it is in-
creasingly a purely private matter. Thus, science need not 
always expand the realm of government intervention. But 
even when it contracts it, there is still palpable social 
change. I suspect that science’s ability to intervene in our 
public discourse in this way is one of the reasons science is 
increasingly distrusted by social conservatives—science 
can shift our social map dramatically.17  
What these two kinds of research show is that we can 
expect the public to need knowledge that private interests 
will neither fund nor pursue. It is thus imperative that pub-
lic funding of scientific research attend to these public in-
terest areas—the detection of causal forces on known 
public interests and the discovery of new public interests. 
However, the public purse cannot be wholly dedicated to 
such ends. Scientists also pursue research because they find 
a particular line of investigation inherently interesting, or 
because they think doing so will be theoretically revealing. 
Research for curiosity’s sake must also be a part of the pub-
lic funding of science (as it is rare that private funding sup-
ports such work). Sometimes the results of this type of 
research will be of profound interest to the public. The his-
tory of science is replete with examples of the serendipitous 
discovery of publicly important findings from curiosity-
driven research.  




How do we ensure that our research funding regimes 
address the public’s need for these kinds of knowledge? 
First, it is clearly important to not just rely upon private 
sources for funding science and to not have public funding 
geared primarily toward private interests. This latter prob-
lem arose in the last years of the Harper government in 
Canada, when national grants to academic researchers 
were increasingly required to have privately secured 
matching funds and government laboratories were being 
shifted to pursue private interest (e.g., the National Re-
search Council—a central government laboratory—was re-
branded and reshaped into a “concierge service for 
industry”).18 Harper was dismantling support for both 
public-interest science and curiosity-driven research. 
Funding regimens must be robust for both public-interest 
and curiosity-driven science, disentangled from the entice-
ments of private interests. 
Still, researchers could primarily focus solely on what 
interests them, driven by internal disciplinary concerns, 
and ignore the public interest altogether. Indeed, it was a 
concern that much academic science was pursued along 
these lines that generated incentives for more private inter-
est science in academia, such as the US Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980. But policies like this did not incentivize public inter-
est science. We want to allow scientists to pursue their re-
search where their curiosity leads in general (that sort of 
freedom and the diversity of agendas it produces is essen-
tial to the scientific enterprise), but we don’t want the sci-
entific community to neglect research in the public interest. 
How should we manage this? 
Currently, we use a range of mechanisms to encourage 
researchers to pursue public interest science. Funding 
agencies often have targeted areas that encourage capable 
researchers of shifting focus to specific areas of perceived 
need. Citizen groups (particularly patient groups) have 
prodded scientists to alter their research to address their 
Science and Democracy: Squaring Expertise with Accountability  
91 
 
concerns. Crowdfunding has become a viable way to pur-
sue particular pieces of research, especially those that are 
likely to be of public interest—and this combined with in-
terest groups can produce substantial funding (e.g., the ice-
bucket challenge for ALS research). The general call for in-
creased Responsible Innovation, where research agendas 
are crafted in consultation with the public in particular ar-
eas, can help to shape research trajectories. And collabora-
tive research projects, where researchers work with public 
stakeholders over weeks or months to generate specific 
knowledge needed for public decision-making, can be very 
powerful in producing relevant and trusted knowledge.  
The difficulty is that there is no one person, or even one 
group, that is responsible for (much less accountable for) 
the direction of research. Yet this is probably a good thing, 
because we don’t want science to be so tightly planned that 
there are clear lines of accountability. Currently we have a 
mishmash of different avenues to try to encourage a di-
verse and publicly interested research agenda. One won-
ders, though, if we could do better in promoting public-
interest science, instead of curiosity-driven or private-inter-
est science. Perhaps an oversight committee, drawn from 
different disciplines but geared towards the public interest, 
could review the range of research being funded and pur-
sued and see if there are gaps that need to be filled. Perhaps 
such a committee could take comments and recommenda-
tions from the general public on whether there are areas 
where the public needs scientific expertise but is currently 
not getting it. Perhaps the committee could make recom-
mendations to granting councils and agencies on where ef-
forts are needed, and perhaps scientists could see if they 
could fulfill such needs. Such a system would not plan all 
of scientific research (even all publicly funded research), 
but it could nudge it in certain directions when needed. 
While it might be a good idea to pursue such a mechanism, 
it would be a mistake to allow it to replace the other mech-
anisms already in existence. This is partly because there 




will always be gaps and failures, and if we rely upon just 
one institutional structure, we will think that that institu-
tion is taking care of the concern so we don’t have to worry 
about it anymore. Additionally, single institutions are al-
ways open to capture by special interests. Maintaining a 
pluralist system for public research funding is likely to be 
both desirable and necessary going forward. 
One final point: What is clearly needed among scientists 
is more attention to not just the public in general but the 
least well off members of the public. The pervasive neglect 
of environmental contamination, health problems, and 
food insecurity among the most vulnerable in our commu-
nities is a deep problem, and a source of inequality that is a 
threat to both democracy and science. Public trust in sci-
ence is shaken by the failure of academic scientists to pay 
attention to environmental and health problems, particu-
larly when those problems turn into a crisis (e.g., water 
quality in Flint Michigan). Issues of distributional justice 
need to be more of a central concern, particularly as we 
strengthen efforts in public-interest science.19 
Conclusion 
We cannot design institutions at the science policy in-
terface that will be forever immune from corruption and 
abuse. Democracy is an ongoing experiment in governance, 
and powerful interests will always try to find new ways to 
game the current system in their favor. It is part of the price 
of being a citizen in a democratic system that one must al-
ways examine whether the existing structures are helping 
or hindering the discovery, expression, and pursuit of the 
public interest.  
That this is an ongoing struggle, and a process we are 
never done with, does not mean we cannot say something 
useful now at a general level. Acknowledging the value-
ladenness of expertise, its importance for governance, and 
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its general inaccessibility in its full details articulates clearly 
the challenge of science and democracy, but also clarifies 
how to proceed. Lines of accountability for expert advice 
run through both expert communities (which should be di-
verse and interactively critical) and the general public 
(which should be able to assess at least the values that are 
part of expert advice). That there are these two directions 
for accountability for expert advice should keep us from 
sliding into technocracy. We do not have to simply “trust 
the expert.” We can demand to know why they think what 
they think, see what their fellow experts think, and assess 
whether the values expressed are those we agree with. Fur-
ther, we can demand that expert communities pay atten-
tion to the needs of the public (especially the least well off). 
But such demands are not equivalent to having experts 
give us (or our elected officials) the answers they would 
prefer. If experts fail to “speak truth to power” (as happens 
in egregious failures of expertise), experts can expect moral 
outrage from the public. And rightly so.  
Being an expert thus requires a certain moral courage, 
to pursue knowledge that is not just potentially unpopular, 
but also needed. The public interest is often revealed and 
coalesced around new pieces of research. We need science 
to perform this function.  
This lecture, however, has focused mainly on the ex-
perts and their relationships with those in power (advisees 
and granting agencies) and with other experts. The public 
has played scant role thus far. It is in the area of science 
communication that scientists and the public more fully en-
gage each other, and that is the topic for the next lecture.
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Commentary on Lecture 2 
VALUES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
SCIENCE ADVICE: THE CASE OF THE 
IPCC 
Arthur C. Petersen 
In this commentary essay, I would like to delve more 
deeply into an important case that illustrates very well the 
concerns raised by Heather Douglas in her lecture on the 
accountability of expertise. The case I am referring to is an 
example of the way the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) deals with scientific and political val-
ues and accountability.1 I will connect to several of the 
points that Heather raised in her lecture, especially the 
question: How assessable is expertise? 
I will focus on the example of expertise on the causes of 
climate change (“attribution”). I will make the argument 
that if you want to assess expertise, you will have to engage 
with an “extended” peer community.2 Reflection on as-
sumptions should lead experts to give an account of the ep-
istemic underpinnings of their expertise. I will argue that 
IPCC reports do not do that enough.3 In pushing scientists 
to give such accounts, one must realize that experts often 
do not like to hear that; in this sense, their expertise should 
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be considered to be on tap, but they are not on top in terms 
of being free to decide how transparent they will be. 
Figure 1. Climate-Change Attribution Figure in the Sum-
mary for Policymakers of the Third Assessment Report 
of the IPCC4 
In the 2001 report of the IPCC, a figure was included 
that has become iconic at the science-policy interface for at-
tributing climate change to human influences (reproduced 
here as Figure 1). The figure contains three panels, each 
showing, on the one hand, the same line with measure-
ments of the global mean surface temperature since 1850 
(going up in the beginning of the twentieth century and go-
ing up at the end of the twentieth century) and, on the other 
hand, a different band of model results (the bands repre-
senting the “internal” variability of the climate system, that 
is, the sensitivity to initial conditions): one for only natural 
external influences on the climate (volcanoes, sun), one for 
only human external influences on the climate (greenhouse 
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gases, particles), and one that combines natural and human 
factors. The latter panel depicts a beautiful match of meas-
urement and model, giving rise to the suggestion that we 
know everything, that there is no room left for any doubt 
that humans are causing the recent climate change. In fact, 
the chair of the IPCC suggested exactly this at a press con-
ference in 2001.5 
Of course, philosophers of science understand that the 
number of degrees of freedom in climate models is high. 
And they will not be surprised to hear that, indeed, virtu-
ally all climate-modeling groups in the world are able to 
present the same final panel with a match. This is not to say 
that the results are wrong. But how should one communi-
cate that the bands are “just” model results, whose match 
with the measurements cannot establish reliability? The 
pertinent questions are: How do we know how reliable the 
models are? And in which senses can we say that they are 
reliable? 
The IPCC has developed a methodology, through three 
subsequent guidances, for assessing and communicating 
the uncertainties in the findings of its assessments. This 
methodology includes calibrated terms for communicating 
probabilities. For the example of climate-change attribution 
to human influences, the IPCC did not communicate in 
2001 that it was 100% certain that humans are causing cli-
mate change, even though the picture is beautiful and the 
line and band match. It said, rather, that it was “likely” that 
most of the warming of the last 50 years has been caused 
by human greenhouse gases. According to the experts, 
“likely” here means a 66% chance that the finding is true. 
I was sitting at the table at the time (in Shanghai, on 20 
January 2001) as an IPCC contact group negotiated what I 
think became one of the most important statements ever 
from the IPCC, that most of the warming is likely due to 
human influences.6 But I could not understand why they 
said “likely.” If you believed the models, the likelihood was 




already estimated to be way higher than 90% (that is, “very 
likely,” the next likelihood category). I had to dig deep 
(through interviews, reviewing internal emails, etc.) to de-
termine how the lead authors had reached their judgment. 
The reason they did not choose “very likely” was that they 
did not trust the models enough. So they picked the next 
lower likelihood category. Nowhere could this reasoning 
be found in the IPCC report; there was no traceable account 
of how they had arrived at this crucial judgment. 
Six years later, the IPCC panel assessed the same ques-
tion. The 2007 report features a similar figure as the 2001 
report, but now the graphs are shown for every continent 
and the authors are willing to say “very likely” (90%). And 
again I could ask the question: Why not the next likelihood 
category of 99% or “virtually certain”?7 The narrative could 
have been, “Even though we still do not fully trust the mod-
els, there have been more warm years, there have been 
more model runs, there have been different types of model 
experiments, and there is a belief that the models have be-
come more reliable.” I do think that the latter belief is prob-
lematic. Again the IPCC featured, in my view, a weak 
practice of assessing the reliability and the quality of mod-
els. 
So what I argue has been missing from the Third and 
Fourth Assessment Reports of the IPCC (2001 and 2007, re-
spectively) is sufficient attention to “methodological relia-
bility” rather than simply “statistical reliability.”8 
Assessment of methodological reliability requires a quali-
tative discussion and a corresponding qualitative assess-
ment of the underpinning of results. Additionally, after 
“Climategate,” the realization has come that “public relia-
bility” needs attention too; how to gain back trust and be 
publicly relied upon is a difficult question for climate sci-
entists. I do not have simple answers here. In this essay I 
am really focused on the importance of the second type of 
reliability: methodological reliability. 
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Let me give one example from the negotiations on rep-
resenting methodological reliability in the Summary for Pol-
icymakers that occurred in Paris in 2007. This is the sentence 
that was under negotiation:  
Most of the observed increase in globally averaged tempera-
tures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the ob-
served increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations. 
We have to get a bit into the politics now. Because these 
IPCC sentences are transferred from the sphere of 
knowledge assessment to the sphere of political negotia-
tions (in the climate framework convention), there is al-
ways a country that does not want a stronger statement 
than the last time. A stronger statement would highlight 
that there is more scientific certainty, which would increase 
the likelihood of international agreements to curb climate 
change. The IPCC meeting in Paris in January 2007 was less 
than two years from what turned out to be the failure of the 
Copenhagen Summit at the end of 2009. In this instance, a 
country used all kinds of ways to prevent this sentence 
from being included. There is, however, an order of speech 
within the IPCC, which is: the chapters have been written—
hands off, governments cannot touch those chapters!—but 
government delegates can comment, making use of a set of 
criteria (such as clarity and representativeness), on sen-
tences in the Summary for Policymakers. Governments ob-
viously will have different views. And the authors have a 
veto right on any change that is made to their summaries. 
One can imagine how hard it sometimes becomes to nego-
tiate the summary line by line, as is the case in the IPCC. 
But it works. 
Still, I argue that it can be done in a more productive 
way if both parties, authors and governments, would be-
have more diplomatically toward each other, understand 
better where they are both coming from, and what their re-




spective rationalities are. One group of actors in these meet-
ings is there on authority of their social, ethical, political, 
and economic values (their role is to represent their pub-
lics), and another group of actors is there on authority of 
their scientific values (their role is to represent, to the best 
of their ability, the papers they have assessed), and must 
provide good “reference.”9 
Back now to the sentence that was under discussion in 
the final hours of the Paris meeting. After days of negotia-
tions and having entered very deep into the night, finally 
we are in agreement—all the countries of the world can 
agree on the sentence by inserting the following footnote: 
“Consideration of remaining uncertainty is based on cur-
rent methodologies.” Of course we were all tired. But it is 
interesting: Why would the opposing country agree with 
this sentence? What is the spin they could give? They might 
say, “The methodologies used are based on models. It is 
just models. It is not reality.” Indeed models are used, but 
that does not imply that there is no reference to reality; still, 
that is typical of the argument they would make. How 
would another country that tends to dramatize climate 
change and typically wants to downplay uncertainty spin 
this sentence? They might say, “Next time the likelihood 
will go up further; from the original “likely” (66%) it went 
up to “very likely” (90%), and it will go up again.” And yes, 
indeed, in Stockholm, nearly seven years later in September 
2013, it became “extremely likely” (95%). 
One issue with the IPCC methodology of likelihood 
statements has already been addressed: The methodologi-
cal unreliability of models has been used to “downgrade” 
likelihood statements without saying so. Another issue, 
which is related to insufficient transparency of expert judg-
ment in the IPCC, is that there is hardly any reflection on 
the nature of expert judgment. “Very likely” means more 
than 90% chance that a particular statement is true. But 
what does that really mean? What do these probabilities 
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mean? How reflexive is the IPCC about what is actually 
happening, and what is behind these statements? The 
“90%” only means that the few authors who have been se-
lected to do the assessment in a particular chapter have 
somehow reached this collective expert judgment. Nothing 
more and nothing less. It carries a lot of weight, because 
these authors have had the scientific training, acquired the 
relevant skills, and have a lot of experience in their scien-
tific practices—they bring all these things to the table. 
These lead authors are the experts. We choose them for that 
expertise. Then, other experts are asked to thoroughly re-
view their statements. The lead authors, however, in the 
end, when they write down their conclusions, get rid of any 
reference to “expert judgment.” Suddenly their conclusions 
are made to flow directly from the underlying science. “It 
is not us.” I find it incredible! 
Twice we have had to intervene as the Dutch govern-
ment delegation asked to make the Summary for Policy-
makers more explicit about expert judgment. In Paris in 
2007, for example, the authors, when defining their uncer-
tain terminology, referred in the final draft to the “assessed 
likelihood of an outcome or a result.” We added “using ex-
pert judgment” to that phrase. In Stockholm in 2013, the 
same problem arose with the definition of “probabilities”: 
“Probabilistic estimates of quantified measures of uncer-
tainty in a finding are based on statistical analysis of obser-
vations or model results, or expert judgment.” We looked 
at it and saw that it was going in the wrong direction. We 
thus changed “or expert judgment” into “and expert judg-
ment.” I think this is important. It is worrisome that scien-
tists who act as science advisers are often not able to 
reflexively say what they are doing. 
Questions on how expert judgment can be reflected in 
the IPCC are intertwined with questions on how science 
and politics relate in the IPCC. I would like to frame IPCC 
assessments as social constructs with elements from both 




science and politics. Thus both types of values are in play: 
values both intrinsic and extrinsic to science. How success-
ful is the IPCC? Well, critics would say they are too success-
ful in terms of connecting with policy, and unsuccessful in 
connecting with science. That issue is what I studied for the 
Third Assessment Report (published in 2001), to address 
criticism in the US Senate testimony by Dick Lindzen that 
the IPCC would not be open enough to skeptics.  
In addition to too little reflexivity in the IPCC, I also 
found that the criticism of lack of openness to skeptics was 
incorrect. For the report that I studied (I took the chapter 
on attribution of climate change to human influences), I 
looked at all the comments there were submitted for that 
chapter in all the review rounds. I looked at all of the re-
sponses to those comments, and all of the review-editor 
comments to the responses, and discovered that there were 
a lot of critical comments, many of which had led to im-
provements in the text in terms of more inclusion of uncer-
tainties and better language.10 So, I do think that skeptics 
(taken in a broad sense, i.e., including not only the “typical” 
climate skeptics but also people who for good reasons are 
critical of climate modeling) play a constructive role in the 
IPCC process. The final outcome is a policy-relevant assess-
ment. It is not, however, the scientific consensus with full 
certainty, and thus it should not be framed in this way. Of 
course, the IPCC can still further improve its communica-
tion of uncertainty, be more transparent, and explain where 
the expert judgments come from, to connect with what 
Heather also emphasizes in her lecture. And I think the 
IPCC could be more reflexive about what is actually hap-
pening in these plenaries. They are all closed. Why? Include 
a webcast, for instance. There is no reason not to do that. 
I conclude with four lessons that I took from my 14 years 
of being a science adviser:11 
Values and Accountability in Science Advice 
105 
 
1. Explicit reflection on uncertainty and values. Take 
“normal science” seriously, but also organize reflec-
tion on its uncertainties and value-ladenness. 
I have bought into the discourse of post-normal science, 
while I do agree with Heather that there never was a period 
where there was no post-normal science. So “post-” should 
perhaps read “extra-”: “extra-normal science.” With “nor-
mal science,” I really mean those proceedings where it is 
the scientific community that is doing whatever they are 
doing: modeling, publishing, peer reviewing, etc. So when 
I say that we need to open up look at ways to bring out the 
different epistemic and nonepistemic values in this discus-
sion, I mean that we need to organize reflection on uncer-
tainty and value-ladenness within normal science as well, 
without throwing it away. So don’t throw away the baby 
(post-normal science) with the bathwater (a form of scien-
tism that does not sufficiently reflect the presence of uncer-
tainty and ignorance in science)! Hence, I do not buy into 
very simplistic readings of post-normal science. 
2. Addressing methodological and public reliability. 
Alongside the statistical reliability of results (ex-
pressed in terms of probability), devote due atten-
tion to their methodological reliability (expressed in 
terms of strengths and weaknesses) and their public 
reliability (expressed as the degree of public confi-
dence in the scientists who produce them). 
As I have already belabored in this essay, do not focus 
only on statistics; also focus on qualitative dimensions of 
reliability. 
3. Extended peer review. Involve a larger group of spe-
cialists and nonspecialists who hold different values 
in monitoring the quality of scientific assessments. 
“Extended peer review,” which also comes out of this 
literature of post-normal science, concerns the ways in 




which one can engage a wide group of people who can pro-
vide comment and are sensible enough so they can be pro-
cessed and responded to, for instance, in the IPCC. 
Everybody—on the basis of a very minimal claim to exper-
tise—can sign up to be an expert reviewer of the IPCC and 
can submit comments. It is very important that not only is 
a very small group of climate modelers, for instance, 
providing comments on the climate modeling chapter, but 
so too are neighboring disciplines and people who work for 
Greenpeace, for example. They all have a stake, as well as 
very valuable contributions to bring, because they can 
highlight particular risks to the climate that may not have 
become mainstream yet in the scientific community. 
4. Acknowledging social complexity. Be wary of ac-
cepting the conclusions of actors and practitioners at 
face value; try to delve deeper through the layers of 
complexity by means of narrative methods. 
The final point—looking at deeper dimensions and dif-
ferent things that are happening at the same time—is re-
lated to the notion of “social complexity.” Scientists often 
have a self-image (overly rationalized) of what they are do-
ing and the country delegates have a self-image (again 
overly rationalized) of what they are doing, and these self-
images are too simplistic in what they hold, because they 
do not reflect the complexity of the way different types of 
values (epistemic and nonepistemic) are interwoven in 
practices. In terms of how to understand this, it is im-
portant to delve deeper. The big question still remains: Are 
there improvements that we can suggest to this mess? It is 
a mess, but already a good and interesting mess. 
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Commentary on Lecture 2 
EXPERTISE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Torsten Wilholt 
In her second Descartes lecture, Heather Douglas ad-
dresses issues that are both politically extremely pressing—
some might say depressing—and philosophically highly 
interesting. As is characteristic of most of her work, episte-
mological concerns, on the one hand, and questions of eth-
ics and political philosophy, on the other, are inextricably 
intertwined. Two main topics stand out from the wealth of 
helpful and innovative ideas presented in the second lec-
ture: the accountability of experts, and policies of research 
funding. In the following remarks, I comment on each of 
these in turn. 
The Accountability of Experts 
Douglas approaches the topic of the accountability of 
experts by making some concrete claims about how it 
ought to be realized. Experts should be accountable for the 
accuracy of their claims to their peers from their respective 
research communities. And they should be accountable to 
the citizenry for the value judgments they inevitably make 
in weighing the uncertainties involved in their expertise. 
Last but not least, for actually making such methodological 




decisions that are in accordance with the value outlook 
they explicitly endorse, experts should also be accountable 
to their home research community. 
From this range of ideas, I will focus on experts’ ac-
countability to the citizenry, since it seems to contain (po-
tentially) the most controversial suggestions. Douglas 
proposes that in the case of formal policy advice, accounta-
bility should be achieved by means of a pluralism of per-
spectives within expert committees, and by means of 
experts expressing their value judgments explicitly. Both 
suggested measures are arguably commendable on inde-
pendent grounds. However, it is not obvious that the value 
of pluralism in expert committees derives from its contri-
bution to making expertise accountable to the citizenry. In 
so far as pluralism contributes to accountability at all, its 
immediate effect rather seems to be to make individual ex-
perts sitting on the committee accountable to each other. To 
conceptually extend this to an accountability to the citi-
zenry appears to rest on the implicit assumption that, by 
virtue of possessing different value outlooks, the experts on 
the committee act as representatives of the citizens whose 
value outlooks they share. However, this is a tenuous kind 
of representation, lacking as it does in, well, accountability. 
Typically, experts do not answer to the citizens whose value 
outlooks they “represent”; they cannot be recalled or dese-
lected by them.1  
A similar point arises with respect to accountability in 
informal policy advising. Douglas suggests that it is estab-
lished by virtue of the close relationship with the elected 
official whom the advisor advises. But whatever accounta-
bility to the citizenry the advisee is subject to does not au-
tomatically transfer to the advisor via this relationship. 
When the official fails to be reelected, the advisor may lose 
her privileged access to the corridors of power. But in the 
vast majority of cases, the advisor has her main occupation 
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elsewhere, so her stakes in the reelection are considerably 
less high as compared to the advisee. 
Note that by expressing my own doubts about whether 
the arrangements proposed by Douglas really implement 
accountability of experts to citizens, I do not mean to sug-
gest that we ought to adopt more stringent measures that 
would do so. I do not think that we should make experts 
answerable to a constituency. It would compromise their 
freedom of judgment. Douglas’ systematic treatment of ex-
pert accountability provides us with an excellent way of ar-
ticulating the reason why: Experts should only be 
accountable to the citizenry for the values they employ in 
weighing uncertainties, not for the accuracy of their claims, 
for which they should only be accountable to their peers. If 
experts were elected by citizens, it would be impossible to 
separate the two kinds of accountability from each other. A 
case in point is the situation that developed after the Flint 
water crisis had reached its climax. Marc Edwards, the Vir-
ginia Tech engineer who was instrumental in proving the 
dangerously unhealthy quality of Flint’s tap water, was in 
a certain sense a policy advisor who was selected by the 
citizenry, since he only got involved in the matter after ac-
tivists had called upon him to help them. However, after 
unsafe levels of lead in the water had been exposed with 
Edwards’ help and Flint had switched back to Detroit wa-
ter as a consequence, Flint citizens started turning away 
from Edwards as he no longer seemed to be delivering the 
kind of information that they wanted to hear.2 Many citi-
zens were subjectively convinced that the water quality 
was not improving after the switch, a judgement that Ed-
wards was not able to confirm. In their search for alterna-
tive water expertise, some citizens soon started to turn to a 
Hollywood actor and a businessman who claimed to have 
invented a novel sponge product for more accurate water 
testing. These two were alleging that Flint water was still 
unsafe, even for bathing, due to contaminants other than 




lead. (The businessman has since backed down on this 
claim.) 
This story is apt to reinforce a point that is implied by 
Douglas’ original discussion, namely that the desired ac-
countability of experts to the citizenry for the value judg-
ments they employ must be kept separate from an 
accountability for the content of their expertise, which could 
easily undermine its credibility and render it pointless. The 
need to keep the two apart also places limitations on the 
extent to which even the desirable kind of accountability to 
the citizenry can be effectively put into practice. I do agree, 
however, that transparency and open communication 
about value judgments, as well as the representation of a 
plurality of perspectives in expert committees, would take 
us in the right direction. 
How far would they take us in our efforts to let experts 
be “on tap, but not on top”? At the core, there is the prob-
lem, in Philip Kitcher’s words, “to decide how to integrate 
the plausible idea that, with respect to some issues, some 
people know more than others, with a commitment to dem-
ocratic ideals and principles.”3  
Douglas shows that we can get some leverage on this 
problem by focusing on accountability. Accountability cer-
tainly is a central and indispensable instrument of the dem-
ocratic process. However, accountability is not the 
beginning and the end of democracy—not, that is, unless 
we subscribe to a minimalist, Schumpeterian conception by 
which democracy is limited to negative control and the sole 
role of the people is to produce a government.4 To be sure, 
Douglas does not commit herself to a minimalist view of 
democracy, nor do I have any reason to believe that she 
would want to. But for what follows, I am going to rely on 
the premise that we ought to aspire to a much richer form 
of democracy than that.5 And so, without going into any of 
the fine points of the debates within democratic theory, I 
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will at least briefly sketch one reason why negative control 
is insufficient. 
Sometimes, there are solutions to political problems that 
are, in a robust sense, good solutions for the community as 
a whole—that is, they are not just combinations of or com-
promises between those solutions that individuals would 
regard as good when judged from their particular perspec-
tive. Simple game theoretical considerations illustrate that 
this is at least possible. It is not to be expected that we will 
be able to actualize or even identify these good solutions if 
all that each of us does is state their individual interests and 
bargain for the deal that serves them best. The democratic 
process must be organized in such a way as to encourage 
the search for a shared vision of the common good and to 
enable deliberative processes that identify solutions that 
best serve the common good. To the degree that citizens 
can participate in this process of public reasoning, it is to be 
expected that lines of reasoning in favor of and against the 
different political options that are addressing the partici-
pating citizens’ viewpoints and concerns are going to be 
produced in the course of the debate. This sort of public 
justification of political options is one of the main features 
of democratic legitimacy that set it apart from other forms 
of government.6 
All this means that democracy requires processes of 
public reasoning that are geared toward discovering, revis-
ing, and developing a shared conception of the common 
good, and opportunities for citizens to participate in these 
processes. Obviously, knowledge plays a great role in this 
view of democracy. Without knowledge, it is impossible to 
participate effectively in such a way as to bring one’s values 
and interests to bear. 
In consequence of this, expert knowledge must first and 
foremost be knowledge that is directed at informing the cit-
izenry. It should feed into processes of public deliberation. 
The more it is delivered into the hands of politicians behind 




closed doors, the less it contributes to democratic legiti-
macy and to the power of the people to govern themselves.  
It might be objected that all of this adds up to a far too 
demanding or even utopian conception of democracy that 
has little to do with the messy realities of our political com-
munities. But I maintain that it has a very concrete bearing 
on some of the most pressing concerns with present-day 
political life in liberal democracies, especially with regard 
to the role of science and expertise. 
The credibility of experts in the context of democratic 
politics is often diagnosed to be in crisis. An incisive mo-
ment came when Michael Gove, then Lord Chancellor and 
one of the leaders of the Leave.EU campaign in the British 
EU membership referendum, used the following language 
to cast aside the many predictions from the International 
Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development, and the European Central Bank—
that is, the IMF, the OECD, and the ECB—in addition to 
other organizations, which outlined the bleak economic 
prospects awaiting the UK when it breaks away from the 
European Union: “I think the people of this country have 
had enough of experts […] from organisations with acro-
nyms saying that they know what is best and getting it con-
sistently wrong […].”7 What is noticeable about this remark 
is perhaps not so much that Gove would make it, but that 
he and the Leave.EU campaign have fared so well with this 
stance, particularly given the glaring untruths on which 
some of the campaign’s arguments were based. The paral-
lels to Donald Trump’s US presidential election campaign 
have been noted many times, and commentators have used 
the label “post-truth politics” to describe the indifference to 
truth that seems to underlie these phenomena.8 
It is easy to get frustrated and angry about post-truth 
politicians and their supporters, but one should resist the 
urge to attribute their success to an epidemic of ignorance 
and stupidity. Much more helpful is Douglas’ perceptive 
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observation that the contempt for science and experts that 
is spreading amongst small-government conservatives is at 
least in part explainable by the fact that, in many contexts, 
scientific knowledge has a great potential for shifting the 
purview of the public, and hence of government. I think 
this is an important root of the problem, but perhaps not 
yet an explanation of its full extent.  
Across Western democracies, governments are increas-
ing their use of the tactics of presenting “necessary” poli-
cies to the citizenry that are portrayed as immediate results 
of factual constraints. Expert advice has become crucial as 
a tool for the legitimization of policies along these lines. 
Public deliberation is thus often short-circuited, and there 
are no opportunities for participation in an open-ended 
process of public reasoning. In parts of the citizenry, this 
contributes to a feeling of being governed by distant and 
aloof elites. The growing resentment of the politics of fac-
tual constraints is transferred to the experts. They are start-
ing to be regarded as implicated in networks of power and 
as serving the interests of elites. This undermines their 
credibility. 
If knowledge is a prerequisite of effective participation 
in the democratic process, and if the required knowledge 
now often specifically includes the kind of highly special-
ized information only professional specialists can provide, 
then a crisis of the credibility of experts is harmful to citi-
zens and harmful to democracy. Therefore, one main chal-
lenge seems to be to restore and maintain the credibility of 
experts in light of their involvement in politics. While ac-
countability and credibility are of course related, and the 
measures proposed by Douglas for strengthening account-
ability would likely also benefit credibility; credibility im-
plies a broader range of issues than accountability. In the 
epistemic realm, trustworthiness cannot be ensured by 
negative control. 




If we widen the perspective to other aspects of credibil-
ity than accountability, we will have to consider a variety 
of other factors as well. If experts are regarded as integrated 
in elite networks, it is sometimes because they are. Changes 
in science policy, such as the intentional creation of incen-
tives for university researchers to profit financially from 
their discoveries by means of patents and spin-offs, have 
changed what it means to be successful in the sciences to 
also include—at least in some fields—financial success. 
Maintaining good relations to people of influence outside 
academia has become a common aspect of many academ-
ics’ work life—it can certainly be useful and perhaps some-
times necessary in order to obtain funding. In many cases, 
scientists no longer work in the kind of institution that 
guarantees their independence and embodies it in a way 
that inspires trust. The relation between different forms of 
institutional and individual independence and the credibil-
ity of expertise is a subject that should be of central concern 
to philosophers and sociologists of science. 
Another area of concern is the mechanisms and institu-
tions by which scientific expertise is delivered. In some 
technical matters as well as in urgent cases, consultations 
between experts and government officials behind closed 
doors are clearly appropriate, but they should remain the 
exception. Ideally, relevant scientific expertise should be 
publicly available early on and should feed into procedures 
of deliberation. Engaging publicly and at an early stage 
with developments of potential relevance to citizens may 
help scientists to regain public trust if they manage to con-
vey that they intend to provide input for public debate ra-
ther than to pass it by. 
Lastly, the credibility of scientists for citizens is based, 
to a large degree, on their accountability to each other. The 
present state of this type of accountability also leaves room 
for improvement, as evidenced by the frequent calls for 
more full and transparent sharing of data, analytic code, 
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and clinical study reports, for full and detailed pretrial reg-
istration and for post-publication peer review.9 Some of the 
suggested improvements also create opportunities for a 
transparent discussion of value-laden issues and their bear-
ing on the management of inductive risks. If post-publica-
tion peer review created a forum to also discuss questions 
of inductive risk more openly, this could make these ques-
tions more transparent for citizens without forcing scien-
tists to cater to public opinion. 
Funding and Public Interest Science 
I conclude with a few remarks on science funding, the 
other thematic focus of Douglas’ second Descartes lecture. 
When it comes to contemporary trends such as the econo-
mization of science, many scientists are eager to point out 
that curiosity-driven basic research must not be allowed to 
fall behind. Douglas rightly reminds us that besides basic 
science and science in the private interest, there is also pub-
lic-interest science that deserves our attention. She pro-
poses oversight committees in order to foster research in 
public-interest science. At the same time, she also expresses 
reservations against too much central planning. 
Of the many reasons to doubt the value of central plan-
ning in science, I would like to briefly unpack one:10 Central 
planning can never be as good at utilizing local knowledge 
and mobilizing individual creativity as decentralized, self-
organizing processes are. Here, by local knowledge I mean 
the kind of knowledge that individual researchers have 
about their own talents and skills, about existing technical 
equipment and other resources available to them, as well 
as about contacts and networks that can be activated for re-
search on a particular approach. These are the kinds of re-
sources that individual scientists draw on when looking for 
a research project that maximizes their chances of success 
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and recognition. Since local knowledge is constantly in mo-
tion and often challenging to communicate, it is difficult to 
think of any efficient way of utilizing it for shaping the re-
search agenda that does not rely on decentralized individ-
ual initiative and competition. 
To a certain extent, I fear that this would also affect the 
work of any committee tasked with identifying the gaps in 
public-interest science that need to be filled. Identifying 
such a gap requires two things at once: identifying the pub-
lic need for a certain kind of knowledge, and realizing that 
this kind of knowledge is within reach from the perspective 
of present-day science. It is the second of these that will of-
ten require local knowledge and creativity, especially if cut-
ting-edge research is involved. “Research,” as Peter 
Medawar once put it, “is surely the art of the soluble.”11 
Seeing which problems are now well enough defined to al-
low targeting with the cutting-edge methods of research 
will often presuppose the kind of gestural and situational 
knowledge that exists dispersed over the members of a re-
search community and is not easy to harvest for a central 
committee.  
A better hope for public-interest science may lie in cre-
ating and improving incentives for this kind of work. Many 
scientists express an intrinsic interest to do work that ben-
efits the common good. Contributions to public-interest sci-
ence that give extra weight to tenure and promotion 
decisions, awarding of prizes, or the selection of members 
of learned societies can be expected to amplify and support 
this interest. At the moment, this would constitute some-
thing like a counter-current to the official institutional cul-
tures that are still promoted within many organizations 
and that typically emphasize bringing science to the mar-
ket. Universities in particular still seem to be stuck in this 
1980s vision. Several universities have adopted the label 
“the entrepreneurial university.” The “public-interest uni-
versity” seems to be suspiciously absent from the lexicon of 
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public relations for universities.12 Institutional cultures af-
fect scientists’ choices, and therefore the valorization of 
public-interest science could be key to improving the im-
balance that Douglas rightly points out. Cultural changes 
work slowly and unpredictably, but I see more reason for 
optimism that they will have a positive effect than in the 
case of oversight committees. 
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BEYOND THE DEFICIT MODEL 
Heather Douglas 
Introduction 
The value-saturation of science both poses challenges 
and opens opportunities for the interactions of science and 
democratic governance, of scientists and democratic pub-
lics. In the previous lecture, I focused on government inter-
actions with science and scientists, addressing both science 
advisors and science funding. The discussion of science-
policy interfaces was far from complete, and filling in fur-
ther details and examining a fuller range of science-policy 
interfaces must await future work. Yet the public was 
largely ignored in that lecture, interacting with science pri-
marily through the election of and evaluation of public of-
ficials, based on those officials’ values and responses to 
science advice. This is, of course, not the central way in 
which the public and the scientific community interact. 
There is usually a more direct connection between these 
two groups, a connection which is the purview of science 
communication. 
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Science communication is a broad field, encompassing 
media reports and press conferences, science museums, tel-
evision and film presentations of science, and formal sci-
ence education. Things have come a long way from the 
days when Carl Sagan was vilified within the scientific 
community for his work on Cosmos;1 scientists now recog-
nize the importance of science communication, and work 
to be better at it. There are science communication training 
modules for scientists; there are awards within scientific so-
cieties for those who do science communication well (e.g., 
the AAAS Award for Public Engagement with Science). 
The scientific community clearly recognizes that if the pub-
lic is to both understand and benefit from the work scien-
tists do, science communication must be done well.  
But scientists have also been frustrated by the impact of 
their efforts in this area. Although science is one of the most 
trusted institutions in contemporary societies—rating 
higher than the media, organized religion, and the govern-
ment in most polls—the public (or more precisely some 
segments of the public) sometimes do not accept or believe 
what scientists are trying to communicate. Topics on which 
a substantial part of the public is skeptical about a strong 
scientific consensus range from climate change and evolu-
tion to GMO safety and vaccines. Recent polls of scientists 
show that most scientists (84% of them) place the blame for 
this rejection of scientific claims on the public’s lack of 
knowledge about science.2  
Scientific literacy surveys further support this view of 
where the problem lies. When taking such surveys—which 
usually entails answering simple questions (e.g., true/false 
format) about what scientists think of as “basic facts”—the 
public does poorly. No nation has even half its adult popu-
lation passing these basic scientific literacy tests. While 
there appear to be gains in some countries in recent years 
on such baseline science literacy, it is still abysmal, and sci-
entists routinely blame this illiteracy for the failure of the 




public to accept scientific findings. After all, if you don’t 
understand basic scientific information, how can you de-
cide what is scientifically sound or not? This is the so-called 
deficit model of science communication—that the public 
fails to accept or believe science because it simply doesn’t 
know enough science.  
In this lecture, I will not argue that scientists are wholly 
misguided to think that the public’s lack of knowledge 
about science is a problem. Rather I will argue that what 
scientists normally think of as the requisite content of this 
knowledge is off target, that what the public needs to know 
about science is not the usual package of a set of facts, of 
bits of knowledge without which the public will have no 
understanding of what scientists are talking about. Rather, 
I will suggest that what is important for the public to un-
derstand about science is the nature of scientific reasoning 
and practice, and that factual scientific knowledge is sec-
ondary to this understanding.  
Further, the understanding of science we need the pub-
lic to have includes not just the role of evidence but the role 
of values in scientific practice. With a public informed by 
such a picture, scientists will need to commit to more of a 
dialogue with the public rather than the one-way transmis-
sion of bits of information. Science communication, when 
done properly, becomes a two-way discourse rather than a 
one-way stream. I will describe some of the mechanisms 
and institutional settings that can assist us with such dia-
logues toward the end of this lecture.  
I will start by describing the baseline view that the pub-
lic is problematically scientifically illiterate and that this is 
the reason for the discrepancies between what the public 
believes and what scientists believe (the classic deficit 
model). Empirical challenges to the deficit model have 
arisen in recent years, undermining the validity of the def-
icit model. These are important challenges, but they have 
not come with appropriate frameworks for understanding 
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what we should be trying to achieve in science communica-
tion. I will argue that these newer approaches for under-
standing science communication fall short. Part of the 
problem is that the current theories of science communica-
tion do not have a rich enough account of the proper roles 
for values in science, and thus, view any influence of values 
on the acceptance of scientific claims as not properly ra-
tional. I argued in the first lecture that this is a mistake, that 
there is a very important way that values can legitimately 
influence the acceptance and rejection of scientific claims—
and this applies to both scientists and the nonexpert public. 
Acknowledging this role means science is no longer a 
value-free resource for public debate. It also opens up the 
possibilities for debate and discourse along productive 
lines. Rather than stalemates of ideological clashes, we can 
see how understanding the intertwining of values and evi-
dence in science provides ways to disagree rationally and 
to discuss our disagreements without disparaging our op-
ponents. Science communication becomes a different en-
deavor with this conception, far more interactive in 
character. But in order for such interactivity to work in 
practice, the public will need to understand the nature of 
science better. Science education should focus on this better 
understanding of the practice of science, producing a basis 
for more interactive and ultimately more robust science 
communication. 
Scientific Literacy and the Deficit Model’s Demise 
The perceived crisis of scientific illiteracy in the US 
dates back at least to the late 1950s, when the country was 
in the grip of concern over the technological prowess of the 
Soviet Union, exemplified by the successful launch of Sput-
nik in 1957. Six months before the launch of Sputnik, the 
National Association of Science Writers conducted a sur-
vey of the US population regarding their perception and 
understanding of science.3 Although the survey focused on 




public interest in science news stories, it also included some 
fact-based questions that attempted to assess how much the 
public understood about particular scientific topics of the 
time: radioactive fallout, fluoridation, the polio vaccine, 
and satellites (a topic on which the public would have done 
better after Sputnik). Less than 20% of those surveyed had 
accurate understandings of all four topics; most Americans 
understood two or less.4 Similarly low levels of literacy 
were found in other surveys of the period.5 By the 1970s, 
more systematic efforts to measure scientific literacy, and 
discussions of what should constitute scientific literacy, 
had begun.  
Debates over how to conceive of scientific literacy were 
tied in the 1970s to the idea that scientific literacy was es-
sential to democratic policy making. The idea of a civic sci-
entific literacy—“a level of understanding of scientific 
terms and constructs sufficient to read a daily newspaper 
or magazine and to understand the essence of competing 
arguments on a given dispute or controversy”6—was made 
distinct from the ability to write clearly about science. It 
was this kind of literacy that seemed essential to society. 
For example, physicist Benjamin Shen argued in 1975 that 
what we needed to worry about was an adequate under-
standing of basic scientific ideas, and that this “civic science 
literacy [was] a cornerstone of informed public policy.”7 
Today, this sense of science literacy is still seen as essential 
for democracy, even for civilization itself. For example, a 
recent Smithsonian report declares: “Scientific literacy is an 
urgent and important issue. Why should we care? The an-
swer is simple: Our way of life and our survival are at 
stake.”8 
As this conception of scientific literacy emerged, the in-
itial challenge was how best to measure this kind of liter-
acy, given that the scientific controversies in the news 
changed over the years. Beginning in the late 1970s and 
with support from the National Science Foundation, Jon 
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Miller worked to provide a “durable” measure of scientific 
literacy, one that could weather changes in the topics of in-
terest of the day. The kinds of questions asked, what are 
now called “science education/literacy indicators,” are 
simple true/false questions that assess whether the public 
grasps basic “facts.”9 What has become a standard tech-
nique, though, does not reflect Miller’s full view. In his 
work on generating measures of civic scientific literacy, he 
embraced a three-part conception of what literacy should 
entail: 1) a grasp of basic scientific concepts (i.e., scientific 
facts), 2) an understanding of scientific inquiry, and 3) an 
understanding of the impact on science and society.10 This 
is indeed a useful tripartite goal for assessing scientific lit-
eracy, but in practice, the first part usually swamps the sec-
ond and third parts. This is probably because asking about 
facts provides the most obvious fodder for ease of testing 
and evaluation. Standard science literacy tests usually con-
tain a dozen or so true/false questions about scientific facts 
(e.g., “The center of the earth is hot.” or “An atom is larger 
than an electron.”) and a couple of open-ended questions 
about scientific inquiry, such as “Describe what an experi-
ment is” Not surprisingly, the questions about facts come 
to dominate discussions of scientific literacy, as it is over 
these questions that statistics can readily be gathered. 
With the regularly dismal showing of democratic pub-
lics on these kinds of tests, many scientists have come to 
blame the public’s ineptitude on scientific literacy tests for 
their failure to accept the authority of expertise regarding 
issues of public import. 11 This is the “deficit model,” the 
idea that the problem of the public contesting or rejecting 
scientific expertise arises primarily because of the scientific 
illiteracy of the public. 
Since 1990, the deficit model has been subjected to some 
potent critiques. Brian Wynne, in his classic 1992 paper 
“Misunderstood misunderstandings,” showed how the is-
sue with science communication in the case he examined 




was not a lack of knowledge by the “lay public,” but a lack 
of knowledge by the experts regarding the actual local con-
ditions and practices to which their expertise was supposed 
to apply. The experts simply didn’t know enough about 
sheep farming or local soils to be able to construct appro-
priate field trials and make accurate predictions crucial for 
ensuring the safety of agricultural practices and products 
in the region after the Chernobyl accident.12 
More recently, political scientists who examined popu-
lation-level trends in skepticism about various contested 
scientific claims empirically disconfirmed the deficit 
model. These scientists tested whether people who do more 
poorly on fact-based scientific literacy tests are those less 
accepting of scientific claims, and found the reverse to be 
true.13 Instead, they found that those most skeptical of key 
contested claims do better on the scientific literacy tests. 
What drives disagreement seems to have more to do with 
ideological commitments or value frameworks than 
whether someone has a grasp of scientific facts. The higher 
the education level, the more some members of the public 
feel competent to challenge expertise. For example, among 
social conservatives, the more people know about science, 
the more skeptical they are about climate change. And it is 
often the more highly educated members of the public who 
are the strongest critics of vaccine policy. Therefore, the 
deficit model does not appear to hold up empirically.  
This disparity might be because the scientific literacy 
tests are too simplistic. For example, knowing that the earth 
goes around the sun once each year is simply not enough 
for understanding climate change. One can be skeptical 
that knowing whether electrons are smaller than atoms is 
even relevant to the issue.14 Perhaps the problem is that a 
little bit of knowledge is dangerous, that having a bit of fa-
miliarity with an area of science allows one to feel freer to 
disagree with experts. But we do not want a more ignorant, 
and thus more pliable, public. Nor can we gain expertise in 
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everything—some division of cognitive labor is needed. So 
there will always be areas where we have only a bit of 
knowledge. Rather than increasing expertise and familiar-
ity with all the areas of publicly relevant science, or aiming 
for reduced scientific literacy (!), we need another path.  
The place to start is looking at the causal factors that 
drive disagreement with scientific expertise (particularly 
with a consensus of scientific experts), aside from scientific 
literacy. Recent work suggests that disputing the experts 
has a lot to do with value commitments and worldviews.  
In Dan Kahan’s work, for example, he has championed 
the idea that ideological worldviews determine much of 
what the public believes. Within his theoretical framework, 
he has developed tests to sort the population by whether 
one is egalitarian (tending to prefer social arrangements of 
presumed equality) or hierarchical (tending to prefer hier-
archical arrangements such as those inside the military or 
private business), and whether one is individualist (valu-
ing the needs of humans as individuals first) or communi-
tarian (valuing the needs of communities first).15 He has 
found that rather than distributing themselves among the 
four quadrants, people (at least in the US) tend to cluster 
into egalitarian communitarians or hierarchical individual-
ists. Kahan finds that depending on how one sorts into 
these two categories (based on his personality tests), one is 
more likely to accept or reject certain scientific claims. For 
example, egalitarian communitarians are more likely to ac-
cept scientific claims about anthropogenic climate change, 
whereas hierarchical individualists are less likely. Even 
more devastating for the deficit model, if a person is a hier-
archical individualist, the more that person knows about 
the science, the more likely they are to reject the consensus 
on climate change.  
Other social scientists such as Matthew Nisbet have ex-
amined particular acts of communication and have noticed 




the impact of framing on the acceptance or rejection of sci-
entific claims. In these studies,16 social and ethical values, 
and how they are drawn upon in a piece of science commu-
nication, are shown to have a substantial impact on the up-
take of particular claims. These social scientists argue for 
reflective science communication strategies that package, 
or frame, scientific information in ways that will reach au-
diences. Doing so might require multiple packaging of the 
same information for different audiences. 
Both of these recent approaches build from insights on 
motivated reasoning, an idea originating from Ziva 
Kunda’s classic 1990 paper, “The Case for Motivated Rea-
soning.” Kunda surveyed wide swaths of psychological re-
search to show that “directional reasoning” was an 
endemic aspect of human reasoning, that such directional 
reasoning was more concerned with reaching a particular 
conclusion than with getting to the truth (she called truth 
directness as being motivated by accuracy), and that 
wishes, desires, and values affected both conclusions and 
reasoning processes. Kunda posited that our motives 
shaped our memory search (leading to selectivity in the 
empirical evidence on which we draw) and our belief-con-
struction processes.17 While much of the evidence Kunda 
discussed drew from research about people’s beliefs about 
themselves and others (notoriously complex subjects), 
some studies concerned people’s beliefs regarding factual 
statements about the world (such as the accuracy of medi-
cal tests or the dangers of consuming caffeine) or people’s 
use of statistical rules (such as an awareness of the im-
portance of base rates).18  
Although Kunda argued that directional reasoning is a 
pervasive aspect of human thought, she also noted that di-
rectional reasoning did not mean that one could believe 
whatever one chose. Evidence still constrained such rea-
soning, and without some evidence or reason to support 
one’s views, even directional reasoning failed to produce 
Science, Values, and Democracy 
130 
the desired end. “People attempt to be rational: They will 
believe undesirable evidence if they cannot refute it, but 
they will refute it if they can.”19  
One can view the work of current social scientists like 
Kahan and Nisbet as demonstrating the pervasive use of 
motivated reasoning regarding publicly controversial sci-
entific topics. But this just seems to make our situation with 
respect to science communication worse.  
On the one hand, openly saying that members of the 
public support certain views because they accept the sci-
ence that fits with their worldviews or their values, and 
they reject what does not, is disparaging of the public. 
Consider Kahan et al.’s discussion of their work (2012): 
Our findings could be viewed as evidence of how remarkably 
well-equipped ordinary individuals are to discern which 
stances towards scientific information secure their personal 
interests.… For the ordinary individual, the most consequen-
tial effect of his beliefs about climate change is likely to be on 
his relations with his peers. A hierarchical individualist who 
expresses anxiety about climate change might well be 
shunned by his co-workers at an oil refinery in Oklahoma 
City. A similar fate will probably befall the egalitarian com-
munitarian English professor who reveals to colleagues in 
Boston that she thinks the scientific consensus on climate 
change is a hoax.20  
Kahan et al. go on to argue that because each individ-
ual’s actions in mitigating climate change is likely to have 
negligible impact, it makes sense that getting along with 
one’s peers overrides any concern one might have about 
climate change for either group. Yet to tell members of the 
public that this is the reason they accept or reject a claim, 
because it fits with their ideological worldview, because it 
is what their neighbors and friends accept, is insulting. (Im-
agine if I told you that was the reason you held the beliefs 




you did—that while you might think you had other rea-
sons, the real reason was because you want to fit in with 
your friends and colleagues.) Although this kind of moti-
vated reasoning can be construed as rational in the sense of 
pursuing one’s self-interests, it falls short of the rationality 
that one would want on public display or in a space of pub-
lic reasoning.  
Openly describing and discussing the public’s views in 
this way is thus problematic. We could, on the other hand, 
use an awareness of values in science communication to tai-
lor communication regarding science to increase uptake of 
the science and not say openly that this is what is occurring. 
We could use the theories to frame communications to 
reach recalcitrant publics. But this just seems manipulative. 
And indeed, social scientists working with framing theory 
raise such concerns. As Nisbet and Scheufele note:  
Public communication and engagement should not be con-
ceived of as simply a way to “sell” the public on the im-
portance of science or to persuade the public to view scientific 
debates as scientists and their allies do. To apply sophisticated 
approaches such as framing or deliberative forums to achieve 
these ends falls back into the trap of deficit model thinking and 
undermines longer-term efforts at building trust, relation-
ships, and participation across segments of the public.21 
It seems we are stuck. It does not seem plausible that we 
can use such theories openly, as that seems insulting and 
disparaging of the public. Telling someone you are tailor-
ing the message to their worldview and/or values because 
they will more likely accept it using motivated reasoning 
would not work, at least in the long run. And to use this 
work without acknowledgement is problematic as well. We 
don’t want to just manipulate the public into accepting sci-
entific consensus. Doing so would likely be self-defeating, 
as the public would probably notice that different science 
communication messages are uniquely tailored, and be-
come suspicious of such communication efforts.  
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The approaches described here seem to make the disa-
greements regarding politically relevant science perma-
nently intractable. If people think what they think because 
it is what they want to think (because it is motivated, be-
cause it is framed to appeal to their deeply held values, be-
cause of their cultural and ideological commitments), it 
seems there is nothing to do but continue the ideological 
wars, hoping for long-term victory through education 
(more manipulation?) and attrition from human mortal-
ity—a bleak picture indeed. Nor do we want to return to 
the days of deficit model thinking. Finally, we don’t want 
to hide what scientific debate there is (in the hopes that do-
ing so will bolster scientific authority), as open debate is 
part of what makes science robust and reliable, and making 
it seem otherwise is one of the flaws of the deficit model. 
We need another way forward. 
Recognizing Legitimate Values in Science 
There is a way out of this conundrum, a path that can be 
discerned by applying a lesson from the first lecture on sci-
ence and values to science communication. The key lesson 
is that an influence of values on scientific reasoning need 
not be irrational (in the sense of being publicly defensible 
and based on public reasons). The trouble with the theories 
of the social scientists is that they presume a value-free 
ideal for science, that scientific reasoning should not be in-
fluenced by values, and that there is a clear dichotomy be-
tween accuracy-directed reasoning and motivated 
reasoning (to put it in Kunda’s terms). Inductive risk con-
siderations teach us that this is not the case, that pathways 
for motivated reasoning can be publicly defensible and 
deemed perfectly rational—and not just in the sense of pur-
suing one’s self-interest. Further, we can tell whether or not 
values are playing a legitimate role by engaging with peo-
ple and asking key questions. 




When examining motivated reasoning through the lens 
of inductive risk, there are two possible interpretations—
one that is problematic and one that is completely rational. 
The first interpretation is that people are ignoring evidence 
that goes against what they want to believe and emphasiz-
ing evidence that fits with what they want to believe (or al-
ready believe). Within the role-restriction ideal for values 
in science,22 this employs the unacceptable direct role for 
values in reasoning about evidence, that the values ensure 
that you get to the desired (even if incorrect) conclusion. 
The second interpretation is that people are more worried 
about some risks of error than others and are adjusting 
their standards of proof accordingly. This interpretation 
utilizes inductive risk in science and emphasizes the indi-
rect role for values in science, that values can and should 
help decide how much evidence is sufficient. If such values 
can create divergent views among experts, we should not 
be surprised that they can also create divergent views 
among the public. Further, the extent to which values are 
influencing the standards of proof, we can understand such 
reasoning as a rational use of values in evidential evalua-
tion (for both experts and nonexperts). 
The empirically based literature does not differentiate 
between these two ways in which social and ethical values 
can influence reasoning about evidence. So I can’t tell 
which mode of reasoning people are actually employing 
when they are reasoning about science. I suspect it is a mix-
ture of both. Sometimes, people are using unacceptable (bi-
ased or irrational) forms of motivated reasoning and, 
sometimes, people are using acceptable (rational) concerns 
arising from inductive risk. This dual possibility provides 
more than competing plausible explanations for the moti-
vated reasoning phenomena. It also provides ways to move 
debate forward, beyond the impasse of ideological stale-
mate. 
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The lens of inductive risk clarifies a way to proceed with 
entangled political, ideological, and scientific debates, a 
way to engage in a dialogue with those who disagree with 
us. Let us take an example of two parties, A and B, who 
dispute the scientific support for Claim C. Both parties 
want to use the language of science to bolster their argu-
ments, i.e., they both want to be seen as taking science seri-
ously as a basis for their position. Party A argues that the 
science supports Claim C and we should proceed with pol-
icy on that basis, whereas party B argues that the science 
does not provide adequate support for Claim C (or argues 
that the science is indeterminate between Claim C and 
Claim F, or really supports F). We should all be familiar 
with such cases. We could be talking about anthropogenic 
climate change, vaccine safety, GMO safety, dietary recom-
mendations, drug safety and efficacy, or evolution vs. cre-
ationism, among other contemporary debates.  
The way these debates go is usually less than produc-
tive. Sometimes disputes turn into debates about specific 
evidential claims, with arguments and counter-arguments 
about methodological adequacy of particular studies. This 
can sometimes be productive, but often just turns into en-
trenched sides. More often, disputes turn into ad hominem 
attacks on who has received funding from whom, or who 
is biased by some influence, or who is being irrational, or 
who is really anti-science. When arguments are made on 
this basis, it is little wonder that they devolve into mutually 
loathing camps. 
Inductive risk provides a different way to proceed. We 
can start with the presumption that everyone is acting ra-
tionally and is taking the evidence seriously. We can ask all 
parties (even our own—this is entirely reflexive) why they 
view the evidence as supporting their view. This should al-
low them to elucidate both the evidential and methodolog-
ical basis for their view and the value basis, including why 
they view the evidence as sufficient. We can then ask all 




parties what evidence would change their minds. If what is 
at issue are value-based disagreements about evidential 
sufficiency (i.e., a proper indirect role for values regarding 
evidential sufficiency rather than an improper direct role), 
some hypothetical evidence should tip the balance to their 
opponents’ position, thus illuminating the sufficiency 
standards others are using.  
There are several discursive paths to follow at this point, 
depending on what the disputing parties say. For example, 
suppose party B says no evidence would ever change their 
mind. Then we can legitimately point out that their view is 
not scientifically based at all, that science has little or noth-
ing to do with their stance, and that an ideological or value 
commitment external to science is what is driving their 
view. The debate can then properly focus on that commit-
ment, what reasons we can have for or against it, and sci-
ence can be left out of it. Imagine how much better the 
creationism debate would be if we could do this. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that both parties can artic-
ulate hypothetical evidence that would change their mind. 
There are two directions to go with this information. One is 
to debate more carefully the values involved in the eviden-
tial sufficiency assessments. Why does party A have such 
lower standards than party B, or why is party B so demand-
ing? Is one of the parties ignoring important implications 
of wrongly accepting or rejecting the claim? Are there some 
important methodological issues at stake? 
Further, one can try to construct alternative policies that 
do not threaten the values at stake for one of the parties. 
For example, suppose we are talking about climate change 
and party B is worried about prematurely accepting an-
thropogenic climate change because of worries about a loss 
of personal freedom or a threat to private businesses. In-
stead of dismissing such concerns, we could work to ensure 
that shifting away from fossil fuels enhances individual 
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freedom (e.g., through energy independence and decen-
tralized energy generation), and that the business opportu-
nities represented by such a shift are strongly supported by 
government policies through free-market mechanisms.  
Finally, one could also attempt to collect the evidence 
that either party said they would find convincing. Perhaps 
with such evidence in hand, the dispute could be resolved, 
and people would change their minds.23 Alternatively, the 
party that said it would be convinced could recant (or level 
additional methodological critiques). But doing so would 
require additional reasons targeted at the recent evidence, 
other than a distaste for the evidence. A failure to offer solid 
reasons for remaining skeptical, and for being able to say 
again what evidence would be convincing (which would 
still be required), or a repeated pattern for setting bars and 
then being unconvinced when the bars are cleared, should 
make us skeptical our interlocutors are engaging in the dis-
pute with integrity. Such failures are evidence that their 
values are playing an improper direct role and should dam-
age the credibility of those who exhibit such patterns. In 
short, depending on how the debate goes, lots of potential 
fruitful paths open. 
By having a theory of how values can legitimately influ-
ence evidential assessment, we can provide a constructive 
path for engaging with people who disagree about eviden-
tial assessment. We don’t have to just point out that they 
are probably cherry-picking data or agreeing with others 
who share their cultural identity, observations both of 
which are pretty insulting to a person’s sense of intellectual 
integrity. We can use a theory of how values legitimately 
influence science to structure a respectful and (possibly) 
productive engagement.  
And this is just one way the philosophical understand-
ing of values in science can help with apparently ideologi-
cal debates over science. Sometimes disputes rest on the 
kinds of studies are done or not done, which influences the 




values that shape the research agenda.24 Acknowledging 
that there are gaps in the literature that need to be filled is 
important when addressing concerns about scientific 
claims. Openly discussing values in science provides ave-
nues for moving the discussion forward, which is prefera-
ble to our current stalemates. We can do so by openly 
acknowledging the values in science, and the values at 
stake in science-based disputes, without disparaging the 
public or losing scientific integrity. 
Scientists, rather than being frustrated by the divergent 
values of the public that make them resistant to scientific 
claims, should view those divergent values as a resource. It 
is those values that can redirect research efforts to problems 
the public thinks important or to gather evidence crucial for 
settling disputes by meeting everyone’s evidential suffi-
ciency standards. But having this kind of productive dia-
logue requires a public that understands scientific practice 
and the proper role for values therein. This will require 
both a shift in what science literacy should mean and rec-
ognized spaces for this kind of dialogue. 
Rethinking Science Literacy 
In order to generate the productive debate described in 
the previous section, note what is and is not needed for the 
public’s baseline understanding of science. What is not 
needed is a passing grade on fact-based literacy tests. What 
is needed is an understanding of the process and practice 
of science. Indeed, we might rethink the name we give to 
this understanding. Rather than “literacy” (the ability to 
read and write), perhaps the skill we want for citizens with 
respect to science is competency or fluency, terms more re-
flective of an ability to engage appropriately and produc-
tively with science. 
The most important thing for the public to understand 
about science is not a set of scientific facts, but its nature as 
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an empirical, inductive, and critical process. Science is em-
pirical because of the central importance of evidence gath-
ered from interacting with the world (both social and 
natural). Scientists focus on gathering evidence to test the 
theories they develop. But what comes with this emphasis 
on the empirical is the inductive uncertainty of scientific 
knowledge. Any given claim25 can be challenged (and re-
fined or overturned) by future evidence. The evidence is 
never complete for any general scientific claim. It is the pos-
sibility for future evidential challenge that makes science so 
exciting for scientists—genuine discovery and novel ways 
of thinking about the world are always a possibility. And 
because science is empirical and inductive, it also must 
maintain a culture of critical interactions among science 
peers. Scientists have to be willing to challenge each other’s 
work, to overturn longstanding views (if the evidence is 
there to do so), and to hold no claim above the critical fray. 
It is this critical culture, the social culture of science, com-
bined with (and arising from) its evidential and inductive 
basis, that gives science its underlying epistemic authority. 
The public must have a clear understanding that this is 
what science is. Teaching science as—and structuring liter-
acy tests around—a fixed set of facts creates the opposite 
understanding. That science is an ongoing practice of in-
vestigation should be the first thing the public learns about 
science in grade school, rather than an understanding of 
science they encounter only once they reach graduate stud-
ies (for those who pursue them).  
If the public embraced such an understanding of sci-
ence, it would be less perplexing when experts disagree or 
when experts change their minds in the face of new evi-
dence. Currently, members of the public express dismay or 
frustration with the instability of expert knowledge when 
confronted with experts in practice. But if the public under-
stood that this was normal, that, in fact, this was science 




working properly, such frustration would likely be miti-
gated, if not resolved entirely.  
If we focused on such an understanding of science, we 
could shift our science literacy tests accordingly. Doing so 
does not mean emphasizing only the qualitative open-
ended questions of Miller’s tests (discussed above) and los-
ing the ability to have readily assessable and comparable 
measures. Recently, some social scientists have begun de-
veloping more appropriate scientific literacy tests, which 
require an understanding of scientific reasoning rather 
than scientific facts.26 In these tests, one’s understanding of 
how to control for causal confounders, how to be aware of 
problems such as drawing results from small numbers, and 
how, in general, to reason about scientific evidence is tested 
in easily assessable true/false questions. Such a test es-
chews fact-based science literacy testing and replaces it 
with the requisite understanding of the challenge of doing 
science and of reasoning about evidence. We do not have 
to give up readily comparable measures of scientific liter-
acy when we shift to focusing on the process and reasoning 
of science.  
In addition to having a more durable and appropriate 
goal for science literacy, there are potentially practical ben-
efits to centering our literacy efforts on this kind of test. In 
developing their measures for scientific literacy, Drum-
mond and Fischhoff found that those who do well on such 
tests do tend to accept the scientific consensus on conten-
tious issues such as climate change more than those who 
do poorly. I do not mean to suggest that getting the public 
to agree with scientists is the gold standard for measures of 
scientific literacy. As noted above, there can be good value-
based reasons for disputing scientific results as well. But 
we should take some comfort in the idea that those who 
understand better how scientists reason also tend to accept 
and agree with what scientists are trying to tell us. 
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Finally, having a public that understands the scientific 
process would enable us to refocus science education on 
how research gets done (including a country’s science pol-
icy culture) and how that research gets used to make policy. 
Science civics should be a core part of every citizen’s edu-
cation, including how values shape what research gets con-
ducted as well as assessments of evidential sufficiency. 
That values legitimately shape scientific practice in these 
ways should be part of the basic education regarding sci-
ence. The public may, in the process, gain tools to critically 
examine current scientific practices, to query the direction 
and institutional structures that shape research agendas, 
and to question the science advice apparatus more thor-
oughly. Rather than view this as trouble, this is what we 
should hope for: a scientifically informed and democrati-
cally engaged public. The question then becomes, how do 
we structure interactions between the public and the scien-
tific community in practice? 
The Requisite Social Structures and Practices 
One big institutional shift will need to be in K-12 educa-
tion. Rather than focusing on training possible future scien-
tists and getting core disciplinary facts across to students, 
primary and secondary education needs to be focused on 
what science is (as described above), how values shape sci-
ence, and how policy structures interact with science. Sci-
ence civics becomes a central rather than peripheral topic. 
There are already reform efforts underway, which focus on 
guiding students through actual discovery processes rather 
than fact-based learning (they learn the facts they need 
along the way in the discovery process). Efforts like the 
AAAS’s Project 206127 try to emphasize a more process-
based approach to science education. But such efforts are 
hampered by the tremendous institutional inertia of the ed-
ucational system, by continued insistence on disciplinary 
fact-based learning as well as standardized testing based 




on the current inadequate system. Changing all this will be 
challenging, but we should be heartened by the fact that 
kids really love doing science and have a tremendous ca-
pacity for it. My favorite exemplar of what is possible is the 
Blackawton Bee study, where second-graders (yes, grade 
2!!) performed and subsequently published a study on bee 
behavior. Their conclusion: “Science is cool and fun be-
cause you get to do stuff that no one has ever done be-
fore.”28 Note that this was not some handpicked cadre of 
exceptional students, but a regular class at a regular ele-
mentary school. Every kid can do science if given the 
chance. It is far more important that kids get the chance to 
experience scientific inquiry than to master scientific facts 
and our educational system should reflect this. 
But we cannot wait for the change in the educational 
system and for future generations to pass through it before 
engaging democratic publics better in science and scientific 
issues. There are a range of techniques and structures that 
are currently being employed, and from these we can draw, 
test, and expand the possibilities.  
Citizens are already engaged in “citizen science” pro-
jects from bioblitzes, to astronomical observation and back-
yard data collection (bird counts, ice rink records, weather 
stations) to online engagement (through games like FoldIt 
or video scanning from undersea cameras). These are of 
great assistance to scientists, but they do not engage citi-
zens in the judgments needed to set up a scientific study or 
to assess evidence. Instead, they use citizens as data collec-
tion mechanisms. Perhaps such projects can be opened to 
include citizen input on the direction of future studies, thus 
drawing citizens deeper into the scientific process. 
A deeper kind of engagement with scientific issues can 
be seen in a range of deliberative forums deployed over the 
past two decades. Citizen consensus conferences, Fishkin’s 
deliberative polls, and deliberative forums like the World-
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WideViews project29 bring groups of citizens (often demo-
graphically representative) together to discuss a particular 
science-based policy issue, informed by experts.30 Some-
times citizens come to consensus and sometimes they vote 
on what to do, and thus divergent views are preserved in 
the record. Such conferences generally have produced sen-
sible and well-reasoned assessments of issues (even if they 
have had uneven success in their influence on policy). Cit-
izens in such spaces become both better informed about a 
particular issue and more reflective about how they would 
like their community or society to deal with it. (They tend 
to think and argue more like citizens than consumers, to 
draw from Mark Sagoff’s classic distinction.31) As such, 
they raise the level of democratic discourse about a partic-
ular issue while in general raising the level of democratic 
engagement among citizens. These are good things. 
While such forums are useful for assessing the available 
research and to improve the discussion of such issues in 
democratic societies, they tend not to influence future re-
search or how experts think about their work. We can have 
even more robust engagement between citizens and ex-
perts through collaborative research projects. In these 
kinds of processes, citizens (often stakeholders as opposed 
to representative samples) work with experts to produce 
the knowledge needed to address a particular issue. It is 
important that such processes be open and transparent, 
that a range of stakeholders be involved from the start, and 
that trust be built and maintained between citizens and ex-
perts over time. When this works (and it has worked well 
in the past32), value judgments and evidence both get aired 
and examined, different evidential standards can be met 
(so that everyone is satisfied with the final result), and ex-
pertise can soundly and accountably inform policy. There 
is robust learning (from two-way dialogue) for all parties 
involved. This is also near-ideal public interest science,33 
and thus needs to be better supported by funding mecha-
nisms. But this involves getting experts repeatedly in the 




room with engaged citizens and stakeholders, and thus can 
be temporally and spatially constraining. Although such a 
process may not be applicable to every issue, when scien-
tific expertise is relevant and needed for local issues, this is 
a near ideal way to approach the problem of public involve-
ment.  
Finally, there are ongoing experiments with other forms 
of public-expert interactions. Colleagues, for example, are 
experimenting with material deliberation, with ways in 
which citizens can interact with the stuff of science, and 
thus think through what kinds of possibilities and direc-
tions new technologies can take.34 There are also efforts to 
embed social scientists and humanists in science labs so 
they can work with scientists to help them understand the 
potential implications of—and the nascent value judg-
ments in—their work, and thus create the potential to bring 
such work more in line with the needs and interests of the 
public.35 In the field of responsible innovation, such exper-
iments are helping to uncover what works, when, and why. 
In general, the recognition of the importance of social and 
ethical values in shaping what science gets done should 
provide further impetus to “upstream engagement” tech-
niques in the responsible innovation sphere.  
These kinds of structures can produce precisely the kind 
of dialogue—the kind of two-way communication—that is 
needed for science communication to be successful. Science 
is not a value-neutral, universally authoritative fact-pro-
ducing machine in these processes. Instead, citizens and 
scientists work together to decide which science should be 
done and how it should proceed, and when a study is done 
(i.e., when the evidence is enough). As such, the science and 
expertise are inherently made democratically accountable.  
As these kinds of mechanisms for interactions become a 
normal part of democratic governance, we can expect to see 
a concomitant shift in the more traditional forms of science 
communication, such as science journalism and science 
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museums. Journalists would have more to cover than em-
bargoed scientific results in scientific journals, with reports 
coming out of processes like citizen juries and collaborative 
analyses. Science journalism is already shifting away from 
the simplistic view that objective reporting means report-
ing two opposing views. More appropriate would be re-
porting on reasons why experts agree or disagree with a 
finding, and the value commitments involved in these as-
sessments. (This could also make science reporting even 
more interesting to the public!) And science museums are 
already experimenting with more interactive science com-
munication methods, for example, with respect to nano-
technology.36 Our “informal” science education system can 
readily adapt to more dialogue and value-transparent 
modes of science communication. Further, social media 
platforms can be used to support dialogue across scales 
where meeting face-to-face is not feasible. 
So, there are a multitude of practical ways to change 
how we conduct science communication to include a two-
way, interactive component. However, pursuing these av-
enues also means changing how we think of science in pub-
lic debate. 
What This Means for the Public Role of Science 
I have been describing a lot of promising avenues, both 
conceptual and practical, for science communication post-
value-free ideal and post-deficit model. But there is one 
thing that must be relinquished regarding how we think 
about science in public discourse, and I suspect that is a 
source of great anxiety for many.  
What we must give up is the idea that science is a value-
neutral source of authoritative statements. If values are im-
portant in shaping the research agenda of science and im-
portant in deciding when evidence is sufficient, then only 
scientific claims informed by acceptable values (and the 




definition of acceptable will change depending on whom 
you are talking to in a pluralist society) will be, and should 
be, authoritative. The ideal of science having a universally 
authoritative voice, above the fray of our political differ-
ences, must be surrendered.37 
Now, we know we haven’t been living in a world where 
science has universal authority for some time. I do not think 
the public contestation of science is a new thing—I am 
skeptical there was ever a golden age when scientists were 
universally listened to, when their advice was always 
heeded, when expertise was unproblematic. Indeed, once 
we had specialized expertise, we had contested expertise 
(at least so it seems to me from the historical record). But 
the sense that we are now in an age of “post-normal” sci-
ence, and that science is under siege as never before, is 
clearly pervasive. And it might seem that the understand-
ing of science I have been advocating, of a value-saturated 
endeavor, where shared values are a part of the basis for 
accepting science, just gives in to these trends.  
I think, however, that relinquishing the idea that science 
can act as a value-neutral part of our public discourse is no 
great loss when 1) we can have more productive debates 
about science without that idea, and 2) that idea does not 
seem to be helping in our practices currently. We might be 
losing the ideal of science as a source of universal public 
reason, but we are gaining an ideal of discourse about evi-
dentially based issues in practice. 
Science, under this vision of its role in society and its 
relationship to the public, is no longer a source of empirical 
claims with automatic authority. The authority of science 
rests on several bases simultaneously (as noted in the first 
lecture). It is based partly on the integrity of individual sci-
entists (keeping values to their proper roles), partly on the 
communal critical practices of scientists, partly on the in-
strumental success of science in human endeavors, and 
partly on shared values. This means that scientists should 
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expect some members of the public (whose values are 
threatened by their findings) to be hesitant, or even re-
sistant, to accepting their findings. The right response is not 
to bemoan a lack of factual knowledge about science, but to 
engage those publics, to find out why they view the find-
ings as problematic, to ascertain what evidence would con-
vince them of the scientific work or which questions they 
want answered, to craft ways forward. We are starting to 
construct social spaces in which this can happen, and this 
is where future efforts should lie. 
In short, science can retain its place as a general author-
ity in society by acknowledging the complex basis of its au-
thority. It is authoritative not because it is value-free or 
produces permanent facts, but because it is a critical, em-
pirical endeavor conducted by a community structured to 
criticize itself, and because of values shared with the soci-
ety in which its work is embedded. Specific claims are al-
ways open to critique, both within and outside of science, 
on both an empirical and valuational basis. How those crit-
icisms unfurl depends on the kind of criticism. The respon-
siveness to that criticism is part of the basis for the authority 
of science. Displaying the resulting dialogue needs to be 
seen not as just part of science communication, but part of 
the democratic discourse essential to our science- and tech-
nology-laden societies. 
Conclusion 
In a sense, the scientists are right: the public’s lack of 
knowledge about science is a major problem. But it is not a 
lack of factual knowledge, of discrete and easily measured 
bits of information that is the key deficit. It is rather a lack 
of understanding of what science is, as an endeavor, that is 
the problem. Scientific literacy tests are geared toward the 
wrong objective, and as such, undermine the public’s abil-
ity to engage with science. We can remake our sense of 




what civic science literacy should be, and what our educa-
tional system should look like, accordingly. 
Further, shared values are a key and legitimate resource 
for the authority of particular scientific claims. The public 
needs to believe that scientists care about what they should 
care about, that they are asking the right questions, and that 
they are appropriately assessing the evidence in order for 
science to be authoritative on particular issues. We can craft 
practices for conducting science communication in more 
engaged, deliberative ways, but we need to have a clear 
idea of how values are legitimately part of science, and how 
they can serve as both a source of contestation and ac-
ceptance of scientific claims, in order for those practices 
and the institutions that support them to be properly struc-
tured. 
Science communication should not be from only one 
perspective or one-directional. Publics in democratic socie-
ties are plural, heterogeneous. While it may be challenging 
to honestly engage such publics, I hope I have provided a 
sense of how to do so here without being either deceptive 
or manipulative. Whether proceeding with these practices 
helps build trust remains to be seen. But whenever frustra-
tion looms, the scientific community should recall that the 
heterogeneity of the public is also a resource for science—
for doing science better. For it is from this heterogeneity that 
science draws the diverse voices, the different ways of look-
ing at a problem or thinking to look where no one has 
looked before that makes science better. 
Indeed, the differences between us, the gaps in values 
among citizens, the contestation in politics, the spaces be-
tween evidence and theory in science—all of these gaps 
that frustrate the urge to create a smooth and perfect foun-
dation, the one perfect communication, the finished and 
complete political system—need to be celebrated as re-
sources for legitimacy. Rather than try to fill or eliminate 
the gaps, we should see them as the space that provides the 




moment for criticism, for new ideas, for disagreement that 
produces better understanding down the road. Even the 
gap between descriptive and normative statements is im-
portant for being able to conceive of a world better than the 
one we are currently in. Our world is riddled with gaps, 
and it is through our willingness to look across them, to en-




1 See Keay Davidson, Carl Sagan: A Life (New York, NY: 
Wiley, 1999), and Karen Jane Sorensen, “Carl Sagan’s Cosmos: 
The Rhetorical Construction of Popular Science Mythology,” 
Dissertation, North Dakota State University (April 2013). 
2 Pew Research Center, “Public and Scientists’ Views on Sci-
ence and Society” (2015), available online: https://www.pewre-
search.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2015/01/PI_ 
ScienceandSociety_Report_012915.pdf. 
3 Robert C. Davis, The Public Impact of Science in the Mass Me-
dia: A Report on a Nation-Wide Survey for the National Association of 
Science Writers (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan, 1958). 
4 Ibid., 135. 
5 Matthew C. Nisbet and Dietram A. Scheufele, “What’s Next 
for Science Communication? Promising Directions and Linger-
ing Distractions,” Botany 96, no. 10 (2009): 1767–1778. 
6 Jon D. Miller, “The Measurement of Civic Scientific Liter-
acy,” Public Understanding of Science 7, no. 3 (1998): 204. 
7 Quoted in ibid., 204. 
8 G. Wayne Clough, Increasing Scientific Literacy: A Shared Re-
sponsibility (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2011), 6. 
 
 





9 For example, see the table produced by the National Science 
Foundation, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/in-
dex.cfm/chapter-7/tt07-08.htm 
10 Jon D. Miller, “The Measurement of Civic Scientific Liter-
acy,” Public Understanding of Science 7, no. 3 (1998): 205. 
11 Matthew C. Nisbet and Dietram A. Scheufele, “What’s 
Next for Science Communication? Promising Directions and Lin-
gering Distractions,” Botany 96, no. 10 (2009): 1767–1778. 
12 See also Brian Wynne, “May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Re-
flexive View of the Expert-Lay Knowledge Divide,” in Risk, Envi-
ronment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology, Scott Lash, 
Bronislaw Szerszynski, and Brian Wynne, eds. (London, UK: 
SAGE Publications, 1996), 44. 
13 Toby Bolsen, James N. Druckman, and Fay Lomax Cook, 
“Citizens’, Scientists’, and Policy Advisors’ Beliefs about Global 
Warming,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 658, no. 1 (2015): 271–295.; Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Pe-
ters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Don-
ald Braman, and Gregory Mandel, “The Polarizing Impact of 
Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change 
Risks,” Nature Climate Change 2, no. 10 (2012): 732–735. 
14 This is one of the facts used to measure scientific literacy in 
Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman, and Gregory Mandel, “The 
Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Per-
ceived Climate Change Risks,” Nature Climate Change 2, no. 10 
(2012): 732–735, for example. 
15 Here Kahan draws from the work of Mary Douglas and 
Aaron Wildavsky on the anthropology of risk. See Dan M. Ka-
han, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and Donald Braman, “Cultural Cogni-
tion of Scientific Consensus,” Journal of Risk Research 14, no. 2 
(2011): 147–174. 
16 See, e.g., Matthew C. Nisbet and Chris Mooney, “Framing 
Science,” Science 316, no. 5821 (2007): 56. 
17 Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,” Psycho-
logical Bulletin 108, no. 3 (1990): 483. 
18 Ibid., 488–489. 
 





19 Ibid., 490. 
20 Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman, and Gregory Mandel, 
“The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on 
Perceived Climate Change Risks,” Nature Climate Change 2, no. 
10 (2012): 733–734. 
21 Matthew C. Nisbet and Dietram A. Scheufele, “What’s 
Next for Science Communication? Promising Directions and Lin-
gering Distractions,” Botany 96, no. 10 (2009): 1776. 
22 Discussed under ideal #2 in Lecture 1, this volume, 24–25. 
23 I recount an actual case of this in Heather Douglas, “Poli-
tics and Science: Untangling Values, Ideologies, and Reasons,” 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
658, no. 1 (2015): 296–306. 
24 Discussed in greater depth in Lecture 2, this volume, 67–93. 
25 Including claims about the usefulness or reliability of par-
ticular methodologies. 
26 Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff, “Development 
and Validation of the Scientific Reasoning Scale,” Behavioral Deci-
sion Making 30, no. 1 (2017): 26–38. [First published online Octo-
ber 12, 2015.] 
27 See AAAS, “Project 2061,” available online: 
https://www.aaas.org/programs/project-2061. 
28 P. S. Blackawton, S. Airzee, A. Allen, S. Baker, A. Ber-
row, C. Blair, M. Churchill, J. Coles, R. F.-J. Cumming, L. 
Fraquelli, C. Hackford, A. Hinton Mellor, M. Hutchcroft, B. Ire-
land, D. Jewsbury, A. Littlejohns, G. M. Littlejohns, M. Lotto, J. 
McKeown, A. O’Toole, H. Richards, L. Robbins-Davey, S. 
Roblyn, H. Rodwell-Lynn, D. Schenck, J. Springer, A. Wishy, T. 
Rodwell-Lynn, D. Strudwick, and R. B. Lotto, “Blackawton 
Bees,” Biology Letters 7, no. 2 (2011): 168–172. 
29 See World Wide Views, available online: 
http://wwviews.org. 
30 Frank Fischer, Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting Public 
Policy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), Chap. 3; 
 





James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy 
and Public Consultation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
31 Mark Sagoff, “At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why 
Political Questions Are Not All Economic,” Arizona Law Re-
view 23 (1981): 1283–1298. 
32 See, e.g., George J. Busenberg, “Collaborative and Adver-
sarial Analysis in Environmental Policy,” Policy Sciences 32, no. 1 
(1999): 1–11, and the Pew Initiative Report on Bt corn and the 
monarch butterfly, “Three Years Later: Genetically Engineered 




33 Argued for in Lecture 2, this volume, 67–93. 
34 Sarah R. Davies, Cynthia Selin, Gretchen Gano, and Ângela 
Guimarães Pereira, “Citizen Engagement and Urban Change: 
Three Case Studies of Material Deliberation,” Cities 29, no. 6 
(2012): 351–357. 
35 Erik Fisher and Daan Schuurbiers, “Socio-Technical Inte-
gration Research: Collaborative Inquiry at the Midstream of Re-
search and Development,” in Early Engagement and New 
Technologies: Opening Up the Laboratory, Neelke Doorn, Daan 
Schuurbiers, Ibo van de Poel, and Michael E. Gorman, eds. (Dor-
drecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2013), 97. 
36 Ai Lin Chun, “The Shifting Roles of Museums,” Nature 
Nanotechnology 9 (2014): 724. 
37 See also Dan M. Kahan, “The Cognitively Illiberal 





Commentary on Lecture 3 
SCIENCE’S IMAGE:  
BRINGING DOUGLAS INTO FOCUS 
Eric Schliesser 
In these set of comments, I first introduce a bit of special 
jargon—what I call “an image of science”—in order to dis-
cuss some core commitments that inform Douglas’ science 
communication proposal. Second, I highlight three big-pic-
ture commitments I discern in Heather Douglas’ project: (1) 
inductive risk, (2) epistemic (so-called “Knightian”) uncer-
tainty, and (3) a Popperian (albeit not falsificationist!) sen-
sibility. In recent times, interest in (1) has been revived by 
Douglas and so should not come as a surprise.1 Third, I call 
attention to these three commitments in order to argue that 
in Douglas’ science communication proposal—the topic of 
the third Descartes lecture—her image of science is a nor-
mative one, despite her tendency to present it as empirical. 
I argue that this entails that Douglas needs to develop her 
science communication proposal to cover situations that do 
not live up to her normative ideal and to make more ex-
plicit the significance of her normative commitments. 
  




An Image of Science 
A professional society of recent vintage, the Committee 
for Integrated HPS, which is dedicated to “the integration 
of the history of science and the philosophy of science,” is 
organized around “the conviction that the common goal of 
understanding of science can be pursued by dual, interde-
pendent means.”2 Even so, anyone familiar with develop-
ments in recent history of science and philosophy of science 
will sometimes wonder if the two disciplines talk about the 
same thing. In fact, when philosophers, historians, and so-
ciologists of science, as well as, say, policy makers, speak of 
“science,” it’s not always clear what they have in mind. 
(And, of course, there are plenty of philosophers of science 
who think that science is plural in some sense.3) To illus-
trate this point, there is even a whole subdiscipline within 
the philosophy of science—the so-called “philosophy of 
scientific practice” (SPSP),4 with its own distinct profes-
sional society—that takes itself to be correcting traditional 
philosophy of science, which, it is said, disregarded “scien-
tific practice.” The mission statement of SPSP suggests that 
“the concern with practice has always been somewhat out-
side the mainstream of English-language philosophy of sci-
ence.”5  
Here, in order to engage with some of Douglas’ policy 
proposals, I introduce some special vocabulary to discuss 
one distinct element of science when people talk of “sci-
ence.” An image of science is (a) a list of characteristics that 
function as a shorthand for representing various scientific 
activities and products (or scientific expertise), and (b) it is 
used in debates, where at least one side relies on the epis-
temic authority of science (in some sense). The image is of-
ten accompanied by both (c) a privileged list of scientific or 
epistemic virtues, and often relies on (d) lots of tacit and 
suppressed commitments about the nature of knowledge, 
the nature of reality, the nature of society, and the nature of 
science and scientific expertise.  




While such images of science may be revealed in polem-
ical contexts, they can also circulate and be taught in ordi-
nary disciplinary training or, say, journalistic 
circumstances. They may be expressed in methodological 
debates within or about science, in social debates in which 
science plays some role or another, and within philosophi-
cal debates. I call it an “image” because while it generally 
presents itself as representing or characterizing science (or 
some sciences) as such, it nearly always abstracts away 
from other nontrivial features of science(s) that may well be 
pertinent. 
Let me offer an example of such an image of science at 
work in Douglas’ oeuvre. In her wonderful 2009 book, she 
claims that scientists are (a) “in near constant communica-
tion” and (b) “competition with other scientists;”6 that (c) 
“ideas” spread “rapidly” and (d) “scientists” discuss “pit-
falls” “readily.”7 As it happens, these elements taken to-
gether are characteristic of thinking of science as involving 
a kind of efficient market of ideas. Now, this is a useful ide-
alization and image of science for some purposes.8 But as a 
representation of reality, it ignores, for example, the signif-
icance of secret (i.e., classified) work and industry-spon-
sored science (often embargoed). In addition, this image 
ignores the incentives (and, perhaps, cultural issues) that 
generate now-familiar replication issues and confirmation 
bias in the literature.9 
That science is or is not always akin to an efficient mar-
ket of ideas can be more or less important depending on the 
use of the image. Versions of this image sometimes get used 
to argue for deference to the scientific community, which is 
presented as a self-correcting enterprise; some-times the 
self-correcting image is introduced in order to contain crit-
icism.10 The image of science in Douglas’ 2016 Descartes 
Lectures does not rely on an efficient market of ideas, for 
Douglas provides examples of scientists that do not self-
correct and fail to challenge each other. This makes one 




wonder whether she has changed her mind between the 
book and the Descartes Lectures, or whether we should un-
derstand her as offering an ideal type (in the Weberian 
sense) in one analysis and a kind of second best in the more 
recent Lectures. 
A key passage for our present purposes in the third Des-
cartes Lecture is this: 
The public must have a clear understanding that this is what 
science is. Teaching science as—and structuring literacy tests 
around—a fixed set of facts creates the opposite understand-
ing. That science is an ongoing practice of investigation 
should be the first thing the public learns about science in 
grade school, rather than an understanding of science they en-
counter only once they reach graduate studies (for those who 
pursue them).11 
In the passage, Douglas offers two (partial) images of 
science: the first one (to be rejected) is focused on a fixed set 
of facts; the second, more preferable one, is committed to 
science being an ongoing practice of investigation. The two 
images are not necessarily in logical conflict with each 
other although they are clear alternatives. (They become 
contradictory if one assumes that the second image is also 
committed to a rather thoroughgoing fallibilism about 
facts, but that’s not a standard move.)12  
In order to forestall misunderstanding, one may won-
der that if the two images are not contradictory, why call 
them alternatives? I do so not just to do justice to Douglas’ 
(correct!) use of “opposite,” but also because an image of 
science presents science as being a certain way and leaves 
no presentational (and psychological) room for the other 
ways science may be. 
Douglas’ proposal is, in fact, to train not just a (small 
number) of would-be scientists, but to teach the “nature of 
science” (and the nature of “scientific reasoning”) to the 




public at large. By Douglas’ lights, the second image cap-
tures essential characteristics of science that the first does 
not. So Douglas’ proposal consists of both a suggestion 
about content (that is, her image of science) and audience 
size. The payoff of Douglas’ proposal is that the right image 
of science would produce better public conversations and 
deliberations about science as well as better science.13 In 
fact, Douglas relies on the idea that her image of science is 
already familiar to those with advanced training in the sci-
ences—“graduate studies (for those who pursue them).” In 
the old image of science (the one Douglas rejects), science 
is an uncontested (and neutral) source of facts and 
knowledge; in her proposed, alternative image of science, 
it becomes a collaborative, open-ended enterprise with the 
public.14 
In Douglas’ hands, the proposal also requires that 
within the intellectual division of labor, folks like us—phi-
losophers of science—end up playing a key role in mediat-
ing between scientists, who are busy investigating stuff, 
and the public. I am not convinced most philosophers are 
equipped to engage with the public,15 although Douglas 
proves an admirable exception to the rule. Before I develop 
more fully a critical response to Douglas, it may be useful 
to highlight some other fundamental characteristics of her 
image of science. 
Three Big-Picture Commitments 
One reason to welcome Douglas’ Descartes Lectures is 
that it is clear that Douglas’ image of science does not just 
rely on her arguments about (1) inductive risk, but also em-
braces (2) epistemic uncertainty, and (3) a Popperian (albeit 
not falsificationist!) sensibility. Douglas’ work on inductive 
risk is subtle and too complex to review here. I just note that 
she has shown the many ways values permeate science 
and, simultaneously, do not undermine scientific authority, 




and that seemingly irrelevant social consequences can mat-
ter greatly in our evaluation(s) of science. Here I focus on 
(2) and (3). 
The package of commitments is revealed in a passage 
where Douglas sums up what image of science “the public” 
must understand about science: 
The most important thing for the public to understand about 
science is not a set of scientific facts, but its nature as an em-
pirical, inductive, and critical process. (A) Science is empiri-
cal because of the central importance of evidence gathered 
from interacting with the world (both social and natural). (B) 
Scientists focus on gathering evidence to test the theories they 
develop. But what comes with this emphasis on the empirical 
is, (C), the inductive uncertainty of scientific knowledge. (D) 
Any given claim can be challenged (and refined or over-
turned) by future evidence. (C*) The evidence is never com-
plete for any general scientific claim. It is the possibility for 
future evidential challenge that makes science so exciting for 
scientists—genuine discovery and novel ways of thinking 
about the world are always a possibility. And because science 
is empirical and inductive, (E), it also must maintain a cul-
ture of critical interactions among science peers. (E*) Scien-
tists have to be willing to challenge each other’s work, to 
overturn longstanding views (if the evidence is there to do so), 
and, (D), to hold no claim above the critical fray. (F) It is this 
critical culture, the social culture of science, combined with 
(and arising from) its evidential and inductive basis, that 
gives science its underlying epistemic authority.16 
Douglas’ commitment to epistemic (or “inductive”) un-
certainty within science is revealed by two commitments: 
first her rather thoroughgoing fallibilism—science is never 
fully secure from possible revision. In addition, on her 
view, future science can be very surprising.17 It can over-
turn what we take for granted about reality (e.g., C, C*, D). 
Such ideas about “inductive uncertainty” have a long ped-
igree in philosophy, including areas of philosophy very 




friendly to the authority of science (e.g., Russell).18 I tend to 
associate them with so-called Knightian uncertainty.19 
An embrace of Knightian uncertainty within scientific 
practice generates sources of “excitement” and a joy in 
“novelty,” as Douglas emphasizes, but it also tends to pro-
mote a stance of epistemic humility and receptivity toward 
nature and others. It helps guard against expert overconfi-
dence. Perhaps it’s because her image of science quite ob-
viously promotes such virtues that Douglas thinks this 
image of science would produce better public conversa-
tions and deliberations about science, for this image pre-
vents scientists from being mere expositors or preachers—
they can engage the public with a spirit of open-minded-
ness that allows them to learn, in principle, from any en-
counter. 
In fact, Douglas’ image of science does not merely em-
brace some characteristic virtues for individual scientists, 
but she is also explicit that it must be accompanied by a 
particular “culture,” one that embraces (E), “critical inter-
actions among scientists.” I tend to associate this (D and E) 
with a Popperian mindset.20 To simplify, in the Popperian 
image of science one does not focus on confirming one’s 
scientific concepts or theories, but in stress-testing them.21 
The Popperian image of science emphasizes looking for ev-
idence that can change one’s mind and promote discussion, 
even critical disagreement.22 Popper’s image has come to 
be associated with falsificationism, but from the present 
perspective, that’s really just a symptom or symbol of a 
commitment to a critical culture. The key to the Popperian 
image is not falsificationism, but rather something akin to 
(D), “any given claim can be challenged (and refined or 
overturned) by future evidence.” 
Before one assumes that Douglas’ image of science is 
uncontroversial (and, of course, by associating it with Pop-
per I imply it is not beyond controversy), it is worth being 
reminded of an alternative image of science that has been 




far more influential within scientific culture and discus-
sions about it (albeit rarely so explicitly stated): 
An extremist is an intellectual lunatic—allowed loose if he 
does not communicate violence, but without an admission 
ticket to ordinary discourse. There is merit in excluding the 
lunatic from the discourse. Occasionally the lone dissenter 
with the absurd view will prove to be right—Galileo with a 
better scheme of the universe, a Babbage with a workable com-
puter—but if we gave each lunatic a full, meticulous hearing, 
we should be wasting vast time and effort.23 
Stigler won a Nobel Prize in economics (1982); he was 
himself a keen historian and sociologist of science. This im-
age of science treats science as a consensus generating de-
vice. It’s a familiar image because it is associated with 
Kuhnian philosophy of science.24 Recall from Kuhn’s Struc-
ture,  
To a very great extent the “term” science is reserved for fields 
that do progress in obvious ways. Nowhere does this show 
more clearly than in the recurrent debates about where one or 
another of the contemporary social sciences is really sci-
ence…they will cease to be source of concern not when a def-
inition is found, when the groups that now doubt their own 
status achieve consensus about their past and present accom-
plishments. It may, for example, be significant that econo-
mists argue less about whether their field is a science than do 
practitioners of some other fields of social science.25  
In Stigler’s passage we can discern a cost-benefit argu-
ment: time and attention is scarce, so it is pointless to listen 
to everybody. This implies that not all objections will be 
heard by the scientific community. Even if one stipulates 
that most possible objections are silly, for this image it’s 
okay to ignore some excellent objections! This image of sci-
ence treats (potentially revolutionary) dissenters as outside 
the peer group—it leaves little room for heterodox views. 




The foreseeable danger of this image of science is that sci-
ence can generate a strong status quo bias because poten-
tially fundamental objections are not explored. 
By contrast, in Douglas’ image of science the (F) “au-
thority” of science does not rest on it being a consensus-
generating device, but rather rests on its (1) critical culture 
(D and E) and ultimately the (2) evidential basis of claims 
(testing) (viz., A and B). That is, according to Douglas, 
when science is challenged in public or when we need a 
proper source to help us figure out what is to be done, we 
should be armed with this image of science. But by calling 
it “‘Popperian,” I have also indicated that it is not a self-
evident image of science. 
Heather Douglas’ Image of Science Reconsidered 
I understand Douglas’ image of science as an attractive, 
normative ideal, one that should be taught, as a normative 
ideal, not just to the public, but also to the scientists, grant 
agencies, and policy makers, so that they (the public, scien-
tists, funding agencies, and politicians) can embrace and 
promote this image of science as much as possible. 
It should be clear from the tenor of my remarks that I do 
not believe that Douglas’ image of science is an accurate 
representation of reality. To be sure, Douglas’ image of sci-
ence draws on themes and norms immanent in scientific 
practice(s). But it is somewhat flattering to this practice. 
There are incentives and norms that prevent the full reali-
zation of science being a “critical culture.”26  
Constraints on space prevent me from offering full de-
tails of empirical sociology of knowledge here that would 
substantiate the suggestion in the previous paragraph, but 
it is worth reminding ourselves of the dual role of (refereed 
journal) publication in scientific culture: to simplify, it is 
both a public record of the status of certain scientific claims 




as well as a means on the path to jobs, promotion, grants, 
and status. Because the credit economy in which scientists 
operate can sometimes be a zero-sum game, it is not sur-
prising that the (anonymous) referee and gatekeeping pro-
cess does not always encourage a critical culture. I am not 
suggesting that this is the most important bottleneck 
against the development of a more vibrant critical culture 
in science—I suspect that the outsized influence of lab di-
rectors over the academic careers of their junior staff is 
more important. All I am implying is that we should not 
idealize the scientific status quo.27 
In fact, I would urge that an endorsement of Douglas’ 
image of science would encourage us to facilitate the devel-
opment and adherence of norms and incentives that pro-
duce more “critical interaction” among scientists. And even 
when there is critical interaction among scientists, we also 
need to create incentives that prevent closing of ranks when 
science is challenged from without.  
This much Douglas should be able to easily accommo-
date. Even if Douglas thinks that scientific reality is closer 
to the normative ideal that her image of science presup-
poses (than I think is the case), I am calling attention to the 
fact that we need a proposal to cover situations that do not 
live up to her normative ideals. Because human nature is 
the way it is, one can easily imagine that Douglas’ image of 
science will be abused in polemical contexts; with funding 
and authority on the line, there will be a recurring tempta-
tion to stifle public criticism by suggesting that existing sci-
ence has a critical culture and that, in principle, any given 
claim can be challenged. Because nonexperts are, by defini-
tion, in a bad position to evaluate such claims about the na-
ture of scientific practice, we need mechanisms (norms and 
incentives) by which we can promote and check that exist-
ing science has a critical culture and that any given claim 
can be challenged. Perhaps Douglas’ image of science can 
shape better practice. 
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Commentary on Lecture 3 
WHAT ABOUT TRUST? 
COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC 
CONTROVERSIES ABOUT SCIENCE 
Daniel Steel 
Introduction 
In her lecture “Science Communication: Beyond the 
Deficit Model,” Douglas is concerned with public contro-
versies about science in which some significant subgroups 
do not accept a scientific consensus on a topic, and reject 
the measures this consensus is taken to support. Examples 
fitting this pattern include anthropogenic climate change 
denial, anti-vaccination movements, and creationism. 
Douglas argues that common approaches to such situations 
either rest on false assumptions (e.g., the deficit model) or 
fail to suggest productive solutions (e.g., motivated cogni-
tion). Therefore, Douglas aims to provide a positive pro-
posal for how to address politically charged public 
controversies such as these related to science. 
In commenting on Douglas’ proposals, I would like to 
begin by noting points of agreement. I agree with her criti-
cisms of the deficit model. I also agree that empirical inves-
tigations of the role of motivated cognition in contentious 




topics do not indicate solutions. Moreover, I agree that 
more explicit recognition and discussion of the role of val-
ues can sometimes be helpful for communication on scien-
tific issues. Given this, I focus here on Douglas’ positive 
proposal, according to which conflicting sides in a contro-
versy should specify what evidence would be sufficient to 
change their minds and why. The idea is that such a start-
ing point can then be a basis for policy proposals that might 
be acceptable to both sides, or lead to the provision of new 
evidence that satisfies all parties to the dispute.  
While I find much to admire in Douglas’ proposal, I of-
fer two critical observations intended in a constructive 
vein. The first is that the intended context of Douglas’ pro-
posal is not specified. Is it intended to apply to open, disor-
ganized, and unstructured debates being carried out in the 
court of public opinion, encompassing venues such as pop-
ular news outlets, blog posts, and social media alongside 
more traditional modes of scientific communication? Or is 
it a model for a deliberative exercise in which representa-
tives of stakeholder groups, including scientists and mem-
bers of the public, are recruited to engage with one another 
in an organized and structured format? Without knowing 
the answers to such questions, it is difficult to assess what 
the proposal might reasonably hope to achieve or by what 
standards it should be evaluated. 
The second concern is that the proposal faces difficulties 
relating to breakdowns of trust that pervade the examples 
of scientific controversies that Douglas mentions. That is, 
Douglas’ proposal recommends assuming that all those in-
volved in the controversy are rational and take the evi-
dence seriously. Yet in some cases there may be good 
reason to think this assumption is false. Moreover, assum-
ing the reasonableness and integrity of others despite evi-
dence to the contrary can make one vulnerable to 
manipulation. Thus, I suggest that discussion of substan-
tive conditions under which trust is, and is not, justified 




should be a component of any approach to controversies 
relating to science. 
Douglas’ Model for Science Communication 
Douglas proposes that science communication on con-
troversial topics such as climate change denial or anti-vac-
cination should avoid the patronizing attitude suggested 
by the deficit model (“let me explain the science to you, 
then you’ll change your mind”) as well as ad hominem in-
sinuations that skepticism about a scientific consensus is 
simply the result of motivated cognition (“you just think 
that because it helps you get along with your coworkers in 
Oklahoma”). Instead, she proposes that: 
We can start with the presumption that everyone is acting 
rationally and is taking the evidence seriously. We can ask all 
parties (even our own—this is entirely reflexive) why they 
view the evidence as supporting their view. This should allow 
them to elucidate both the evidential and methodological basis 
for their view and the value basis, including why they view 
the evidence as sufficient. We can then ask all parties what 
evidence would change their minds. If what is at issue are 
value-based disagreements about evidential sufficiency (i.e., a 
proper indirect role for values regarding evidential sufficiency 
rather than an improper direct role), some hypothetical evi-
dence should tip the balance to their opponents’ position, thus 
illuminating the sufficiency standards others are using.1 
Douglas considers two primary paths forward at this 
point.  
The first is that at least one party refuses to say what 
evidence would make them change their minds. Then 
Douglas suggests that it can be concluded that members of 
this group are driven by some extra-scientific motive, such 
as political ideology or profit, rather than some genuine 
concern about scientific uncertainty—in short, they are be-
ing dogmatic. In this case, the discussion ends and it is 




plain to all which side in the controversy is being unreason-
able.  
The second possibility is that both sides articulate their 
evidential thresholds; they state the evidence that, if pro-
cured, would cause them to relinquish their position. Two 
further, not necessarily mutually exclusive, possibilities 
present themselves at this stage. The first of these is to ex-
plore the value judgments that underlie the difference, and 
possibly try to craft a compromise policy solution that 
would satisfy both. As an example of this, Douglas sug-
gests market-based approaches to climate change mitiga-
tion, such as cap and trade schemes or a carbon tax. The 
second is to seek evidence that would settle the dispute. If 
such evidence is acquired, and agreement is reached as a 
result, the problem is solved. But if one side persistently re-
fuses to accept evidence that, to all appearances, satisfies its 
demands, that is an indicator of dogmatism. Thus, as in the 
case when one party to the dispute refuses to state what 
evidence would cause it to change its views, in this situa-
tion it will gradually become apparent to all who is being 
unreasonable. 
Douglas’ proposal, then, is to create a setting in which it 
is possible to rationally discuss differing value judgments 
that are relevant to disputes about what scientific evidence 
is sufficient on a controversial topic, while at the same time 
maintaining scientific integrity and not permitting values 
to substitute for evidence. In what follows, I take a closer, 
sometimes critical, look at this idea. 
The Court of Public Opinion or Deliberative Democracy? 
The first question to ask about this proposal is exactly 
what sort of process it is recommending. At several points, 
Douglas speaks of an unspecified “we”: “We can start with 
the presumption,” or “We can ask,” and so on. But just who 




is being referred to here? Scientists who adhere to the sci-
entific consensus view on the topic, philosophers of science 
or other academics who research this topic, or any inter-
ested person? And in what context is the imagined conver-
sation occurring? As noted in the introduction, at least two 
possible interpretations suggest themselves. The conversa-
tion might be some open public discourse in the court of 
public opinion or the marketplace of ideas (choose your fa-
vorite metaphor). Or it might be an organized and struc-
tured deliberative exercise involving a carefully selected 
mini-public.2 Unfortunately, Douglas does not clarify what 
context she has in mind.  
Begin by considering the “court of public opinion” in-
terpretation of the proposal. In this case, who is the “we” 
who presumes the good faith of others in the debate and 
asks all parties (including its own) to state the evidence that 
would make it change its mind? And to whom should such 
requests be directed? Several options can be imagined. Per-
haps the “we” consists of those committed to the scientific 
consensus on the issue, who may be scientists, other aca-
demics, civil society groups, or representatives of govern-
ment agencies. Or perhaps “we” stands for any individual 
interested in the issue and willing to devote time to discuss-
ing it. No matter how one answers these questions, several 
difficulties immediately arise, because the various “sides” 
in an unstructured public debate are rarely sharply deline-
ated. As a result, it is likely to be unclear what the suite of 
contrasting positions are, who is associated with each, and 
who is authorized and obligated to speak for them. 
For example, consider a discussion of the sort Douglas 
imagines on the topic of anthropogenic climate change. 
Many different climate scientists and organizations agree-
ing with the scientific consensus might issue public state-
ments, yet these will not always coincide on matters crucial 
to Douglas’ proposal, such as what evidence suffices for 
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which claims and which actions should be taken given val-
ues and uncertainties. Similarly, if members of a scientific 
consensus group, following Douglas’ proposal, wish to ask 
skeptics of anthropogenic climate change to state what ev-
idence would change their views, they will have many in-
dividuals, organizations, and websites to choose from who 
may differ from one another in a variety of ways. Thus, a 
group of scientific consensus individuals may be uncertain 
of its ability to speak for other like-minded people, and is 
likely to have difficulty identifying an authoritative source 
to speak for the other “side” (assuming that it is in fact a 
relatively cohesive unit). And to make matters worse, rep-
resentatives of each “side” may have such doubts about the 
other. That is, they may doubt whether a person or organi-
zation asking them to state for the record what evidence 
would change their views represents an important constit-
uency to whom they have an obligation to reply. In such 
cases, failure of response is not necessarily an indicator of 
dogmatism. People or organizations that receive large 
quantities of correspondence cannot be expected to reply to 
them all in a detailed fashion. Moreover, even if they do 
reply, it is unclear to what extent they can be taken to speak 
for others who hold similar views. 
In contrast, these issues are more manageable if Doug-
las’ proposal is a model for an organized deliberation 
among a selected group of stakeholders or members of the 
public. In a setting of this sort, individuals can be chosen to 
represent salient opposed positions in the controversy, and 
organizers can impose ground rules assumed in the model, 
for instance, that participants treat one another respect-
fully, that they carefully consider questions from the other 
side(s) about what they would judge to be sufficient evi-
dence for claims at issue, make it understood that a failure 
to respond would be taken to indicate dogmatism, and so 
on. Of course, this would only constitute a sort of internal 
validity: within the context of the deliberative exercise, the 
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conditions assumed by Douglas’ proposal could be approx-
imated. Such a process might have value for those who par-
ticipate in it, or as a source of advice for policymakers. But 
whether those interested in the issue but not directly in-
volved in the deliberation would view it as legitimately 
representing their concerns and interests is another matter 
entirely. 
Bringing Trust into the Picture 
Another concern about Douglas’ proposal stems from 
the mutual distrust that frequently arises among opposed 
camps on politically controversial topics. This issue is exac-
erbated by the fact that in some cases such distrust may be 
justified. 
Consider the initial prescription of Douglas’ proposal 
that one assume that all sides are operating in good faith, 
that they are rational and take the evidence seriously. What 
if this presupposition is not true, and indeed there is evi-
dence to think that some vocal participants in the debate 
are unreasonable or lack integrity? What if, in fact, some 
people are not being rational (plausible in the vaccine case, 
I think), or are more interested in pushing claims that will 
promote their bottom line than in “taking the evidence se-
riously” (as seems likely for some skeptics of anthropo-
genic climate change)? For example, in the case of anti-
vaccine movements, there is very good reason to think that 
some leading actors, such as Andrew Wakefield, have been 
dishonest, driven by ulterior motives, and have engaged in 
fraudulent research.3 Similar accusations have been leveled 
at some leading anthropogenic climate change skeptics4 
and, indeed, Douglas has directed such charges at Fred 
Singer.5 Assuming the good faith of individuals such as 
these would appear to simply be naïve, and make one sus-
ceptible to being duped or manipulated.  




This difficulty is especially acute if Douglas’ proposal is 
taken to be a model for a discussion being carried out in 
public venues such as talk radio, partisan websites, blogs, 
and social media. Such venues do not contain mechanisms 
for filtering out dishonest or abusive communication, can 
become dominated by individuals who promote extreme 
views, and can create a vicious cycle in which like-minded 
individuals reinforce one another’s biases. In short, such 
discussions are hardly a setting in which a presumption of 
reasonableness and careful concern for evidence would be 
appropriate. Moreover, when there are good reasons to 
suspect that other sides in the debate are not operating in 
good faith, there can be good reasons to refuse to engage in 
dialogue, for example, by refusing to answer requests to 
state what evidence would change one’s mind. In situations 
of poisoned trust, refusal to participate may derive from a 
justifiable suspicion that participation would only make 
one susceptible to being manipulated into inadvertently 
supporting objectives one strongly opposes. Moreover, 
these concerns can be relevant for deliberative exercises 
wherein organizers attempt to impose some measure of or-
der and civility. 
To illustrate, consider ill-fated efforts by the French gov-
ernment to conduct deliberative democracy forums on the 
topic of nanotechnology in 2009 and 2010.6 This attempt at 
deliberative democracy quickly devolved into a fiasco due 
to the refusal of opponents and skeptics of nanotechnology 
to participate in the process. Gaillard describes the situa-
tion as follows: 
Contrary to many deliberative experiments based on the care-
ful choice of a panel of citizens, either randomly or in a repre-
sentative way according to the diversity of social 
backgrounds, these debates were open to all. If the meetings 
indeed occurred in some cities, the debate was not held in 
many of them, individuals or organizations preventing them 




from happening by force. Some debates thus had to be can-
celled due to these protests (with banners, shouting…). These 
dissenters were putting forward the following argument: 
joining the debate means recognizing the legitimacy of the de-
bate and the authority, which in turns means accepting nan-
otechnology, the political outcome of the debate suspected in 
advance to be the endorsement of R&D in nanotechnology.7 
Moreover, the dissenters’ argument appears to have 
had some merit. As Gaillard explains, “At the very same 
time that the public debate on nanotechnology was being 
set up in France, calls for proposals in research were al-
ready being launched in this field by research institutions 
or funding agencies.”8 Consequently, the dissenters may 
have been justified in regarding the deliberative exercise as 
little more than window dressing intended to legitimize a 
decision that had already been made. In such circum-
stances, refusal to participate may be reasonable and can-
not be taken as a genuine indicator of dogmatism or values 
overriding evidence. 
In sum, distrust is common and sometimes justified in 
public controversies related to science, and that in turn calls 
into question Douglas’ prescription that all participants as-
sume opposing camps are reasonable and take the evidence 
seriously. In some cases, there may be good reasons to 
doubt this assumption, and when this is so, naïvely assum-
ing the integrity of certain individuals or organizations 
may make one vulnerable to manipulation. As a result, an 
ability to discern which sources of information are worthy 
of trust, and which are not, is important for navigating con-
troversial topics effectively. Moreover, distrust may arise 
from longstanding social divisions, such as inequalities or 
historical injustices, which can hardly be assumed away by 
an act of will. In such circumstances, the important ques-
tion is whether objective conditions required for trust are 
present and commonly recognized.9  





In spite of the above, I believe that Douglas’ proposal 
contains valuable insights, but for something more modest 
than a resolution of longstanding science-related contro-
versies. Specifically, I think her proposal has considerable 
interest as an outline for a deliberative exercise involving 
stakeholders or members of the public. Within such a con-
text, some of the concerns raised above can be mitigated by 
not including individuals with a track record of dishonesty 
or abusive behavior, and by insisting that rules for respect-
ful and considered communication be followed. But such 
approaches, while potentially valuable, are modest, insofar 
as they do not promise to resolve the sorts of controver-
sies—climate change denial, anti-vaccination, etc.—that 
Douglas proposes to address. There is no assurance that the 
public at large would accept their results, in part because 
deliberative exercises are unlikely to change the broader so-
cial forces that sustain distrust. I conclude, therefore, with 
the constructive suggestion that Douglas’ proposal might 
benefit from greater attention to the role of trust and dis-
trust in public controversies related to science. 
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